FACULTEIT SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN

Understanding the relationship between capacity and decentralisation in local governance:

A case study on local administrations in Turkey

Evrim Tan

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graad van Doctor in de Sociale Wetenschappen

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation focuses on the relationship between decentralization and capacities in local governance addressing the central question of ‘when decentralisation leads to better governance?’. Literature in public management suggests that local governments can monitor and act better on local needs, thus empowering local government with the discretion to mobilize local resources leads to higher accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in governance. This edifice was first challenged when contradictory results were attained from case studies in developing countries in the 1990s. The cases showed that decentralization may lead to higher corruption, local elite capture and decrease in public service quality. These equivocal outcomes of decentralization practices were largely addressed as part of 'management deficit' in governance and various capacity building programmes have been implemented by international donor organizations to educate managers, organizations, even communities and institutions. Albeit not being a substantial evidence of improvement in governance, every year billions of dollars are spent on capacity building programmes to enhance the governance capacity in developing countries. Relying on surveys and official data collected from 65 Turkish provincial municipalities, this dissertation provides evidence that socio-economic conditions are the main determinant on the outcomes of decentralization in comparison to governance capacity. Using regression based analysis, the paper suggests the relationship between decentralization and governance should be addressed not only on managerial perspective but also on developmental level.

ABSTRACT

Deze verhandeling focust op de verhouding tussen decentralisering en de capaciteit tot besturen binnen lokale overheden, met als centrale vraag "wanneer leidt decentralisering tot een beter beleid?". De literatuur over publiek management suggereert dat lokale overheden beter geplaatst zijn om lokale noden te monitoren en er naar te handelen. Lokale besturen in staat stellen om de lokale middelen in te zetten zou dan ook leiden tot een meer verantwoordelijk, efficiënter en effectiever beleid. Dit principe werd voor het eerst in vraag gesteld wanneer case studies over ontwikkelingslanden in de jaren 1990 tot tegenstrijdige resultaten leidden. Deze voorbeelden toonden aan dat decentralisering kan leiden tot meer corruptie, machtsmisbruik door elites en een achteruitgang van de openbare dienstverlening. Deze dubbelzinnige resultaten van decentralisering werden over het algemeen gekaderd als een gebrek aan managementkwaliteiten in het beleid. Internationale donororganisaties lanceerden daarom tal van capaciteit opbouwende programma's om managers, organisaties en zelfs gemeenschappen en instellingen op te leiden. Hoewel er geen substantieel bewijs bestaat dat dit voor een verbetering van het beleid zorgt, worden elk jaar miljarden dollars besteed aan programma's om de bestuurscapaciteit in ontwikkelingslanden te versterken. Gebaseerd op enquêtes en officiële data vergaard in 65 Turkse stedelijk-provinciale entiteiten, komt deze verhandeling tot de vaststelling dat de socio-economische factoren de belangrijkste determinanten vormen wat betreft de uitkomsten van decentralisering en de link met bestuurscapaciteit. Gebruik makend van een regressie-analyse suggereert dit onderzoek dat de verhouding tussen decentralisering en beleid niet enkel vanuit een managementperspectief, maar ook vanuit een ontwikkelingsperspectief moet benaderd worden.

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CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION

In the second half of the 20th century, the literature on public administration witnessed a rapid transformation in methods and in way of thinking. This transformation has altered the Weberian notion of the state which relies on the hierarchical state structure and functioning. Particularly, the embodiment of Thatcher and Reagan's market oriented public policies paved way to the inclusion of private sector originated principles and techniques into the realm of public administration. New concepts such as deregulation, privatisation, and adaptation of management principles have occupied the public administration literature. Consequently, the field of public management has emerged as a separate branch from public administration. This change in the literature took another turn in 1990s with the emergence of another buzzword, i.e. governance. Nowadays, governing the society incorporates horizontally public, private and civil society organisations on the one hand, and vertically local, regional, national and supranational state organisations on the other into a complex, reticular set of relations. Hence, what used to be a dihedral relation between citizen and the state, turned into a multidimensional realm with various interactions among different actors.

Shifting roles and changes in governance necessitated local governments to incur new discretionary responsibilities and matching capabilities. Decentralisation, albeit being a far older concept in the literature, has become thus a fundamental element in the governance literature. It is widely acknowledged that decentralised systems contribute both to democracy and also to the efficiency and effectiveness of public governance. Thus, decentralisation has been a favoured policy priority among policy makers in different democratic political structures for the last decades (Rondinelli, Nellis, & Cheema, 1983; Treisman, 2002; Swenden & Maddens, 2009). Although decentralisation policies and the degree of decentralisation vary across country cases, it is expected that decentralised authority and responsibilities provide in return some advantages to governance system, e.g. effectiveness, efficiency, better service quality, empowerment of different segments of the society, economic growth, democratisation, accountability, and even in some cases security (Rodden, 2004; Pollitt, 2005; Sharma, 2006; Treisman, 2007). So far, many studies have been conducted to evaluate certain aspects of decentralisation policies. Yet, the outcomes of decentralisation policies are not coherent in each case. For instance, it is observed that decentralisation practices in some developing countries have caused in return high corruption with inefficiency and ineffectiveness on public services (Prud'homme, 1995; Litvack, Ahmad

& Bird, 1998; Smoke, 2003; Oxhorn, 2004). Evidences indicate that decentralisation can have positive effect but only if certain conditions are met (Smoke, Gomez and Peterson, 2006).

Even though, the determinants for the success of decentralisation policies are equivocal, one commonly agreed element is an adequate local capacity is necessary for the successful implementation of the decentralisation reforms and for the functioning decentralised governance (UNDP&BMZ, 2000). In that sense, the capacity building programmes have been embraced widely by donor organisations (e.g. UNDP, World Bank) in developing and transition countries to assist on policy implementation. However, capacity is an elusive concept (Brown, LaFond, & Macintyre, 2001) and 'what variation of capacity on different local administrations is functional?' remains largely unanswerable (UNDP&BMZ, 2000). Furthermore, there is limited knowledge on how variations of capacity are affecting the decentralisation practices.

Hence, the relationship between capacity and decentralisation is largely unapprehended. There are different assumptions on this relationship, but basically there are two different camps. The first camp claims that possessed capacity is a determinant for the success of decentralisation policies (e.g. Bahl & Linn, 1992). The second camp argues that decentralised organisations will obtain the capacity in time thus rejecting the former argument (e.g. Rondinelli et al., 1983). In this regard, the World Bank supports the latter by positing the following;

> *"Working Group 5 (Institutional Capacity) at the Technical Consultation on Decentralisation and Rural Development, FAO, Rome, December 1997: "Rather than plan and make large up-front investment in local capacity building as a prerequisite for devolution of responsibility, there was a broad consensus that it would be quicker and more cost-effective to begin the process of devolution, to permit learning by doing and to build up capacity through practice." The evidence increasingly shows that local capacity can be built by the process of decentralisation, particularly when appropriate programs to increase interaction with the private sector are included in decentralisation design"* (World Bank)

This debate is not only limited within the academic circles or international donor organisations but also it is relevant for the policy practitioners and policymakers. For instance, during a technical consultation on decentralisation, Fiszbein (1997) gives the following anecdote:

"An interesting illustration of the controversies associated with these questions (i.e. whether the local level has, or can develop quickly enough, the necessary capabilities) is the parliamentary debate that took place in Colombia as a new law that would create untied fiscal transfers to local governments was being discussed in the early 1980s. The mainstream opinion in Congress was that no real benefit would be derived from transferring funds and responsibilities to local governments if their lack of capacity would not allow them to manage them effectively in order to improve the quantity and quality of services offered to the population. Interestingly enough, the proponents of the law --that would eventually be passed by Congress-- did not try to argue that such capacities indeed existed. Rather, their argument was that only if fiscal resources and responsibilities for service delivery were transferred to local governments would those capabilities develop, as it is only if and when faced with concrete challenges that local institutions would acquire them (Galan [1990]).

In fact, at least for some of the Colombian reformers, the creation of local capacity --understood as the consolidation of democratic state and civic institutions particularly in more than 800 rural municipios-- was an objective rather than a condition for decentralisation. Almost a decade later, Bolivia would follow a similar path, and similar discussions can be found in post-civil war debates in several countries in Central America."

Besides, the traditional modes of governance are changing parallel to the overall shift in public management. Now private sector organisations and civil society groups are taking a more tangible role and responsibility in governing the society. In this transitional stage, roles of the state and other actors are re-evaluated in terms of their legitimacy, responsibilities and function in governance. Inevitably, these new dimensions are expanding the discussion on governance capacities for public organisations. All these systemic changes necessitate reconsidering the implications of decentralisation and capacity in the broader sense of governance.

1.1 Research Aims

The main aim of this research is to reduce the ambiguity surrounding the subject of '*when decentralisation leads to better governance?*' by analysing the relationship between capacity and decentralisation in local governance scale. The research aims to achieve a better understanding on the dynamics that shape the interaction between capacity and decentralisation in relation to better governance.

The main research question of this study is *‘what is the relationship between capacity and decentralisation in local governance?*’. Two complementary research questions are indicated to answer the main research question. First, ‘which capacities are primarily important for the success of decentralisation?’ and second, ’how does the variation in capacities influences decentralisation in local governance?’ Each research question will be elaborated respectively through specific research objectives.

1.2 Contribution of the Study

There are three main reasons to consider this problem worthy of consideration. First of all, as mentioned above, there is limited knowledge on the mutual implication of decentralisation and capacity. It is unclear, what is the required capacity in governance institutions to implement successful decentralisation reforms or how decentralisation policies affect the existing capacities. It has been an under-researched area and the existing literature allows limited ‘generalisations’ (Fiszbein, 1997). Secondly, the capacity building programs are being applied as subsequent actions after decentralisation reforms took place in country cases. In this respect, this research has the possibility to bring new perspectives on capacity building regarding when to apply and what to apply. Third, this research will be conducted with a governance perspective, thus it will not only evaluate the intra-organisational capacity changes, as most of the capacity assessment studies do, but it will comprise the relational capacity of the locality as well.

On a more country specific level, Turkey, profoundly known as a centralised state, has enacted various local administration reform acts in the last decade. Functions, roles and responsibilities of local governments have been extended with these regulations. Services which had been traditionally carried out by central government organisations including activities in culture, sports and arts; issues and precautions in social service provision for women, youth and children; organisation of supplementary courses for job opportunities; active foreign relations; provision of medical services; educational responsibilities; establishment of geographical and urban information systems; environmental health protection and waste collection and management have been assigned to municipalities. Along with increased responsibilities, municipalities have obtained increased opportunities of borrowing and entrepreneurship and to be able to establish commercial companies and firms. The rapid transition of local administrations in functions and responsibilities revived the discussions on the lack of capacities in local governments and the need of capacity building. Although the need of capacity development in administrative, financial and personnel related dimensions was recognised in the 9th Development Plan (p-93-95), the need of capacity enhancement exists to be a major priority for local administrations. Hence, the findings of this research will provide insight on the trajectory of decentralisation policies in Turkey. Policy makers in central and local authorities will benefit from the results of the study and will be able to apply the model on their own policy choices for capacity enhancement. Furthermore, both theoretical and empirical studies on Turkey are limited in terms of decentralisation and capacity. Since country cases are essential for the accumulation of knowledge in governance literature, the research will be a contribution for this literature as well.

The practical contribution of this research will be on the policy design for capacity building programmes. By examining different aspects of decentralisation and capacity in governance institutions new approaches and inherently new programmes will be able to be developed for country cases. Subsequently, it will contribute to studies trying to understand the ambiguous nature of decentralisation regarding to policy outcomes.

1.3 Overview of the Chapters

The dissertation is organised in seven chapters. Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical framework of the study. Respectively, the chapter presents the theoretical and conceptual dimensions of local governance, decentralisation and capacity, and elaborates the challenges on building theoretical arguments for the relationship between capacity and decentralisation within the local governance. After a careful assessment, the chapter sets forward the choices made to overcome the foreseen theoretical challenges. Chapter 3 familiarises the reader with the Turkish case. It sheds light on the reform trajectory and characteristics of the public administration system in Turkey with a focus on local government system. Additionally, the power relations between the local and central authorities and the capacities in local administrations are other focal points in the chapter. Chapter 4 is the methodology chapter and states the methodological choices taken in the research. The highlights in the chapter are the research design and the data collection method, operationalisation of the variables, selection of the indicators, validity and reliability criteria. Chapter 5 analyses the collected data and evaluates the assumptions on the relationship between capacity and decentralisation in local governance. Chapter 6 expands the data analysis with the qualitative responses gathered in the field research. The chapter reflects on the interpretation of the statistical findings and provides a more consistent analysis for Turkish case. Chapter 7 presents the concluding remarks and reflects on the theoretical and policy implications of the findings.

CHAPTER II- THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter presents the three core concepts of this study- *local governance, decentralisation* and *capacity*- and builds up the theoretical arguments on the relationship between capacity and decentralisation in local governance. There are two fundamental challenges to overcome in this attempt. First of all, these concepts predicate multiple cognitive meanings, which directly affect their definitions and applications. Thus, any researcher should elaborate the different conceptual dimensions and reflect on how they are affecting the theoretical propositions. Secondly, the concepts of capacity and decentralisation will be adjusted into the theoretical framework of local governance. However, the literature on governance does not indicate a fully-fledged theory. Rather, it is a composition of various theoretical approaches towards different aspects of governance. As a remedy for this, a synthetic approach will be adopted. The various theoretical contributions on governance will be synthesised into a comprehensive theoretical framework to adjust decentralisation and capacity.

The chapter is a composition of four subsequent parts. It starts with the presentation of local governance. The aim in this part is to lay out the usage of the concept theoretically and cognitively, and to set the stage for the application of decentralisation and capacity. In consecutive parts, decentralisation and capacity will be elaborated respectively and will be positioned in local governance. In the final part, theoretical propositions will be drawn on the relationship between decentralisation and capacity in local governance, and an analytical model will be presented as a basis for the measurement of capacity.

2. 1 Local Governance

2.1.1 What is governance?

In the last two decades, governance has become overwhelmingly popular in social sciences. Nevertheless, the usage of the term is frequently not precise and equivocal. In his notable article, Rhodes (1996) highlights six different usages of governance in the literature: the minimal state; corporate governance; the new public management; ‘good governance’; socio-cybernetics systems; and self-organising networks. The ambiguity surrounding the term is not limited with its applications in the literature but it pertains to the semantics as well. Whilst in the earliest usages, the term was predominantly a synonym for government; the contemporary ones might refer to the rules, to the practices or to the system of governing itself. Considering these conceptual shortcomings, it is worthy to ask why 'governance' has turned into such a prevailing concept in political sciences. Pierre & Peters (2000) answer this question by underlining 'its capacity to cover the whole range of institutions and relationships involved in the process of governing'. Inherently, it is no surprise, that different scholars have highlighted different attributes of governance on their studies and studied the term from their point of view.

One of the prime definitions of the term is made by Rhodes (1996). According to his definition, governance is 'self-organising, interorganisational networks' which complement markets and hierarchies as governing structures for authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and co-ordination. Rhodes portrays a transformation in the ways of governing the society where the traditional roles of state institutions on public service delivery are replaced by compelling 'self-organising networks'. These networks created by governmental and societal actors are propelling the state to a systematic change where 'no sovereign actor is able to steer or regulate' (Rhodes, 1996:15). In Rhodes' view, governance is an adversary concept against government where the government is obliged to cooperate with these networks to govern the society.

Another prominent scholar, Gerry Stoker, on the other hand, adopts a more comprehensive definition towards the concept. Stoker (2000:3) defines governance 'as a concern with governing, achieving collective action in the realm of public affairs, in conditions where it is not possible to recourse to the authority of the state'. In Stoker's definition, governance refers not only to networks but also to governing institutions, mechanisms and styles as well. In an earlier article, Stoker describes five propositions on different aspects of governance:

"1) Governance refers to set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond government.

2) Governance defines the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues.

3) Governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action.

4) Governance is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors.

5) Governance recognises the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority. It sees government as able to use new tools and techniques to steer and guide" (Stoker, 1998:2).

Although in Stoker's approach, governance lacks the distinct boundaries to enable a theoretical framework, it envisages a map to identify the key trends and developments in the changing world of government. In this approach, governance is something independent from the control of any actor (including state), which is a 'set of practices' for collective decision-making.

The third valuable approach towards governance was demarcated by Pierre & Peters (2000). Referencing to the etymological roots[1] of the concept, Pierre & Peters prioritise the 'steering' notion on their definition. From their point of view, governance is not a substitute concept against traditional institutional linkages between public and society but rather adaptation of more informal channels to enhance resource mobilisation and coordination with key actors surrounding the society. Thus, state is not depicted as a passive and incapable actor unable to exercise control over emerging networks but instead it is a deliberate policy preference. In their governance definition, state is the 'primus inter pares' and the only potential actor with the ability to mobilise other societal actors for its purposes. Unlike the conventional state perspective, in this governance approach, the strong states are those which incorporate entrepreneurial skills, political zeal and brokerage abilities thus able to coordinate and get the priorities on various joint public-private projects.

These three approaches provide a general overview on the governance perspective. Hence, governance can be perceived as a specific type of governing style (e.g. Rhodes), as the compilation of various attributes to governing (e.g. Stoker) or it can be a generic term to define the style of governing in a setting (e.g. Pierre & Peters). In a more simplistic way, the cognitive meaning of governance can correspond to 'one of them', 'all of them' or 'each one of them'. Most of the definitions in the literature are situated in line with either of these cognitive approaches. Nevertheless, regardless of the definition adopted, there is a consensus on that the emphasis on governance is an outcome of the changes in domestic and international environment. Therefore, it is not possible to frame governance without stating the causes that led to the changes.

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[1] The etymological roots of 'governance' indicate in its Greek origin 'steering'.

To start with, the key underlying factors articulated in the literature are usually associated with globalisation. Globalisation suggests that with the internationalisation of markets (Hirst & Thompson, 1999) and increasing speed on economic transactions among countries, multinational companies have freed themselves from the national boundaries and political control of nation-states (Baylis & Smith, 1997; John, 2001). The severe economic competition among multinational companies affected not only the capital markets but also the political settings to please the markets. The demand from private sector to be involved in public decisions and to be more influential in the political agenda has increased with the purpose to secure the competitiveness of their businesses. Especially, private actors have become more interested with local politics to ensure the required labour force and efficiency of transport links (John, 2001:13). On the other hand, local and regional administrations have perceived the increased attention of private sector to local service provision as an alternative to the state investments for economic development (Parkinson et all, 1992; John, 2001:11). The globalisation had also implications on the social and cultural segments as well, thus eventually paved way to the creation of complex networks among social, private and political actors.

New policy challenges and changes on the demand of the society are other causes on changes on governing practices. The complexity of newly emerged policy areas such as environmental problems, high levels of migration or ageing population in the developed world required the involvement of various levels of government and non-government actors in cooperation and decision-making to find solutions. Moreover, the increasing dissatisfaction of citizens with the government policies has become evident starting with 1970's economic crisis in the world (John, 2001:13). The trust of people on traditional government policies had fallen and the turnout rates decreased gradually. The unconventional forms of political behaviour through associations and new interest groups have become popular. The changes on political behaviours encouraged both academicians and politicians to seek new ways to determine public policies. In this regard, the most prominent initiative was pioneered by Thatcher in the UK and Reagan in the USA by their extensive support for market-based practices on public service delivery and deregulation of government. The practices of privatisation, deregulation, cut-backs in public spending, tax cuts, monetarist economic policies, radical institutional and administrative reforms, and adoption of market-based philosophy on public service production and delivery were remarked as the indication of a new phase in the public service system labelled as New Public Management (Hood, 1991, Pierre & Peters, 2000:2). Additionally, the issue of democratic government and the legitimacy of non-governmental organisation have become part of the discussions in the context of governance.

As a third point, the evolution of the EU as a sui generis political creation and the end of the Cold War contributed tremendously to the discourse on governance. First of all, the EU enabled the structural framework, thus sub-state entities have become hub of power on decision-making and development policies. The allocation of the EU structural funds through NUTS regions and the adoption of 'subsidiarity' principle as a constitutive element for the EU functioning, have contributed to the importance of regional and local governments. Second, with new international institutions, e.g. the Committee of Regions, the EU enabled international bodies where sub-national entities can precede their policies without the limitation of national boundaries. The sub-national entities found the platform to exchange ideas and to interact with other organisations to empower their policies. Third, with the creation of the internal market, the EU disassociated the monopoly of nation states on setting trade and tariff policies which eventually increased the competition among regional and local governments to attract more international investment. Fourth, the EU has guaranteed a legal and political framework for nation states to adapt bolder policies on allocating political and administrative rights to the historical and ethnical regions, as it is apparent in the creation of Scottish parliament or Belgian federal structure. Fifth, the creation of the concept 'multi-level governance' to define the functioning of the EU contributed to the governance literature. Thus, public policy making has been perceived in the EU context as an interplay between sub-national, national and supranational entities. Beside the EU, other international institutions such as the OECD and the IMF have contributed to the governance discourse as well, both academically and also by creating international standards for better governing. Especially, the 'good governance' principles have been manifested as the international norms that all governments are encouraged to transpose their systems to achieve the standards defined by those organisations.

2.1.2 The 'state of the art' in public governance

Until 1990s, the general consensus was that national governments are the main actors to steer the society and economics. However, this idea has been contested with increasing emphasis on policy networks and emergence of New Public Management (NPM) rhetoric.

The state has been portrayed as an overly extensive, bureaucratic body which is ineffective and inefficient compared to the private sector. As mentioned previously, this perception was empowered by Thatcher's and Reagan's policies, and state as an actor on public service system has been delegitimised. In this period, the foremost studies in the US literature (see Stone, 1989) debated the informal networks between market and public sector organisations (i.e. *regimes*) as the best practices for localities to compete in the global market economy. Nevertheless, the discussions on regimes at that time were predominantly limited with the governing decisions related with market functioning.

On the other hand, particularly in the European literature, the emphasis has been given to the networks of societal and international actors and their functions on managing the society (see, Kooiman, 1993). The activity of governing has been disassociated from the monopoly of state and governing has been redefined as 'all activities of social, political and administrative actors that can be seen as purposeful efforts to steer, guide, control or manage societies' whereas governance is 'the patterns that emerge from governing activities of social, political and administrative actors' (Kooiman, 1993:2). Additionally, Rhodes, through his well-known studies 'Hollowing out the State' (1994) and 'Governance without Government' (1997) took the arguments one step further and brought new aspects to the discussion on state's role in governance and to the governance literature in general. In this sense, Rhodes (1994) first declared that the state has 'hollowed out' his capabilities to international and national networks of private and societal actors; thus lost its ability to steer the society. In the latter study, Rhodes (1997) took the argument further, and stated the governance of society is 'about managing networks'. These networks have both the capacity and the influence to steer the society and the only way to steer the society is for the government to cooperate with these networks as an equal actor on public sector management (Rhodes, 1997). In this setup, state is the collection of inter-organisational networks made up of government actors and society as a whole, in which all are interdependent and equal in terms of sovereignty. All actors are motivated from their own interests and the networks are independently organised. The distinction among the public, private and civil society is no longer important whereas only the networks made up by those organisation are at the heart of the governance (Rhodes, 1997; Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1999; Giguère, 2008: 47).

Hence, networks have been acknowledged as new ways of public service delivery and public policy implementation. In this regard, networks are recognised as 'stable patterns of social relations between interdependent actors which take shape around policy problems and/or policy programmes' (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1999:6). Nevertheless, new challenges and questions have been introduced regarding the management of networks and to rationalise the co-operation among actors. The practices of network governance have been introduced as part of these discussions, and the role of the government has been assumed as a network manager. Kickert and Koppenjan (1999) described that the network management comprises three types of activities: action concerning a pattern of relations, consensus building and problem solving. Within a network, the managers adapt some certain tasks as network activation (initiating an interaction process) and organising interactions (defining the rules and procedures), setting up contacts (linking problems, solutions and actors), facilitation (putting in place effective conditions for interaction), and mediation and arbitration (conflict solving). In the case of an insolvable situation, the network manager, i.e. the government, can seek to restructure the network through changing the rules of its compositions. Moreover, government can use regulations, financial resources and communication tools to influence actors thus to ensure they meet expectations as best as possible (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; Giguère, 2008:48).

Nevertheless, there are still some criticisms to the premises of network governance. Since the assumption is that the actors in the network are interdependent and have the same legitimacy, even though the government can pursue negotiations and compromises among network actors, it is not certain the solution will be in public interest. The success on compromises to sustain common interest will be too dependent on the personal skills of the network manager and it is highly probable in the cases where a compromise close to private interests of private sector actors is, the collective well-being and public interest could be in question (Giguère, 2008:48). In addition, the lack of mechanisms to enable democratic participation and the criticisms on the accountability of actors are the biggest challenges to networks.

As part of the discussions on networks, new ideas are presented to enable public services. Among those, public-private partnerships (PPPs) or in general partnerships among governance actors deserve further attention. Although partnerships have been acknowledged in earlier practices as means of solving problems specific to the regions, with the shifting ideas, partnerships have been advertised as best practices for public service delivery. The general idea is that partnerships are set up by the initiator for a predetermined general purpose, where members of public, private and voluntary sectors participated in different forms of representation (Giguère, 2008:49). Partnerships have been promoted especially on their functions to channel the local actors in local development and contributing to formation of national policies through the lessons learned in local level (Giguère, 2008:49). First local partnerships were initiated in 1991 in Ireland with the objectives to enable local employment and economic development. The pilot practices have been acknowledged as successful and partnerships are now part of the governance structures in most of the developed countries. OECD (2001) defines a number of principal tasks of partnerships: (1) pursuing a general objective such as stimulating economic development, promoting social cohesion and improving the quality of life; (2) endeavouring to achieve that objective mainly by increasing the degree of co-ordination between policies and programmes via the different services and levels of government, and by adapting them to the local context; (3) when the outcome of improved co-ordination is insufficient, setting up new projects and services; and (4) working at the local level to involve local actors; and especially civil society, in identifying prioritised and in project development, and to harness local resources and skills (Giguère, 2008:49).

Beside the network-oriented approach towards governance, other scholars have conceptualised governance in terms of structures and processes (see Pierre & Peters, 2000). In the structural view, Pierre & Peters (2000:15) propose four different governance modes among political and economic institutions, each of whom has a distinct approach to direct the society and economy. These governance modes include hierarchy, market, network and community based governance arrangements. Pierre & Peters (2000:14) underline that each of them have strong sides to deal with one part of governance issue, but also weaknesses corresponding to others. Additionally, the solutions suggested by these modes are bound in cultural and temporal terms and depend on time and place.

Coming to the features of the modes, hierarchical governance refers to the Weberian model of public services which foresees the vertical integration of bureaucratic institutions regulated by law. The state as the embodiment of collective interest is separated from the society and all institutions within the state apparatus function through command and control in a hierarchical order. The subnational governments are embedded within the integrity of state system and their autonomy is limited within the legal authority of the state. Hence, the hierarchy regulates both the functioning of state institutions and also their interactions with the society. This mode of governance has been called in the literature as traditional or 'old', but as Pierre & Peters (2000:14-15) underline the legal and constitutional frameworks regulating current state institutions have been created according to this system of functioning thus it still prevails as a mode of governance despite all the substantial changes.

The second, market governance, refers to both a set of relations between economic actors cooperating to resolve common problems but also adopting the basic functioning of market system based on supply and demand to govern the public service mechanism. The idea is that the most just and efficient way of resource allocation on public services relies on citizen's choices not to elected officials, which may or may not be responsive to their constituencies (Pierre & Peters, 2000:19).

The third mode, network governance, corresponds to the general conceptual discussions on networks which were elaborated previously. According to this mode, networks are organised interests among state and non-state actors on a given policy sector. The relationships among actors are less informal compared to market and hierarchy based structures, the coordination mechanisms are formed through cooperation and negotiation among equal partners instead of formal rules. The argument favoured by this model is that networks facilitate coordination among public and private interests, and enable diffusion of the expertise in private actors in the policy process. thus increase the efficiency on public services (Kitthananan, 2006; Pierre & Peters, 2000). The counter argument holds that since networks represent common interest, they could challenge the interests of the state. Hence, the issue of accountability and representation will be in question.

The last mode of governance described by Pierre & Peters (2000) is the communities or communitarian governance. Based on communitarian perspective (see Etzioni, 1995, 1998), states are too big to resolve the problems of communities thus communities should resolve their common problems through a collective responsibility with minimum intervention of the state (Kitthananan, 2006). The underlying element on this mode of governance is the virtue of civic spirit as the key to governance. The main criticism to communitarian governance is the simplistic view of communitarians that individuals are inclined to make personal sacrifices for common good of community.

Pierre & Peters (2000:22) underline that the structural view on governance is important since it enables to determine what roles the state and other actors can play within the framework of governance. On the other hand, the process perspective highlights another important dimension on governance framework which is the interactions among structures. This perspective focuses on the processes of 'steering' and 'coordination' and perceives governance as a dynamic outcome of social and political actors (Kitthananan, 2006). This conceptual approach is especially beneficial to study the changes in governance, since it focuses on the degree of inclusion and influence among actors and evaluates the changes over time.

One other possible approach towards governance is adopting an institutionalist perspective. For instance, Pierre (2011) adopts an institutionalist approach on his recent study about urban governance. He justifies his stance by underlying that current literature on governance focuses too much on processes, partnerships and joint ventures whilst overlooking the institutions and structures which matter for governance as well. Following a normative institutional perspective, that institutions represent structures and systems of norms, beliefs, practices and routines (see. Peters, 1999), Pierre (2011:21) argues that the literature on governance overlooks the significance of the systems of values and norms which gives the processes meaning and purpose. Further, he asserts that without studying the purposes, goals and objectives, governance cannot be understood and assessed as a process. In this regard, neo-institutional theory enables valuable contributions to the governance framework.

Based on this perspective, Pierre (2011:25) describes four different models for urban governance: managerial, corporatist, pro-growth and welfare governance. Each model suggests different governance objectives and strategies to the institutions in localities as well as their interactions with regional and central government. In managerial governance, the classical NPM elements on public management are influential as emphasising on relaxing the political control over the city administration and service production. Customer-oriented approaches should be adopted on political decisions, and whereas managers should employ the public decision with substantive discretion and autonomy, elected officials should focus on long-term goals and objectives. The criticism to this model is rooted in the controversies existing in NPM as being inadequate on accountability and democratic deficiency. Corporatist model emphasises the role of organised interest in local government and allows local government to bring the 'third sector' into public service production and delivery. The questions raised in this model are related with the governability of cities (see Pierce, 1993) where sometimes the tensions among different segments of the city (such as labour organisations against business organisations) can hinder effective cooperation. The third model, pro-growth governance, suggests the economic growth is the overarching objective of local governance system and being the 'unitary interest' among all actors, it should be separated from political debates. This model of governance is the least participatory model among four models and posits concerted public-private actions as the engine of the local economy. The last model, welfare governance, focuses on the governance of the industrial cities whose local economy relied traditionally on manufacturing, and failed to restructure its economic setup to meet the needs of international economic forces. In this depiction, these states have very limited viability and growth in the local economy and depend to the influx of capital through the central government. Therefore, this type of governance tries to reinvigorate the state's involvement on resource mobilisation rather than public-private collaborations. The examples of this model are observable largely in formerly prosperous regions in Germany, the USA, the Scandinavian countries and the UK.

Last but not least, Bouckaert (2015) describes 'spans of governance' as an attempt to merge the structuralist and institutionalist approaches towards modes of governance. Bouckaert identifies five spans of governance namely, corporate, governance, holding governance, public service governance, suprastructure governance and systemic governance. Corporate governance captures the notion of the transferability of private sector governance into public sector management system. Corporate governance pursues the adaptability and limitations of governance systems and practices in private sector into public sector. Holding governance broadens the focus of corporate governance and look into the 'connectedness' of a range of organisations in terms of function, territory, policy field...etc. Public sector governance focuses on the public service delivery and incorporates cooperation with private and non-for-profit actors. Suprastructure governance brings the ideological and normative aspects of governance and deals with values, norms, culture and ideologies which shape and direct governance. The last span, the systemic governance, refers to the system design of governance in state level. This type of governance elaborates that macro-governance deals with issues such as the distribution of power, checks and balances and mechanisms inside the country on decision-making and implementation.

All these different studies provide valuable insight on how to grasp governance from different aspects. Another major debate in the literature is to create a fully-fledged theoretical framework towards governance. The discussions on differences and similarities of NPM and governance are worthy of consideration in this debate.

It is generally acknowledged, that the premises of NPM have a kinship with the emerging forms of governance (Peters& Pierre, 1998). For that matter, both perspectives acknowledge the downplaying role of elected officials on public services. Unlike the traditional public administration's approach, both of them accept the diffusion between the public and the private sector and perceive competition as positive for public service delivery. Moreover, both NPM and governance underline the importance of results and output controls, and disregards input control which was preferred as main control mechanism within the traditional public administration. Output control can either be implemented through customer satisfaction charts and performance indicators like NPM suggests, or it can be generated by bringing members of private and voluntary sector into public service production and delivery as governance perspective suggests. There is one additional similarity between NPM and governance, which is their shortcoming to implement accountability while trying to replace the political power derived from the legal mandate or from elected office, with an entrepreneurial style of leadership or with an indirect remote model of leadership as in the NPM. Whilst governance literature suggests 'stakeholderism' and consumer choice as an alternative to traditional channels of accountability, NPM has little concern about the accountability as arguing the customers have the opportunity to influence the service production directly without the involvement of their elected representatives (Peters& Pierre, 1998).

On the other hand, the main differences between two concepts are generally related with the theoretical underpinnings. First of all, governance is part of the political theory and unlike the ideologically driven NPM, it is an old concept in the literature of social sciences. Inherently, governance anticipates efficiency while preserving some degree of political control over the public services; NPM just seeks to transform the public sector to a set of organisations whose only difference from private sector is the nature of the product that is delivered (Pierre & Peters, 1998). Second, while NPM focuses on the intraorganisational relations to enhance output on customer satisfaction and efficiency through management techniques, governance is largely about the processes on interorganisational relationships. The final difference is that NPM foresees a cultural shift on production of public goods, whereas adoption of new forms of governance does not require such a cultural shift.

The most recent contribution to this academic debate has been posited by Osborne (2011). Osborne (2011:7) argues that governance once an element within the PA and NPM regimes of public policy implementation and public services delivery, turned into a distinct regime in itself. This new regime, called New Public Governance (NPG), has different characteristics theoretically and practically from PA and NPM regimes. Theoretically, NPG is situated within institutional and network theories and posits 'both a plural state, where multiple interdependent actors contribute to the delivery of public services, and a pluralist state, where multiple processes inform the policy-making system' (Osborne 2011:9). In practice, this regime focuses upon organisational relationships and upon the governance of processes, stressing service effectiveness and outcomes that rely upon the interaction of PSOs with their environment. On the issues of resource-allocation and accountability, according to the NGM, inter-organisational networks are the central resource allocation mechanisms and accountability is achieved by negotiations at the interorganisational and interpersonal level within these networks (Osborne, 1997).

Nevertheless, the question of accountability and legitimacy is a major contested topic in the governance literature. The argument revolves around that service provisions through networks are leading to the democratic deficiency as they are hampering the traditional accountability mechanisms through elected parliamentarians. Indeed, in the traditional parliamentarian democracy, decision-makers are held accountable through elections and constitutional checks on public authority. The clear hierarchy between the state and lower tiers of government ensures this chain of accountability between citizens and policy makers. However, networks function through negotiations among cooperating actors and a hierarchical control of service provisions are not possible as in the traditional system. In most cases, the networks depend on the convergence of state and private interests which reduces local democratic input and legitimacy.

Different theoretical approaches addressed the issue of accountability and legitimacy of new governance structures, e.g. communitarianism, deliberative democracy, direct democracy, multi-level governance. The common point of these approaches is that they are proposing alternative ways of accountability and a sort of deinstitutionalisation of existing government structures (Peters & Pierre, 2000:138).

For that matter, communitarianism argues that large-scale decision-making mechanisms of the government should be replaced by smaller units of governing which represent the interest of communities directly. The deliberative democracy argues that representative democracy does not allow average citizens to exert power on decision-making and decision-making institutions should be reformed to allow the involvement of citizens on decision-making. The direct democracy argument takes a step further and argues that citizens are both capable and ready to decide on policy actions and suggests replacement of representative democracy mechanisms with new mechanisms allowing citizens to decide on public policies through popular votes. However, Pierre & Peters (2000:140) note that none of these theoretical approaches supplements governance in coherent and integrated manner that is required. Instead of this, Pierre & Peters (2000:141) claim that in many instances the traditional patterns of governance are preferable and the use of the alternatives might reduce governance capacity.

Some other scholars, on the other hand, argue that different systems of accountability exist in current modes of governance. For instance, Goss (2001:24) argues, that each agency involved in local networks has different systems of accountability through ministers, local politicians, shareholders, local communities or boards where the audit and regulation regimes depend on the individual case. Although Goss acknowledges the need of modern accountability systems that match the reality of local governance, the idea of creating new institutions to ensure accountability is not articulated in this approach.

Finally, the idea of multi-level governance has developed with the evolution of the EU decision-making structure. This approach suggests the accountability of public decision-making can be traced in supra-national level as well, and the legitimacy is ensured through the interplay among different governments existing in local, regional, national and supranational levels.

2.1.3 Local governance and the actors in local governance

The previous part provided a comprehensive overview of governance literature. In this regard, local governance is the reflection of these discussions into the local scale. Therefore, the definition of local governance opens up the discussion on cognitive meaning of governance. In this research, the local governance will be used close to the Pierre and Peters' definition. In other words, local governance will be perceived as the governing action of local government whereas the local government is the 'primus inter pares'. Thus, better local governance corresponds to the success of local government on mobilising other actors to provide demanded public services in the locality. However, different from Pierre & Peters' definition, better governance is not only the indication of the abilities of one actor but also the compliance of other actors to the expected roles. Hence, the emphasis in this part is identifying the key actors in local governance and shedding light on theoretical approaches towards their functions. But, before that, I will first focus on the concept of 'local' and question what does it stand for.

Goss (2001:26) defines four premises to define 'local'. According to Goss, first, local can be perceived spatially, as the proximity to the necessary facilities. Second, local represents a sense of identity which creates the feeling of belonging among the residents. For this approach, spatiality is a relative concept which can vary in terms of distances. Local reflects the shared history, common identity and connectedness among the residents. Third, local can be understood as an element of scale. Local owns the minimum scale to create economies of scale and capacity to adopt strategic decision-making. Fourth, local conjures a site of power which can counteract and negotiate with regional and central governments. In this sense, 'local' can correspond to different inferences thus 'local governance' is not a confined concept comparing to local government since its borders are not limited with the borders of local government's jurisdiction.

After this remark, the first and foremost actor who will be elaborated in this part is the local government. Local governments are democratically elected authorities that exercise political choices within denoted boundaries (John, 2001:34). However, depending on traditional and historical status, there is a great variation among local governments across country cases in terms of size, structure and discretionary powers. This variety reflects to the literature both in terms of contextualising the local government and also defining its typologies.

In his classical work *'Considerations of Representative Government'*, John Stuart Mill describes two important functions to local governments. First, local government is the keystone of the democratic system by enabling political participation of local citizens through elections. Second, local government is the means of providing effective and efficient local services as they contain the local knowledge, interest and expertise, especially compared to the distant central authority (Andrew & Goldsmith, 1998). The efficiency and democracy arguments have been expressed by other British academics as well (e.g. L.J. Sharpe, K. Joung, John Steward). The American argument, on the other hand, shows a slight difference on underpinning the context of local government. Unlike the efficiency argument of British scholars, on American writings local governments are associated with pluralism and individual sovereignty (Andrew& Goldsmith, 1998, Wolman, 1996). In the European context, the emphasis is on the dichotomy between northern and southern practices (see Page and Goldsmith, 1987; Page, 1991). According to Page & Goldsmith' classification, the northern group of Scandinavian countries, UK and Netherlands preserve a form of 'legal localism' (Page, 1991) where the values of local self-government and decentralisation are eminent. The local government has the legitimacy as the primary responsible institution to provide local public services. In the practices of northern group, there is a clear distinction between local politics and central politics. The southern group (Belgium, France, Spain, Italy and Greece), on the other hand, emphasises territorial representation of local interests nationally which Page defines as ‘political localism’. Unlike the northern group, there is a sense of communality and unity between centre and local administration. Clientelist practices of local representatives are other common features of southern countries. Other classifications on local governments (e.g. Bennett, 1993; Hesse & Sharpe, 1991) identify three or four groups instead of two. The main distinction in those typologies occurs on differentiating the UK from the rest of Nordic group, as a case close to the American and Australian practices and defining Germany, Netherlands, and Austria as a unique cluster on itself which hold mixed features from both northern and southern groups. According to Bennett, in the Anglo-Saksonian system, the local governments have weak constitutional status unlike the Scandinavian countries. Germany, Netherlands and Austria, forming a unique group, preserve both local government traditions like in Scandinavian countries also deconcentrated state administrations of Napoleonic countries which signifies the southern group in Goldsmith and Page’s classification. Kuhlman & Wollmann (2014) add one more category to the list of public administration models in Europe, namely Central Eastern European Model referring to the post-communist Eastern European countries part of the European Union. They identify two groups of countries under Central East European Model according to administration traditions of the formerly ruling historical empires of Habsburgs, Ottomans, Prussians and Tsarist Russians. The first group of countries, which were part of the realm of Habsburgs or Prussians, adopted decentralised constitutional and administrative model in local government whereas the second group of countries, which were part of the realm of Ottomans or Tsarist Russia, has centrally dependent, weak local administrations.

Another distinction emphasised by Goldsmith and Page is the different political culture between northern and southern countries reflecting the dichotomy between Catholic south and Protestant north. Especially, they argue because of this dichotomy southern secular states administer the education services centrally while in northern cases these services are decentralised to the local government institutions. Moreover, among northern countries there are few levels of government, smaller numbers of local authorities and larger average size of local authority comparing to southern cases and while welfare services are provided by local authorities in the north, regional and central authorities are responsible in the south (John, 2001: 36-37).

However, with the transition of governing institutions, the distinction among local government systems has becoming even more perplexing. The governments are adopting similar practices to deal with the emerging challenges, but in the meantime the path-dependency to traditional systems are determining the course of actions. John (2001:23) describes this situation as the institutional transformation only reflects one side of story but since the traditional local government activities remain in place, the trajectory of local governance will be in similar but also intrinsically in different ways across country cases.

The second emerging actor in local governance is the private sector and the role of businesses on governing. Looking back to the 19th and early 20th century, the involvement of local business leaders to local politics is not something new. However, with changing production systems and political development, local businesses drifted apart from the direct involvement with local politics and big production facilities are removed to suburban areas (Harding, 1994). As seen in British and French cases, the central authority controlled the local policy making on transport and development issues. Moreover, the central authority dominated the public finances either through direct supervision of local expenditures like in France, or through the control over capital projects as in the UK (John, 2001:43). Local politicians were hinged on the consent of central authority on investment and planning, thus business representatives did not see any economic initiative to involve in the local politics. Besides, developments in domestic market and financial systems empowered the capital or central cities on financial services. Thus, the involvement of businesses is consolidated largely on centres close to the central decision-making (John, 2001:43). Additionally, the political culture of traditional local governments focusing either on delivering services or accessing to central government resources did not contribute to the development of relations between local politics and private sector. Hence, in classical literature on local administration, the business participation was not eminent (John, 2001:43).

As mentioned previously, the changes in international economic systems have exposed local economics to international competition. Local politicians have become more concerned with ensuring the competitiveness of their local economies and with attracting private businesses to invest their localities. The social policies affecting the labour market and investment on transport services are turned into the primary interest of involving private businesses. The increase of local administrations' discretion on planning of local services motivated the private businesses even more to intervene in local decision-making and to become part of the local politics. As an outcome, public-private partnership has turned to an essential way to realise investment for local development. In return, the local policy makers have become more concerned to create a good reputation in order to attract inward investment (John, 2001:45).

The roles of citizens and the local community have been altered in local governance framework as well. Citizens are expected to be involved directly on decision-making and in some cases to participate in public service delivery unlike their conventional role as passive receivers in public service equation. New governance organisations, such as city councils, development agencies, tenant management organisations or neighbourhood initiatives, are emerging as complementary to traditional public service bodies (see Goss, 2001: 186-187). The motive is to enable the direct involvement of citizens and representatives of civil society institutions to public service mechanism, thus to ensure consistent and effective policies compatible with the demand of the society. With this purpose, a wide range of community representatives is placed to the task forces and boards of governance institutions. Additionally, most of the local governments have created advisory councils and bodies to exchange ideas with civil society institutions. The practice of direct participation of citizens to public service mechanisms turned to a general norm rather than a preference of individual local authorities. Although in theory, the direct involvement of citizens is acknowledged as a priority in governance, in practice there is still no consensus on which responsibilities the participating citizens or civil society institutions should carry, how should they perform them and what is their legitimacy. The assumption is that putting a variety of people with different expertise and backgrounds to a board, will enable concise policies to govern the community. However, as Goss (2001) underlines, in reality neither the community nor the local politicians has a civic understanding what responsibilities these governance bodies should carry and what are their roles on public service delivery. Therefore, it is not clear for policy planners what should be learned from these citizens' initiatives and how to incorporate in public service mechanism.

The last element that I will examine is the changing role of the central authority on local policies. As a general trend, central authority has loosened its control on local development and investment policies. The central planning agencies have removed from local planning decisions and former central competences on financial and administrative decisions have been allocated to local authorities. Although the variances among national systems are still evident, common provisions have emerged in most of the Western countries (Newman and Thornley, 1996). In this context, France has liberalised the central control over local planning gradually, starting with decentralisation reforms in 1980s. Traditionally welfare countries, such as Sweden, have decentralised the central authority on planning of welfare functions to local authorities (John, 2001: 45). Additionally, regional administrations have been created as a middle tier between centre and local and they have obtained some former responsibilities of the central authority on planning decisions. On the other hand, through contracting out and privatisation of centrally owned enterprises, states have created the milieu for local and regional administrations to compete for both public and private sector resources thus to increase the efficiency on public service delivery. With this purpose, central authorities of most of the industrialised countries set up programmes to be implemented at the local level either by the local authorities or other agencies, sign contracts directly with local suppliers for the provision of services and set up new autonomous agencies in order to perform specific tasks (Giguère, 2008:47).

The discussion at this stage is whether the central authority still possess the instruments to control or retain its former power in local public policies. As briefly mentioned before, there are two different views in the literature. One perspective foresees an irreversible decrease in state power thus the central authority is losing its leverages to control local policies in terms of decision-making (e.g. Rhodes, 1997). The other one depicts a more optimistic scenario, and argues that the state is transforming itself to adapt to changes in its environment changes and changes are not indications of declining of the state but deliberate actions where the central authority still controls the means to shape local politics (Pierre & Peters, 2000: 92). To supplement this argument, indirect transfers and investments from central authority are still vital for local governments even in the cases where decentralisation has been implemented extensively (e.g. Spain). Moreover, the coordination problems emerged with intense agencification on public service delivery (see. Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 2010) have led to a re-centralisation of allocated functions and created the conditions for the central authority to intervene on locally related decisions.

2.2 Decentralisation

From the governance perspective, decentralisation is not only a mean to achieve the governance objectives but also an intrinsic characteristic of the governance system. The reason lies on the ontology of the concept which includes both procedural and systematic features. Nevertheless, decentralisation is conceptually not limited to governance per se but the theoretical premises are dispersed in different scientific fields such as political science, public administration, economics and development studies. The evolution of the concept is intermingled among these fields, thus capturing the concept of decentralisation requires a comprehensive approach. Depending on the focus of the study, aims of decentralisation can involve increased economic efficiency and effectiveness in service provisions; increased democratic voice to citizens and local accountability; increased economic growth and equity in public services; empowerment of civil society; a remedy for ethnic based secessionist movements or development goals such as achieving good governance principles and poverty reduction. However, these anticipated outcomes of decentralisation have been contested by various empirical studies in both developing and developed countries. The findings of these studies highlighted the importance to evaluate decentralisation policies within the social and institutional context of the country cases rather than adopting it as one fit for all.

In this section, first, the definition and cognitive meanings of decentralisation will be elucidated. Second, the theoretical premises and the conceptual evolution of decentralisation will be revealed. In addition, various typologies of the concept and motivations of governments for decentralisation practices as well as controversies in the literature will be elaborated. Last, decentralisation will be evaluated within the governance framework and propositions concerning with local governance will be subtracted.

2.2.1 What is decentralisation?

Defining decentralisation is not an easy task for scholars. In the public management literature the term is used, most commonly to refer to the allocation of central power and authority on political, administrative and fiscal issues to sub-state and non-state actors. However, the applications of decentralisation are neither limited to the public management nor homogenously spread among scientific fields. Thus, as Macmahon stated (1961, p.15), 'It is impossible to standardise the usage of the word by seeking to give it meanings that would be acceptable universally... It is a word that is not confined to public affairs and to formal organisation in government or business... It must be accepted as a word of innumerable applications. Throughout all of them, however, runs a common idea, which is inherent in the word's Latin roots, meaning *away from the centre*'. Unfortunately, even this considerably thick definition has its shortcomings on defining the concept. This is mainly due to the fact that this definition intrinsically includes only the *dynamic* elements. However, decentralisation can refer to the dispersion of power and authority within a closed system thus giving the characteristic of the system. Therefore, a 'decentralised system' depicts an organised set of relations which function either with limited dependency to an acknowledged centre or without an organised centre. For instance, a market economy is a good example of a functioning decentralised system. So the definition of decentralisation is bound to the context in which it is applied. In this research, the local governance implies the governing action of local government. This perspective essentially sets forward that the local government would be the focal point. Therefore, decentralisation will be treated from a systematic point of view, whereas it implies the share of local government on governing actions comparing to central authority.

2.2.2 Conceptual features of decentralisation

Decentralisation is described in the public management literature commonly as an ambiguous and multifaceted concept. (Fesler, 1965; Mintzberg, 1979:181; Prudhomme, 1994: 2; Cohen & Peterson, 1999: 23; Oxhorn et al., 2004:4, Dubois & Fattore 2009). The ambiguity with decentralisation is partly due to its treatment as a sub-concept under broader discussions rather than being the subject of a deep analysis on its own (Prudhomme, 1994; Hales, 1999). Therefore in numerous typologies of decentralisation, same concepts often correspond to different meanings. Oxhorn et al.(2004:4) add two more explanations why decentralisation is an ambiguous concept; first, decentralisation processes usually have contradictory outcomes and, second, theoretical contradictions among different schools of thought impede the development of persuasive theories.

Furthermore, it is a multi-faceted concept (Oxhorn et al., 2004; Dubois & Fattore 2009). Dubois & Fattore (2009) shed light on this phenomenon by pointing out its impact for a potential misanalysis:

> *"Decentralisation along one dimension could be related to one set of causes and effects, and decentralisation along another dimension could relate to a different or opposite set of antecedents and outcomes. Researchers who do not explicitly look at each dimension or haphazardly aggregate dimensions will mismeasure the type and degree of decentralisation."* (Dubois & Fattore, 2009:706; Schneider, 2003)

One rationale behind this argument is that decentralisation has a lot of references in various fields such as economics, organisational science, political science or development studies, and drawing a demarcation line between scientific fields is practically impossible due to level of interfusion. Therefore, acknowledging the overlapping definitions and the need for a comprehensive approach is much more important than providing precise definitions (Sharma, 2006).

Another one is that different studies have the tendency to address certain aspects of decentralisation while trying to achieve general conclusions on it. For instance, the impact of fiscal decentralisation on economic growth has been a popular theme among economists. However, neither theoretical nor empirical studies have managed to avoid contradictory outcomes that would indicate whether decentralisation is good or bad. One reason of this contradiction is that while some studies included only one aspect of fiscal decentralisation such as revenue decentralisation, other studies included expenditure decentralisation as well. Similar examples can be traced regarding to other aspects of decentralisation as well.

2.2.3 Typologies of Decentralisation

The conceptual evolution of decentralisation inevitably had an impact on the typologies of decentralisation as well. Consequently, the typologies on decentralisation have flourished (see Dubois & Fattore, 2009). The table presented by Dubois & Fattore (2009) gives a useful overview of decentralisation typologies in the literature.

Table 2.1 Decentralisation Typologies

Typology	Reference
Economic (industrial, regional economic planning), Administrative (administrative/ Internal, administrative/Spatial, administrative/Functional), Political (legislative, corporate, millennial)	Furniss (1974)
Administrative, Political Vertical vs. Horizontal, Selective vs. Parallel	Porter & Olsen (1976)

	Mintzberg (1980)
Deconcentration, Delegation, Devolution, Privatisation	Rondinelli, Nellis, & Cheema (1983)
Inter-governmental/Political, Management	
Fiscal, Political, Administrative	Devas (1997)
	Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird (1998)
Functional, Territorial	
	Bray (1999)
Political, Spatial, Market, Administrative	
	Cohen & Peterson (1999)
Decentralisation by default, Privatisation, Deconcentration, Fiscal decentralisation, Devolution	Manor (1999)
Structural, Decision, Resource, Electoral, Institutional [Treisman (2002): vertical, decision-making, appointment, electoral, fiscal, personnel]	Treisman (2000)
Political decentralisation, Administrative decentralisation, Administrative deconcentration	Benz (2002)
Fiscal, Institutional (local and intergovernmental), Political	

	Smoke (2003)
Big push vs. small steps, Bottom up vs. top down, Uniform vs. asymmetric	
	Shah & Thompson (2004)
Administrative, Fiscal, Political	
Political/Administrative, Internal/External,	Falleti (2005)
Non-competitive/Competitive, Basis of division (territory/function/process/target group)	Pollitt (2005)

Source: Dubois & Fattore, 2009

As previously mentioned, same terms under different typologies usually correspond to different meanings in accordance with the focus of the study. For example, while political decentralisation refers to the legal transfer of power to autonomous bodies in one study (see Benz, 2002), in other, it signifies democratic preferences (see Smoke, 2003).

Acknowledging this variety, three most common types of decentralisation, i.e. political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation, will be examined accordingly. The terms will be elaborated largely in accordance with the definitions suggested by the World Bank[2].

a. Administrative decentralisation:

The World Bank defines the administrative decentralisation as 'the transfer of responsibility for the planning, financing and management of certain public functions from the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, or area-wide, regional or functional authorities.' Administrative decentralisation contains

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[2] The World Bank distinguishes four different types of decentralisation, namely political, fiscal, administrative, and market decentralisation. It defines market decentralisation as a transfer of power or responsibilities to private companies. However, this type of decentralisation is considered a kind of delegation in most of the studies. In this study, the functions of market decentralisation are incorporated into delegation as well.

redistribution of authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government.

Three major forms of administrative decentralisation have been acknowledged by the literature; deconcentration, delegation, and devolution.

Deconcentration is often considered as the weakest form of decentralisation and it refers to the distribution of decision making authority and financial and management responsibilities to lower tiers of central government. This type of decentralisation is used most frequently in unitary states.

Delegation occurs when central governments transfer responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions to semi-autonomous organisations not wholly controlled by the central government, but ultimately accountable to it. Governments can delegate responsibilities to public enterprises or private corporations on special service provisions such as housing services, education services, regional development, transportation or for special project implementation. Usually these organisations have a great deal of discretion in decision-making. They may be exempt from constraints on regular civil service personnel and may be able to charge users directly for services (World Bank, 2011).

Devolution is considered as the most extensive form of administrative decentralisation. Some scholars even consider devolution as part of political decentralisation. The act of devolution contains the transfer of authority for decision-making, finance, and management to quasi-autonomous units of local government. Devolution usually transfers responsibilities for services to municipalities that elect their own mayors and councils, raise their own revenues, and have independent authority to make investment decisions. According to the World Bank, in a devolved system, local governments have clear and legally recognised geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority and within which they perform public functions.

b. Political Decentralisation

Political decentralisation corresponds giving more power to citizens or to their elected representatives in public decision-making. Commonly, political decentralisation is associated with federalism and includes ‘organisations and procedures for increasing citizen participation in selecting political representatives and in making public policy; changes in the structure of the government through devolution of powers and authority to local units of government; power-sharing institutions within the state through federalism, constitutional federations, or autonomous regions; and institutions and procedures allowing freedom of association and participation of civil society organisations in public decision-making, providing socially beneficial services, and mobilising social and financial resources to influence political decision-making' (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007).

c. Fiscal decentralisation

Fiscal decentralisation is the division of public expenditure and revenue between levels of government, and comprises the financial aspects of devolution to regional and local governments (Davey, 2000). Financial management, budgeting accounting, delegation, procurement, auditing, or other similar processes through which local governments manage their financial affairs is not part of the fiscal decentralisation policies (Davey, 2000).

The World Bank explains the forms of fiscal decentralisation as the following;

a) Self-financing or cost recovery through user charges;

b) Co-financing or co-production arrangements through which the users participate in providing services and infrastructure through monetary or labour contributions;

c) Expansion of local revenues through property or sales taxes, or indirect charges;

d) Intergovernmental transfers that shift general revenues from taxes collected by the central government to local governments for general or specific uses;

e) Authorisation of municipal borrowing and the mobilisation of either national or local government resources through loan guarantees.

Davey (2000) describes two interrelated issues in the context of fiscal decentralisation. The first is the division of spending responsibilities and revenue sources between levels of government. The second is the level of discretion in regional and local governments to determine their expenditures and revenues. Both aspects combined define the determinants for the local and regional governments to measure the actual degree of decentralisation. Davey (2000) formulates four determinants to measure the amount of power and responsibility that regional and local governments exercise;

(1) What range of public services they finance;

(2) Whether their revenues are commensurate with these responsibilities;

(3) How much real choice they have in allocating their budget to individual services;

(4) Whether they can determine the rates of their taxes and charges.

On the other hand, a form of fiscal decentralisation, fiscal federalism refers to the assignment of tax and expenditure authority to the lowest level of government possible. In fiscal federalism, the local government act autonomously in taxation and expenditure activities. The advocates of fiscal federalism argue that it creates the discipline and market features to ensure productive efficiency. The critics of this theory points to the fact that this theory disregards the transfers from central authority which can be detrimental for local governments (see Prud'homme, 1995). Prud'homme (1995) highlights dangers of this sort of arrangements arguing that (a) redistribution cannot be undertaken at the local level because of high level of competition on capital; (b) economic stability can be impaired since the central government has lost power over fiscal policy; (c) it would be inappropriate for developing countries where access to basic needs are in question; (d) corruption is more likely to rise with greater decentralisation.

2.2.4 Theoretical premises and motivations for decentralisation

The literature on decentralisation has been expanding parallel to its conceptual evaluation. Cheema & Rondinelli (2007) describes three phases on this evolution.

The first phase, in the 1970s and 1980s, was about thinking decentralisation as a form of deconcentrating hierarchical government structures and bureaucracy. After more than two decades of centralised practices following World War II, governments in both developed and less developed countries, realised the limits of central economic planning and management governments. Governments started to decentralise their hierarchical structures, and shifted part of their competences to local authorities in order to make public service delivery more effective. Furthermore, in the early 1980's, the promotion of administrative decentralisation had become part of the development strategies of aid agencies in developing countries (Cohen & Peterson, 1999: 11). Especially, the inability of central governments in Africa to provide public services to local areas (see Kiggundu, 1989) and the fall of authoritarian regimes in Latin America fostered the need for decentralisation. In this period, decentralisation was seen as a way to improve organisational performance in government as part of the organisation (see Mintzberg, 1979) and development theories.

The second phase took place in the mid-1980s and included new paradigms such as political power sharing and market liberalisation. In this period, decentralisation was contextualised predominantly within the neo-liberalist discourse. Privatisation and market liberalisation were embraced by the decentralisation literature.

During the third phase in 1990's, decentralisation was seen as a way of governance to wider public participation. Two important discursive developments in governance, i.e. the "New Public Management" movement in the western countries and promotion of 'democratic governance' by international organisations, reshaped the role of decentralisation. The NPM movement defined an efficient government as 'innovative, market oriented, decentralised and customer oriented' (Osborn & Gaebler, 1992), and advocated that the efficiency in public services can only be achieved through the participation of citizens and through the teamwork among the government agencies in a decentralised governance structure. According to NPM, decentralisation results in better governance, facilitates the development of more effective and efficient public sector management, increases popular participation in government, allows for better mobilisation and use of resources, and encourages market-like responsiveness to the provision and consumption of public services (Hope Sr & Chikulo, 2000). Furthermore, 'democratic governance' has been embedded by the international institutions into the decentralisation objectives. This policy has been materialised foremost with the promotion of 'subsidiarity principle' by the EU and 'good governance' objective by international donor organisations such IMF, World Bank and UNDP. In short, decentralisation has been incorporated into democratisation literature as an essential concept.

Nowadays decentralisation in public management is situated in the discussions of enhancing democratic voice and economic efficiency on public services. Although most of the theoretical propositions estimate the positive effect of decentralisation on both notions, empirical studies reached contradictory results on backing the theoretical premises.

In regards to theoretical arguments on economic aspects, one of the earliest theoretical explanations was presented by Tiebout with 'public choice theory'. Tiebout (1956) argued that decentralisation would contribute to the economic efficiency on public services by enhancing the competition among local administrations on citizens. In the so called 'public choice theory', residents of localities are depicted as 'shopping' customers between different municipalities with the flexibility to choose the one with optimal mixture of taxes and public services. This creates a competition among municipalities to provide the best services with most reasonable amount, thus ensuring the municipalities are not wasting local resources nor overproducing public goods. The most common criticism to public choice theory is that in practice, citizens are not as mobile as the theory predicts and they are not necessarily motivated with rational choices, but are bound to their social and local identities. Further theories driven from public choice theory anticipate that in the decentralised or federal systems where the competition is high, local administrations would have abilities to adopt innovative and regenerative systems, thus decentralisation would contribute to the economic growth (Feld, Zimmerman & Döring, 2003). Musgrave (1959), on the other hand, pointed to the fact that since local administrations have better information on the needs and demand of localities, decentralisation will enable increased efficiency on public services.

Nevertheless, empirical studies based on these theoretical assumptions have not succeeded to provide satisfactory evidences to verify the arguments. Especially, the impact of decentralisation on economic growth still remains as a contested argument. The empirical studies are clustered in two different camps in terms of their findings on individual and comparative cases. The first group (see. Akai & Sakata, 2002; Thiessen, 2003; Stansel, 2005; Iimi, 2005) verified that decentralisation has statistically a significant positive impact on economic growth. The second group (see. Woller & Phillips, 1998; Davoodi & Zou, 1998; Zhang & Zou, 1998; Xie, Zou & Davoodi 1999; Jin & Zou 2005) determined that the impact on economic growth is either statistically insignificant or negative under some certain conditions. The main explanation on contradictory outcomes usually relies on different theoretical approaches and methodological choices.

In contrast, the democracy argument relies on different propositions. Since Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill, decentralisation has often been associated with pluralistic politics and representative government, but it could also support democratisation by giving citizens, or their representatives, more influence in the formulation and implementation of policies (World Bank, 2011). The former appraises decentralisation within the traditional forms of democracy and advocates that political autonomy through popular elections is enhanced with decentralisation (see Rudebeck et al. 1998; Whitehead 2002; Harris et al. 2004), whereas the latter assesses decentralisation in conjunction with deliberative democracy and direct representation. The deliberative democracy theory (see Bessett, 1980; 1994) states that consultative processes through discussions among various stakeholders are essential to enhance democracy, whereby finding solutions to common problems would be possible with limited resources and constraints (Chambers, 2003). For this purpose, local governments should be free from the ties of bureaucracy; thus they can be more flexible in consultation and negotiation within locally specific conditions. So, the devised policies will be much responsible to the local needs which are essential for democracy (Dahl, 1971). The expectation is that this sort of engagement between local citizens and the government will address better to diverse interests in society than those made only by national political authorities. However, these theoretical arguments are contested as well, especially with the empirical studies conducted in developing countries in Asia and Africa. For instance, Oxhorn et al. (2004) argue that decentralisation itself does not improve democratic governance, but rather, democratic effects are shaped by (1) motivations of decentralisation, (2) historical patterns of state-society relations, and (3) institutional arrangements. Moreover, another counter argument points to the danger of capture of local government by local elites thus impairing local democracy (see Shah & Thomson, 2004; Pal& Roy, 2010). Especially, in the cases where civic participation in local government is low and large inequalities in land ownership exist, interest groups and local elites may capture local governments and direct resources towards their own priorities rather than towards improving the provision of local public goods and poverty alleviation (Shah & Thomson, 2004).

Nevertheless, the motivation of decentralisation is not only limited with democratic and economic expectations. Shah & Thompson (2004) claim that short-term political considerations have been more decisive on initiating decentralisation reforms rather than long-term structural benefits. As widely observed in Central and Eastern European countries, aspirations for the EU membership were substantial to implement wide-range of decentralisation reforms. Also, in some other developing countries, political and fiscal crises (e.g. Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey) or political calculations to sideline oppositions (e.g. Poland, Peru, and Pakistan) were substantial reasons for decentralisation. In relation to political motivation of decentralisation, Eaton (2001) gives the following examples:

> " *i. Decentralisation might be a voluntary choice of politicians—it can increase political stability and economic growth in a way that compensates politicians for any loss of power they may experience in the short run (see also Manor, 1999).*
>
> *ii. Decentralisation may result from political pressures exerted by sub-national politicians. If sub-national politicians can influence the political careers of their representatives in the national assembly, these legislators may be coerced into supporting decentralisation (according to Willis et al, 1999). In Brazil, the return to democracy in the 1980s set the stage for fiscal decentralisation when governors regained political influence.*
>
> *iii. Decentralisation may reflect short-term gains for politicians, since politicians usually discount future gains heavily. When government is divided, the party in control*

of the legislature may promote decentralisation as a way to constrain the executive branch. Experiences of Argentina and the Philippines suggest that political struggles over the control of revenues and expenditures may have less to do with substantive debates over development strategy than with short-term and highly dynamic political calculations."

Another motivation for decentralisation is the external influences through globalisation and information revolution (Shah & Thompson, 2004). The globalisation perspective relies on that nation states are 'too small to tackle large things in life and too large to address small things'. Besides, international organisations such WTO, UNDP and other specialised institutions in global governance are taking profound roles in regulating information technologies, international financial transactions and macroeconomic management. Additionally, the EU's policies and principles on subsidiarity, fiscal harmonisation and structural funds have a direct impact not only on candidate countries but also on developing and transition economies.

2.2.5 When decentralisation leads to better local governance?

As it is evident on the evolution of the concept, decentralisation has become a substantial term in governance literature. Decentralisation has not only been promoted as the way to reach governance objectives but also an ideal state within governance framework is described as a decentralised state (see Osborn & Gaebler, 1992). This state between decentralisation and governance can best be described as a symbiotic relationship. In other words, public governance today cannot be implemented without decentralising central functions to local and regional bodies as well as to non-state actors whereas almost in each political setup decentralisation is associated with governance objectives.

Therefore, it is no surprise; decentralisation reforms have been implemented in various countries with the aim to develop governance. In this regard, practices and reforms in developing countries have been salient on empirical studies to reveal the relation between governance and decentralisation (see Crook & Manor, 1998; Turner, 1999; Grindle, 2000; Campbell, 2003; Olowu & Wunsch, 2004; Oxhorn et all, 2004; Saito et all, 2005). For instance, on their comparative study among seven Sub-Saharan countries Olowu & Wunsch (2004) observe that in order for decentralisation reforms to be successful they need to be supported by (1) effective local authority and autonomy, (2) sufficient resources for localities,

(3) effective institutions of collective action, and (4) open and accountable local political processes. However, Saito (2005:10) underlines that in most cases these factors are conflicting with each other and they are not necessarily complementary as a change in one does not directly lead a change in other. The findings of Saito et al. (2005) on a comparative study among Asian and African developing countries provide that decentralisation per se does not lead to improved governance. Rather, it relies on country specific social and institutional arrangements. For instance, in the case of Uganda, decentralisation is salient in order to redefine the roles and responsibilities of diverse stakeholders through which better governance might be achieved (Saito, 2001). In the cases of Sri Lanka and Ghana, capacity enhancement in both central and local governments are recommended rather than decentralising tasks to local governments (Saito, 2005:VII). Their advice is that decentralisation is not a technical tool to achieve better governance but decentralisation reforms are deeply entangled in the political landscape of countries.

Nevertheless, different theoretical and empirical studies have proposed various hypotheses and propositions to explain the relationship between decentralisation and governance. In the subsequent part, different propositions concerning the subject will be arrayed in an analogical order.

To start with, Kodras (1997) evaluates devolution and the corresponding pros and cons arguments of governance. Kodras underlines that devolution to local governments is instrumental to make public services more flexible as it brings it closer to the people. However, devolution can also create inequalities in service provision due to geographic differences in expertise, material and financial resources, infrastructures and political will. Moreover, local governments usually do not have the capacity to provide services that a higher level of government does. In addition, local governments are less capable to compete in international market, whereas national governments can provide uniform standards and regulations and fiscal redistribution for inequalities created by competition. In the case of fiscal federalism argument, Kodras points out that although efficiency on public services can be achieved to a certain extent, the competition with the state on tax incentives, free lands, cheap labour and infrastructure investments will lead to a zero-sum game and eventually it will cost more to local governments than yielded by the investment.

Stohr (2001) states the need for new systems at the local level that are more decentralised and make use of civil society and private sector. In his study, Stohr deals predominantly with deconcentration and devolution and compares their strengths and weaknesses. He suggests that deconcentration can exercise better resource allocation than devolution considering that the former maintains a higher degree of centralised control over decision-making through line ministries. Devolution by contrast tends to lead to higher innovation in the creation of public-private partnerships and alternative financing strategies. Nonetheless, the issue of coordination appears as a salient factor on the comparison. Stohr underlines that the coordination between levels of government departments and ministries may break down in the case of devolution. Saito (2005) highlights the problem of coordination by comparing the former hierarchical structures with the new governance structures. In the former, the state, being the legally superior entity, exercises command and control on local and regional bodies. Since decentralisation reforms often repeal these control mechanisms, new forms of coordination practices emerge through more consultative approaches.

Furthermore, Stohr et al. (2001) emphasise that decentralisation should be adapted to the specific needs of each context, and they call for caution on that decentralisation cannot solve the problems of participation, poverty and inequality without considering the national context first. In fact, in several national contexts with multi-ethnic populations engaged in power struggles, decentralisation may lead to fragmentation and breakdown of the national polity and civil society. In this regard, Sorens (2009) opposes the idea that political decentralisation to the ethnically different regions will reduce the secessionist tendencies as in the examples of Scotland, Belgium and Catalonia. Sorens (2009) argues that the motivations of governments in these examples are based solely on political calculations whereby decentralisation is perceived as a political insurance for the winner-take-all electoral systems. In fact, Sorens claims that monopolisation of regional politics by a secessionist or other regional party would reduce the prospect of decentralisation, since the government parties will not have the incentive to implement further decentralisation with the prospect of increased political power at the regional level.

In sum, Stohr et al. call for a formula between decentralised and centralised authority, which can serve better to fight against social inequalities rather than higher decentralisation. In the right balance, central authority can ensure redistribution of resources thus preventing pre-existing inequalities emerging from local power relations. Regarding to the development of an active civil society, four types of barriers (i.e. psychological, economic, social and technical barriers) are described which can impede the impact of decentralisation. Stohr explains that overcoming these impacts requires time as well as institutional adjustments and support of national and supranational agencies to empower the sense of solidarity and common purpose in localities.

Pierre & Peters (2000) position decentralisation as a policy style within the governance context. According to them, state can ‘decentre-down’ its functions to lower tiers of government or ‘decentre-out’ to agencies and similar institutions in an ‘arm-length’. Pierre & Peters (2000: 204) assert that ‘decentring-down’ is a strategy for the state to empower the capacity of sub-national governments on resource mobilisation to provide public services. Yet, this strategy entails a trade-off for the central authority between coordination of public services and increased capacities in sub-national governments. Advantages of ‘decentring-down’ is first, it is useful for central government to share the responsibility on socially defined problems thus to decrease the tension towards the state. Additionally, it enhances citizen participation as well. Nevertheless, there is one caveat that increased engagement of citizens and more independent sub-national governments can challenge the traditional modes of governance. Therefore, governments need to adopt new policy actions and capabilities in order to be able to respond to policy challenges in the aftermaths.

The other policy style - decentring out- encompasses the dimension of efficiency regarding decentralisation. Through decentring out the public services to private and semi-private institutions the competition raises and as a consequence efficiency in service provisions can be achieved. Yet, the caveat here is that marketisation of public services can foster social inequalities and impede the role of citizenry in a democratic system. Especially in systems with strong legalistic tradition, decentring out can cultivate dissatisfaction among citizens.

Bussell (2010) highlights four hypotheses in the literature when and where decentralisation might produce improved governance:

a) “electoral” hypothesis: an increase in competitive elections at the local level should encourage incumbents to perform better.

b) “political entrepreneur” hypothesis: the nature of good governance will depend on the motivations of mayors and other officials, as “they have the greatest opportunities to set public agendas and use public resources to achieve their objectives”

c) “public sector modernisation” hypothesis: municipal governance could depend on the degree of “public sector modernisation,” in the form of new techniques for improving the capacity and efficiency of local administration.

d) “civil society” hypothesis: good governance depends on the ability of citizens to organise and vocalise their demands, an activity that should become more feasible in a decentralised setting.

However, Warner’s study on rural governance in USA (2003) challenges the arguments on competition. He asserts that the core idea of ensuring effectiveness in government services and responsiveness to citizen voice through competition has altered in time because of the inadequacy of local and rural governments in terms of administrative and financial capacity. Many rural governments lacking an adequate revenue base or sufficient professional management capacity failed to achieve successful governance practices. Even though the market practices could be a reliable way to increase the efficiency on government services, they fail to achieve equality on service provision because of uneven markets. In conclusion, Warren suggests that cooperation with other levels of governments and with private and civil society actors can bring efficiency and equity in comparison to competitive markets (see also Warner & Hefetz, 2003). In contrast to cooperation argument, Boyne (1996) argues that decentralisation is expected to bring competition to local level. Boyne makes a distinction between traditional and new competition. According to him, the traditional competition corresponds to the interparty competition which is often ineffective at the local level. The new competition refers to the competition between a council and other organisations for service production and encompasses both geographical and tier-level competition. Boyne underlines three elements which shape the new competition: (1) structures of organisations (i.e. consolidated vs. fragmented), (2) autonomy in setting policies and (3) finance. Boyne claims that the higher the level of central funding, the lower the incentive for fiscal movement between areas. However, Boyne acknowledges that in order to realise ‘horizontal equity’, some central funding is necessary to remove income discrepancies in different areas.

Finally, studies on developing countries provide empirical evidences on various institutional and organisational shortcomings can lead to inefficiencies in recently decentralised systems. In their study on health service delivery in Uganda, Nannyonjo & Okot (2012) account for several conditions where in the absence of certain capacities, decentralisation fails to lead improved governance. In sum, these conditions can be summarised as following; (1) decentralisation may increase local monitoring and in return reduce corruption as long as communities possess a certain level of social capital and local awareness of corrupt government practices; (2) absence of oversight mechanisms and local elite capture of resources for public services can pose challenge for effective decentralisation; (3) social capital is also important for local government to collect user's fees and taxes; (4) in case where local communities lack the means of information on local governance services, decentralisation can lead to lowering the quality of public services; (5) even in the case where there is a certain level of capacity on receiving information, residents may not be in a position to hold local leaders accountable or the central government may be too weak to monitor local leaders; (6) coordination problems among different public bodies and tiers of governments might impede a direct accountability between citizens and the administration responsible on individual public services; (7) decentralisation might fail to achieve efficient service delivery because of poor design (Kimenyi & Meagher, 2004); (8) the most important factor of failure in decentralisation policies is the lack of institutional capacity and skills in local politicians and bureaucrats especially to levy taxes, to administer resources and operate certain public services which require a certain level of technical adequacy; (9) decentralisation failures might be a result of the lack of human capital that ensures taxes are diligently collected and channelled into social services; (10) decentralisation failures can take place due to challenges on recruiting, motivating and retaining the staff, lack of resources because of programme failures, reduced independence and complexity in central-local relations (11) the level of decentralisation might be an impediment on the success of decentralisation as in the cases of grants allocated by the central government to local governments. If the block grants are conditioned on too many restrictions, the local leaders might claim that they have no authority over public spending. Yet, the grants without any restrictions might lead to local elite capture; (12) while the ability of localities to raise revenues independently from central government might increase electoral accountability, it can easily lead to regional imbalances and internal migration towards richer regions resulting in social imbalances.

Similarly, Sharma (2014) summarizes eight essential preconditions mentioned in the literature that must be ensured while implementing decentralization to avert any potential dangers. These are;

- Social Preparedness and Mechanisms to Prevent Elite Capture
- Strong Administrative and Technical Capacity at the Higher Levels
- Strong Political Commitment at the Higher Levels
- Sustained Initiatives for Capacity-Building at the Local Level
- Strong Legal Framework for Transparency and Accountability

- Transformation of Local Government Organizations into High Performing Organizations
- Appropriate Reasons to Decentralize: Intentions Matter
- Effective Judicial System, Citizens' Oversight and Anticorruption Bodies to prevent Decentralization of Corruption

With all the empirical findings and various theoretical assumptions on decentralisation in governance framework discussed above, it is clear that empirical studies fall short to verify all prospects about decentralisation. Nevertheless, the following assumptions can be posited on the relationship between decentralisation and local governance:

1) Theories suggesting that decentralisation leads to better governance anticipate a co-dependent relationship between citizens and local governments, where the local government relies on local sources and has the discretion to act on it. Residents involve in governance process as shareholders via proxy organisations thus enhancing the accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in public services. This way, the source of legitimacy is created by the mutual interaction between citizens and local government.

2) Arguments suggesting that higher decentralisation indicates always better governance are far too optimistic. A more reasonable argument would suggest that both centralisation and decentralisation have their aptitudes for better governance. From the state perspective, decentralisation and centralisation can be a trade-off where the former can enable more flexibility and efficiency on government services whereas the latter is important to ensure social equality and coordination among institutions.

3) Decentralisation serves for better engagement in governance by bringing the government services closer to citizens, and promoting grass-root democracy in localities. However, in the cases of a local elite capture or a lack of civil awareness to supervise government actions, decentralisation can adversely affect the local governance. In this regard, a certain level of social capital is imperative to ensure the monitoring of local government's action and tax revenues.

4) Decentralisation can foster competition in public services horizontally and vertically, which is important for the quality of governance. Yet, it also entails the danger of losing coordination and creating social inequality. Most studies suggest that existence of the central authority is important for the insurance of equal service provisions. However, increased influence of central authority can impede the development of abilities in local

governments for better governance. Therefore, better governance would most likely rely on a 'pareto optimum' between the central and local governments in terms of responsibilities and competences.

5) However, the level of this 'pareto optimum' is dependent on some underlying conditions. These underlying conditions refer to capacities of the governing institutions, socio-economic and socio- cultural conditions as well as the regulatory framework. Especially the existence of certain capacities in the governing institutions is deemed essential for the success of decentralisation policies. Among others, a sufficient human capital, means of collecting information, financial capacity, institutional capacity to ensure proper policy design and implementation have been suggested imperative to reap the benefits of decentralisation. Additionally, findings assert that the socio-cultural conditions and social cleavages arising from ethnic and minority related problems are also influential on adjusting the share of responsibilities between central and local authorities.

In sum, there are still many unanswered questions regarding the determinants on the success of decentralisation policies in local governance. For this reason, decentralisation can lead to unexpected outcomes, but in the meantime it has the potential to bring increased efficiency, solidarity and effectiveness in government services. Under these conditions, it is most important for the governments to be aware of contextual conditions and to be capable to deal with what decentralisation can bring. Yet, the questions still remain that how should the policy makers decide on the degree of decentralisation to ensure the best outcome in local governance and which conditions are the main determinants on this outcome.

2.3 Capacity

In this section, the third core concept of this study, capacity, will be elaborated. The design of this chapter starts with the definition of capacity, wherein different approaches on defining the capacity will be presented. After this, the conceptual features of capacity will be elaborated. Here the emphasis will be on highlighting the aspects that are necessary to conceptualise capacity. Especially, the differences between capacity, capability and performance will be scrutinised. The part on conceptual features of capacity will be concluded with the underlying aspects of capacity assessment. In the following part, the typologies of capacity in the literature will be discussed. The last part of the section will focus on defining the capabilities which are associated with better local governance, and will summarise the list of capabilities deemed necessary for better local governance.

2.3.1 What is capacity?

Capacity is one of the most elusive concepts in the literature of public management. It is described as a process and an outcome (Sowa et al, 2004); as the ends and the means to the ends (Honadle, 1981); as dynamic and multidimensional (see Ingraham et al, 2003); it is given both tangible and intangible, or quantitative and qualitative dimensions (Kaplan, 2000; Christensen & Gazley, 2008). Different actors (e.g. academics, practitioners, analysts...etc.) can attribute different meanings to the concept of capacity or the scope of research can vary depending on macro- or micro- visions on the concept (Morgan, 2006). These multiple qualities of capacity complicate the task of defining the concept, and thus various definitions exist in the literature. However, in almost each definition, capacity is associated with an *ability to perform*.

Although this definition is simple enough to avoid possible conceptual pitfalls related to capacity, it is too abstract to be operationalised. In fact, this is a problem with the nature of capacity itself. Capacity is in essence an ethereal concept. All efforts to define this essence are bound to the material limits of conceptualisation. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that most of the definitions on capacity are subjective and that they are shaped by the perspective, professional background and objectives of the researcher.

After clarifying this essential point, Morgan (2006) lists five different approaches with regards to the concept of capacity. The first approach, which was especially preferred by practitioners, is about perceiving capacity as a human resource which has something to do with skill, development and training at the individual level. The second one, which is generally preferred nowadays by practitioners and analysts, acknowledges that capacity goes beyond the conventional training and technical aspects into the realm of problem solving abilities and producing results. In other words, capacity is ‘the means’ to improve results and performance. The third approach, which is often shared by academics and researchers, describes capacity as a buzzword encompassing everything, thus an impractical concept. This perspective advocates for an improvement of existing approaches in public sector reform, institutional development, NGO management and good governance, instead of, seeking the Holy Grail for performance improvement, so to speak. They are usually sceptic on the function of capacity interventions in terms of performance development. The fourth approach, largely advocated by governments and international agencies, highlights the symbolic importance of the term which can incorporate a wide range of issues, such as 'ownership, commitment, innovation, partnership, learning, institutional development, decentralisation, public sector reform, knowledge management, change, scaling up, sustainability, participation, training accountability, performance improvement and so forth'. The idea in this perspective is that capacity is a flexible concept which can cover everything from micro to macro level. Therefore, any action can be implemented within the pretext of improving capacity. The last approach, according to Morgan, is a newly emerging way of thinking about capacity which is sort of a reaction to the former perspective. The argument here is that the former perspective (the fourth approach) fails to operationalise capacity in a practical manner. As a response, the last perspective advocates seeking some central ideas for capacity which can guide the action. This aspiration is placing the questions of 'how and why capacity emerges' next to the traditional question of 'what types of capacities are needed'.

Hence, the definitions on capacity vary depending on the researcher's approach to the concept. For instance, when studying the impact of capacity on performance management, Ingraham and Kneedler (2000) prefer a precise definition for capacity as 'government's ability to marshal, develop, direct and control its financial, human, physical and information resources'. By contrast, other studies give broader definitions such as 'a set of attributes that help or enable an organisation to fulfil its missions' (Eisinger, 2002), or 'the ability to carry out stated objectives' (Goodman et al., 1998). Chaskin (2001) describes capacity even in a more comprehensive manner as 'any quality that can promote or impede successes'.

The term 'governance capacity' as the synonym of power in governing has hardly been studied in the literature. The most comprehensive theoretical discussions on this matter have been presented by Dutch and Flemish scholars under the concept of 'bestuurskracht' which can be translated as the power of governing. For instance, according to Nielsen et al. (2000), *bestuurskracht* indicates the degree in which the government is successful in solving the problems or in avoiding the problems to occur. Derksen et al. (1987) argue that *bestuurskracht* in local government shows the capability of carrying out the tasks legally and solving the local problems and needs. Maes (1985), associates *bestuurskracht* with the ability to fulfil the daily needs of the citizens, which require the appropriate means (e.g. financial and personnel capacities), self-sufficiency and effectiveness on service delivery and a democratic and transparent organisation. Lastly, Delmartino (1975) suggests that the term incorporates the capability of local government in governing the locality, the ability of taking care of both cultural and material needs in the locality and the capability of solving the problems in the domain effectively.

To sum up, capacity can have 'thin' or 'thick' definitions depending on the scope of the study and on the perspective of the researcher. However, in order to grasp capacity one additional element is required: 'the context', which describes expectations, statements, tasks...etc. In this study, capacity will be studied within the context of local governance, which entails all the theoretical expectations in terms of better governance. The theoretical propositions on better governance oblige us to consider both expectations in relation to local governments but also in relation to the surrounding institutional environment. Furthermore, 'the context' is also affected by the country-specific conditions which delineate the tasks and functions expected from the local governments. In fact, capacity as a concept is like a liquid which takes the form of the container in which it is placed. Hence, the next part will focus on to define the conceptual features of capacity.

2.3.2 Conceptual features of capacity

The elusiveness of capacity impelled the researchers to identify the conceptual features of capacity. Overall, five different features of capacity have been underlined by various studies.

First of all, capacity is not a monolithic concept; it is the collective ability of different components. Each component preserves an aspect of capacity which is independent on its own but at the same time part of a whole. These components create jointly the capacity of the whole. Thus, capacity is also an outcome of the joint functioning of these components. Literature phrases this feature of capacity as 'the ends and the means to the ends'. In a more concrete example, there is no argument that Usain Bolt has a high capacity to run fast in short distances, but running fast is in the meantime an outcome of the good reaction time[3] and acceleration time[4].

Secondly, components of capacity are not necessarily tangible, quantifiable elements. The intangible elements such as 'responsibility, endeavour or team spirit' are as important as the skills and resources on capacity assessment. In fact, Kaplan (2000) argues that intangible

[3] The elapsed time to start running
[4] The required time to reach full speed

elements are more important and higher valued components of capacity, since they determine the organisational functioning.

Thirdly, usually capacity exists in a latent state. In other words, in different external conditions and/or with exterior interventions, capacity can reveal increased outcomes. In fact, this feature is the underlying rationale for capacity building practices. For instance, we know that with better training and new skills, the capacity of the subject can increase. However, the enigma is why we cannot achieve the same results with same practices in different cases. The answer to this question is partly related to the fourth and fifth features of capacity.

Fourthly, despite being latent, capacity is not necessarily a static concept. It can increase or decrease over time. The changes in capacity can be a result of exogenous or endogenous factors. In fact, this feature is related with the so-called 'capacity development' which is an important subject in the literature. The exogenous changes can be deliberate actions or they can occur because of the conditions in the surrounding environment. Going back to the runner example, Bolt had probably a good capacity to run fast even when he was a child, but his capacity has developed in time with growing up and having stronger muscles. Furthermore, his capacity has extended even more probably with good nutrition and trainings. So, the former refers to an endogenous change, while the latter can be an example of exogenous changes. In addition, Bolt grew up in Jamaica which is known for successful athletes and has a good tradition on running competitions. This is a good example for an enabling environment.

The fifth feature is that capacity is a multidimensional concept. In a descriptive example, Honadle & Howitt (1986:10) observed five different dimensions of capacity evidenced in a public organisation. First of all, capacity entails the ability of an organisation to *survive*, i.e. being self- sustaining. However, since public organisations are created to serve to the public and to keep a certain level of quality on public services, a definition limited with survival is inadequate to assess the capacity of a public sector organisation. Secondly, capacity can refer to the *power* of a public organisation to achieve social goals. Thirdly, capacity can be defined from an *institutional* perspective. Thus capacity can be regarded as the development and maintenance of organisations. Fourthly, capacity includes a *systemic* dimension, such as the ability to convert inputs into socially desirable outputs. Lastly, capacity can refer to the ability of a public organisation to carry out the self-defined objectives ('inner directedness') or directed objectives from external sources ('other directedness'). Honadle & Howitt (1986:13) conclude that capacity captures at a minimum all of these dimensions: survival, power, institutions, systems, conforming to local expectations and external standards.

In a nutshell, the researcher should pay attention to these aspects: (1) capacity comprises both the end also the means to the end; (2) capacity contains both tangible and intangible elements; (3) capacity can be in a latent state and change with external interventions; (4) capacity is not a static concept it can change as a result of endogenous and exogenous factors; (5) capacity is multidimensional. These underlying aspects of capacity are important to understand the nature of concept. Nonetheless, there are additional conceptual dimensions that need to be clarified in order to assess capacity comprehensively.

2.3.3 Capacity as a black box concept

So far, various caveats are mentioned on how to approach capacity as a concept and which aspects should be taken into consideration. Before moving to the theoretical dimensions of capacity in public governance, there is one essential element that needs to be mentioned as part of the conceptual discussion, and that is how to assess capacity. This element is important for particularly two reasons. First of all, capacity is not a standalone variable without an adjacent concept describing 'capacity of what?'. In this research, this adjacent concept is the local governance. Secondly, we cannot observe capacity directly. We can only observe the outcomes of the capacity, e.g. successes, failures or achievements. Similarly, we cannot observe the changes in capacity as well; we refer to the changes in outcomes as the changes in capacity. In other words, as the transformation of potential energy to a kinetic energy, capacity upholds the potential of the object to perform, which could only be assessed by the amount of energy released from the transformation of the object from a potential to a kinetic state.

These kinds of concepts are usually associated with the famous example of 'black box'. The Black box metaphor implies that we can observe the concept solely in terms of its input, output and transfer characteristics without any knowledge of its inner mechanism. As a result, measuring capacity requires additional concepts indicating the changes in the input or output stages. For this reason, concepts such as 'capability' or 'performance' are usually adjusted in empirical studies to seize the impact of capacity.

Indeed, the confusion between the meaning of capacity and its close synonyms - capability, competence and performance - is a conflicting theme. Franks (1999) makes a distinction between capacity and competencies or capabilities, where capability denotes 'the knowledge, skills and attitudes of the individuals or groups, and their competence to undertake the responsibilities assigned to them', whereas capacity refers to 'the overall ability of the individual or group to actually perform the responsibilities'. Franks underlines that capacities do not depend only on the capabilities of the people but also 'on the overall size of the tasks, the resources which are needed to perform them, and the framework within which they are discharged'.

Another scholar, Peter Morgan, (2006) defines capabilities as the collective skills that can be both technical and logistical or 'harder' and 'softer'[5]. The difference between capability and competence is that competences refer to the attributions of individuals. From his perspective, capacity is the construct of five core capabilities: the capability to act, the capability to generate development results, the capability to relate, the capability to adapt and the capability to integrate. Hence, capability encompasses pretty much everything which is required for a system to produce a value, whereas capacity is the ability of this system.

On the other hand, the distinction between performance and capacity is the latter corresponds to 'the means to achieve performance' (Honadle, 1981). Here, performance is the end product of the capacity. Similarly, Hou et al. (2003) describe capacity as a prerequisite for performance. In their study, they define capacity as the formal rules that 'restrain discretion and direct behaviour of both political and administrative actors in a way expected to facilitate the achievement of the performance objective'. Hence, performance is a key indicator to manipulate on capacity. Although it is not directly part of capacity, especially in empirical studies, changes in performances are usually taken as changes in capacity.

Clearly, scholars vary on their definitions depending on their research interests. Studies focusing on the impact of capacity focus on the output part and usually incorporate performance indicators to assess capacities. Other studies interested in the capabilities of actors prefer an input-oriented capacity definition in order to assess capacities. Yet, a comprehensive capacity assessment should integrate both input and output stages while taking into account the operational framework. For that matter, UNDP (2008) describes that an appropriate capacity assessment should be 'a structured and analytical process which should include assessment of various dimensions within the broader systems context, as well as the evaluation of specific entities and individuals within the system.'

[5] Morgan exemplifies 'harder' capabilities as 'policy analysis or financial management' and 'softer' capabilities as 'the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning and identity'.

One other crucial aspect in assessing capacity is, that capacity depends on temporal and spatial conditions within the given context. Gargan (1981) explains this statement with an example, that quality of contemporary urban life is superior for a great majority and same public services are much more efficient compared to 50 years ago. However, changing new conditions on public services, e.g. growing interdependencies in the public sector, changes in expectations regarding the adequacy of public services, emergence of qualitatively new public problems and redefinition of roles and rules in the policy processes, necessitated to re-define the notion of capacity in public management. As a consequence, lack of capacity does not have to necessarily emerge from inadequate resources to carry out objectives. Rather, changes in the expectations can create an assumed capacity gap. Therefore, it is essential to define the expectations from the subject before capacity assessment. The used analogy of Usain Bolt can also assist here to have a better understanding on capacity assessment. With his physical attributions and training, we would have expected a good result from Usain Bolt even in his earlier runs. If he couldn't have achieved good running times matching his attributions (i.e. input), we would have evaluated that he is not fully using his capacity. We wouldn't have had the same expectations about a runner with weaker qualities and trainings. Therefore, with our expectations we are creating different bars of evaluation for the same activity. The expectations we have created about Bolt have increased even more in time because of the phenomenal results he had achieved in consecutive runs. Therefore, any failure or any less fulfilling result will be judged on him not being able to use his full capacity. And lastly, to visualise the effect of the context, we wouldn't expect the same results from Bolt if he were 40 years old. Even though his timing is not as good as his previous runs, we would think he is using full capacity because our judgments have been shifted by the changes in his physical attributions.

To sum up, capacity is not a directly observable phenomenon. In our abstract thinking, we conceptualise capacity with inputs to entity and with outputs from the entity. Concepts such as capability or performance facilitate the analysis the inputs and outputs. Moreover, capacity assessment changes over time with changing conditions in the context. In other words, same abilities could be insufficient in different cases and in different times. Hence, capacity assessment should incorporate a clear understanding of contextual conditions as well.

2.3.4 Typologies of capacity in public governance

Literature on capacity in public governance is situated amid the organisational science, management science and development studies. Typically, the locus of theoretical works on capacity shows variations depending on the field of interest. Therefore, there are three different but complementary types of capacity in the literature. The first one is the 'management' or 'managerial' capacity, which generally corresponds to the managerial abilities of decision-makers in an organisation. The second, 'organisational' capacity reflects the whole ability of an organisation to produce intended outcomes. Organisational capacity encompasses all processes, resources (e.g. human, financial, technological...etc.), and competences existing in an organisation that regulate the internal and external functioning of the organisation. The third type of capacity, which might be called 'institutional', 'systemic' or 'societal' capacity, is based on the holistic assumption that the capacity of an organisation cannot be explained solely by its components. The functioning of an organisation is dependent on the conditions in the surrounding environment, and this capacity reflects the capacities existing in the milieu where the organisation is operating. Usually, studies on institutional capacity analyse how regulations, legal frameworks and policies affect the functioning of organisations, and try to assess the impact of coordination and governance of inter-organisational relations.

Hence, in public governance three distinct venues can be differentiated to trace capacity: (a) the capacity of decision-makers (i.e. managers and leaders of organisations), (b) the capacity of the organisation, and (c) the capacity existing in the surrounding environment of the organisation. Although each venue- or 'levels of capacity'- has different characteristics to be considered, they are conjoint and changes in one level has profound effects on other levels as well. Therefore, a comprehensive theoretical framework of local governance capacity should include all these different levels.

Figure 2.1 An analytical illustration for levels of capacity in governance



Source: Personal elaboration

Using this general understanding of governance capacity, the aim in this part is to identify first the underlying features of each level of capacity and later the capabilities referring to better governance under theoretical expectations.

a. Managerial capacity:

As mentioned previously, managerial capacity primarily focuses on the abilities and skills of the manager. In an early study, Honadle & Howitt (1986) explain a wide list of abilities that managerial capacity comprises. According to them, managerial capacity includes the ability of identifying problems and developing policies to solve these problems; conceiving programs for the implementation of the policies; attracting and absorbing financial, human, material and informational resources; managing these resources; and evaluating the activities for future guidance. In other words, managerial capacity conveys all competences pertaining to a manager which are required to bring the organisation into success.

Not all definitions on managerial capacity put the weight on the shoulders of the manager. According to Ingraham & Kneedler (2000:294), government's managerial capacity relies on 'management subsystems' driving the management of financial, human, material, and informational capital of the organisation. Nevertheless, the functioning of these management subsystems relies on environmental factors (e.g. characteristics of constituent populations and socioeconomic conditions) and qualifications of managers such as effective leadership, use of information, allocation of resources and a 'results focus'. Hence, in this definition, managerial capacity is formulated as an overarching ability of an organisation to allocate the necessary resources at the right time into the right place.

Contrary to Ingraham & Kneedler, Raboca et al. (2010) underline that managerial capacities do not rely on qualifications of management subsystems alone but on the way these systems are integrated. According to them, there are three aspects determining the managerial capacities of a public organisation: (1) managerial capacity depends on the configuration, the processes and the activities connected to the managerial subsystems and to the link between them; (2) managerial capacity depends on the way these systems are integrated; (3) managerial capacity depends on a result-oriented managerial system. In other words, the components of management systems (i.e. the act of leading and the processes), the integration of management systems and an overall vision to produce intended outcomes underline the three essentials of the managerial capacity. In a synthesising manner, Raboca et al. (2010) suggest that managerial capacity are "those competencies, skills, aptitudes possessed by the leading factors in an institution and which are necessary for managing the activities and the internal processes from the institution successfully".

To sum up, these three different but complementary definitions provide different scopes for managerial capacity. Managerial capacity can be limited with the abilities of the manager or it can incorporate all managerial processes and systems .

b. Organisational capacity:

The literature on organisational capacity shows a great variation in terms of subject of study. Public bodies and governmental organisations, private sector organisations, voluntary and community based organisation have been units of analysis in different studies so far. Nevertheless, a review of literature on organisational capacity indicates usually similar aspects for organisational capacity.

To start with, Honadle (1981) states that organisational capacity of a local government includes 'the ability to forge effective links with other organisations; processes for solving problems; coordination among disparate functions; and mechanisms for institutional learning'. Furthermore, she claims that the capacity of an organisation is not limited only with the inputs such as resources on personnel, revenue, information or community support. The real strength of an organisation lies in its capacity to attract and absorb resources.

In another study on community development centers, Glickman and Servon (1998) define five major components of capacity: resources, effective leadership, an external helping network, specialised skills to undertake housing and development projects, and political resources. Similarly, Eisinger (2002) underlines five critical capacity elements; resources, effective leadership, skilled and sufficient staff, a certain level of institutionalisation, and links to the larger community environment. Again, Austin identifies five aspects for organisational capacity: normative vision (indicating missions, values and strategies); societal context (social space); requisite resources (human, financial, information…etc.); actors (institutions, networks, individuals) and functions required (planning, decision making…etc.)

In a nutshell, organisational capacity, regardless of the type of organisation, incorporates internal and external dimensions of an organisation. Organisational capacity is not only about the resources, capital, structures, processes which are required for the organisation to function. Additionally, links with external environment and the relations with other organisations are equally important.

c. Institutional capacity:

There are different applications of institutional capacity in the literature. In some studies on local governments, institutional capacity corresponds to the local environment that the public organisation is operating. Other studies describe institutional capacity as the overall capacity of the institution wherein various organisations operate. Nevertheless, institutional capacity is perceived in general as the governability of the domain. In that sense, the most important aspect on institutional capacity is to understand to what extent the environment contributes to the organisation's objectives. Especially, studies on local governments and institutional development underline the institutional capacity as an important aspect to be considered on capacity building programs.

For instance, Gargan (1981) states that capacities of local governments rely at any point in time on the interaction between community expectations, community problems and community resources. By this token, expectations involve 'perceptions and attitudes on adequate levels of public services, appropriate styles of political leadership, and accepted ways of conducting public affairs.' Resources include tangible elements such as money, knowledge, administrative skills, private sector associations, neighbourhood organisations and political popularity but they are not limited to these. Problems, on the other hand, refer to the community specific issues which entail different preferences to accomplish the objectives. In short, Gargan proposes a definition for local government capacity as 'a function of expectations, resources and problems', and underlines that the local government capacity problem is 'more a conceptual problem than a management practices and techniques one.'

Chaskin (2001:292) notes three aspects on community capacity; the existence of resources, networks of relationships, and leadership in pursuing a community's objectives. Cairns et al. (2005), on the other hand, underline the importance of 'social capital' which indicates the social ties between individuals and groups in the society, on capacity building efforts on communities.

Cornell (2002) states that the three components for institutional capacity are; institutional authority (decision-making and control over assets, strategies, programs), institutional environment (the rules and incentives set up by any society), institutional effectiveness (administrative competence of the society).

On all definitions, the governability of society, the existing formal and informal conditions regulating the social interactions, political culture and the compatibility of the organisation with these societal conditions appear as the key aspects for institutional capacity.

2.3.5 Which capabilities does the local government need for local governance?

The changing roles and ways of interactions in local governance have altered the capabilities needed by the local government regarding the managerial, organisational and institutional capacities. In this part, the roles, skills and qualifications associated with managerial, organisational and institutional levels of capacity in local government will be elaborated.

a. Managerial capabilities for local governance

The roles, which are associated with the public managers and head of local governments, have changed drastically parallel to the shift in governance. In traditional public administration, regardless of the political configuration, the head of local government was the agent of both central authority and citizens. The primary responsibility of local governments was to ensure the public service delivery and implementation of policies within the capacity of their organisations and assure the satisfaction of both principals. These sets of relations can be named as a function in a two-dimensional system where the manager was an interlocutor for demand and supply relationship between central authority and citizens. Therefore, the capacity of local government was determined alongside the fruitful relationships with central authority. Nevertheless, these classical functions of local representatives have altered, first by NPM and later by the contributions of governance philosophy. More and more, the head of local government is expected to be an active, entrepreneurial and independent actor who can juggle among national, international and local actors to acquire the necessary capital to satisfy various private, public and civilian interests.

Eventually, these new roles have necessitated new capabilities and skills to become competent. First of all, a new mode of leadership is required for local governance. The politically neutral, executive leaders are no longer satisfactory. The fragmented nature of local politics and conflicting interests demand stronger brokerage and linking abilities (Pierre & Peters, 2000; Bekkers et al., 2011). Therefore a strong leader is no longer one who can execute the policies relying on the legislative powers, but one who can create 'safe places' for the organisational and societal interactions. Naturally, these new responsibilities require new individual characteristics and abilities. According to Minnaar and Bekker (2005:141-2), great organisational leaders hold the following characteristics; a special charisma, self-belief that tends to bother on arrogance at times, the ability to move out a 'comfort zone' in order to shift traditional paradigms, the ability to question the status quo, which makes these people good innovators, an ability to convince others to follow them in pursuit of a new direction. Similarly, a strong leader for local governance is the one who can set the vision for others to follow, and in addition to it builds motivation and trust among contributing partners. Furthermore, a strong leader should acquire the necessary skills to face with challenges in volatile conditions and resolve the problems effectively arising by conflicting interests. Therefore, as John (2000:135) underlines from the governance perspective a strong leader is the one who is capable to lead the partnerships built by various actors. Many leaders, who lack the ability to empathise and to be imaginative, fail to be successful in their endeavour (Goss, 2001:193).

Second, the reliance on legal and constitutional powers is no longer satisfactory for competency. As Pierre & Peters (2000:198) stated, these powers are replaced with 'entrepreneurial skills', 'political zeal' and 'brokerage abilities'. Hence, the source of legitimacy has become an important part of the debate. In this sense, Moore (1996) offers that successful managers should build legitimacies for their actions through managing relationships with politicians and public. Likewise, Goss (2001: 161) states that managers should sponsor innovation, manage risk and legitimacy.

Third, the type of knowledge sought by the managers has changed. Nowadays, reliance on professional knowledge like financial management, project management or human resources management is less and less sufficient to determine action (Goss, 2001:163). The knowledge on how to extract the resources and capacities of others and channel them into a socially valuable action is becoming more predominant (Goss, 2001:161). Unfortunately, these multidimensional conditions of governance are challenging many public servants who are used to work in straight lines and thus frequently fail to provide the knowledge sought by the managers. Hence, public managers should pioneer new education and training activities for their staff to enable self-directedness and self-driven learning (Du Plessis, 2008:134).

Lastly, the previously explained two-dimensional sets of relations between central authority and citizens have turned into a multidimensional setting. In the current situation, neither the central authority has the monopoly on capital, nor are the demands directed through conventional sources. Citizens are taking part directly or collaboratively in decision-making and implementation processes which are turning them into active shareholders rather than passive public service receivers. Therefore, new sort of responsibilities have emerged for head of local governments. On the one hand, Osborn (2009: 414) states that 'stakeholder management' is an important duty in new public governance. On the other hand, Voets & De Rynck (2011:209) argue that 'boundary-scanning' and 'boundary-spanning' activities are required to create inter-relations among various actors. In other words, head of local governments or public managers should bring information about their environment to their organisations and keep the other actors informed about their organisation. Voets & De Rynck define five distinct roles through which network managers can create innovative capacity to deal with inter-institutional challenges. These roles are 'vision keeper', 'creative thinker', 'network promoter', 'network champion' and 'network operator'. A public leader should combine these different aspects or at least lead to create necessary organisational conditions to cover these responsibilities.

b. Organisational capabilities for local governance

The abovementioned capacities for managers are only applicable if they are backed with capable organisations. Some general characteristics of capable organisations are same for all types of organisations. For instance, a capable organisation is usually well aligned with the overall strategy, has clear and simple tasks for employees, and acquires sufficient resources and effective working systems. Nevertheless, these classical capacity components are subject to change due to changing expectations from local governments. The introverted, socially detached local governments are no longer valid to be capable organisations. Local governments are expected to generate new tools and ways to interact with citizens, to be flexible and to be able to respond effectively on rapidly changing conditions. These features demand first and foremost, a fundamental change on the organisational behaviour. Hence, local governments should adopt effective means to ensure organisational learning and acquisition of knowledge.

There are different approaches for organisational learning. One approach indicates that organisational learning starts from individual level, thus individual learning is essential for the organisations (Goss, 2001: 174). On the other hand, other scholars argue that collective action is the source of organisational knowledge (Argyris and Schön, 1996), and that the organisation should create suitable conditions through rewarding and encouraging the acquisition of knowledge. Another possibility is that individuals can actively support organisational learning by sharing knowledge. However, one caveat here is that if individuals feel themselves competing with others, they will most probably use their knowledge to achieve supremacy over others thus this attempt will most likely be unsuccessful (Goss, 2001:175). Considering all these different approaches, Goss (2001: 176-7) gives some examples where organisational learning can take place:

- Deliberately giving managers and staff time to think and reflect.
- Spending the development time not acquiring new skills but exploring the wider environment.
- Valuing of diversity of perspective, experience and background. Including people in teams because of their difference.
- Designing challenge and discussion processes into new initiatives and everyday work.
- Including practice exchange into all day-to-day work, scheduling visits, job swaps, secondments as well as workshops and conferences.
- Developing ‘creativity spaces’ either using the internet or intranets, or setting up improvisation or innovation workshops.
- Accessing ideas from outside- turning data from users into easily accessible information; using user-consultants.

- Creating 'learning laboratories'.
- Storing knowledge in easily accessible ways.
- Linking the organisation to other organisations' data systems.
- Ensuring easy access to the internet for work purposes- creating internal networks, intranets, chat lines, on-line discussions and problem-solving groups.
- Building-in debriefing and reflection time to all meetings and projects.
- Debriefing all projects and initiatives carefully; identifying learning points, sharing them and storing them to learn from next time.
- Developing effective evaluation systems.

Considering these various steps, Goss suggests several methods and techniques to increase organisational learning for local governance. Negotiation workshops, citizen juries, community workshops, interactive conferences and open-space events are suggested as some options where local people, politicians and managers can share their ideas on solutions for local problems (Goss, 2001:194).

In addition to organisational learning and acquiring the necessary knowledge to adapt the conditions of local governance, organisations need to develop the means to seize required resources. Most importantly, acquisition of information and money are essential for the organisational capacity. An organisation has to obtain the necessary revenue bases to be able to respond to the expectations. Especially, the decentralisation of various services necessitates an adequate tax revenue base for local governments and the ability to generate income through commercial activities in private market. In cases where local administration lack revenue-raising capacity, local governments become dependent to central funding via direct and indirect transfer of capital. Moreover, Kroukamp & Lues (2008: 112) argue that the authority and the capacity in raising revenue is critical for better service provisions, and in addition, the imposition of taxes forces local governments to become more responsible. However, acquiring private investment is usually a challenge for local governments since they need to employ less coercive instruments and adopt less rigid political and administrative control to be attractive towards private investors. For instance, state institutions can lay regulatory policy instruments for private capital, but in a globalised economy this action could lead to reverse outcomes such as replacement of private investments into less hostile environments (Pierre &Peters, 2000: 204). Moreover, most of the time mobilising the resources from private sector requires inter-organisational and interpersonal trust to be developed beforehand (Reddy, 2008: 65).

The capital on information relies primarily on acquiring the technology and establishing the necessary instruments to gather information on residents' needs and on partnerships with private companies. To oversee the contracts with private companies, public organisations need the necessary human capital to develop and adopt effective information systems, which should be supplemented with transparency to ensure feedbacks (Kettle, 2009: 252). Similarly, feedbacks on citizens' needs to rely on transparency in government activities. Thus, setting some certain standards of excellence in terms of accountability and transparency can facilitate the trust and eventually the feedback into government institutions (Charlesworth, Cook and Crozier, 2003: 13).

The management of these two capitals brought up another important element for organisational capacity which is the capacity to tackle with public-private partnerships and participations of citizens. According to Rhodes (1997:138-41) some key factors in partnership working include: 'a clear strategic focus, strategic leadership and support, the importance of trust, organisations and people in partnerships, capacity for cooperation and mutualism, organisational complementarity, co-location and coterminosity, the value of action and outcome-oriented procedures'. Trafford and Proctor (2006:120) also identify some key elements for successful partnerships such as good communication, openness, effective planning, ethos and direction. Training the staff who takes part in partnerships, is also essential for successful partnerships. Especially, joint studies between involving parties can facilitate to develop a common vocabulary and understanding on how to work together (Mcquaid in Osborne, 2009: 140). In fact, governing the interactions with private sector and citizens is part of the discussion with 'metagovernance'. Metagovernance can be described as governing the relations among governance actors. According to Jessop, governments can adopt several actions for metagovernance which can :

- provide the ground rules for governance and the regulatory order in and through which governance partners can pursue their aims;
- ensure the compatibility or coherence of different governance mechanisms and regimes;
- act as the primary organiser of the dialogue among policy communities;
- deploy a relative monopoly of organisational intelligence and information with which to shape cognitive expectations;
- serve as a ' court of appeal' for disputes arising within and over governance;

- seek to re-balance power differentials by strengthening weaker forces or systems in the interest of system integration and/or social cohesion;
- try to modify the self-understanding of identities, strategic capacities, and interests of individual and collective actors in different strategic contexts and hence alter their implications for preferred strategies and tactics. (in eds. Stoker, 2000: 23)

Last but not least, the organisational capacity relies on clear processes of planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of governance services. Only the organisations with managerial and technological capabilities can provide the coordination of these processes.

c. Institutional capabilities for local governance

Effective partnerships and successful engagements with society are fundamental in local governance. However, there might be difficulties for local governments to engage with society and private sector if these actors lack the capacity to contribute as a shareholder. Hence, recently the enhancement of capacities in localities has become a priority in capacity building programmes.

Nevertheless, there are multiple forms of capabilities that local governments should acquire under institutional capacity. Institutional capacity can be related to the ability of governance systems to build new institutions to create means of collaborations through formal and informal ways with society (see Matthiesen, 2002); to the creation of 'micro political processes' within neighbourhoods which can annihilate the processes which produce social exclusion (see Allen & Cars, 2002); to a style of policy making which relies on negotiation and persuasion which allows mutual learning (see Taylor, 2002); or to the capacity or organisations to create new relationships for engaging collective action (see Healey, 1998). A fair assumption shall include all these aspects as part of institutional capacity. Therefore, the abilities to engage and build relations, abilities to learn and use the knowledge or the abilities to build necessary institution to enable collective actions are some dimensions of institutional capacity in local governments.

As in public organisations, being an active participant in institutional scale requires a learning process for adaptation. Nevertheless, there are some fundamental differences among societies which have detrimental impact on the learning process. For instance, having a prior culture of engagement with politics or trust in institutions facilitates the transition process.

The learning capacities of communities show variations depending on socio-cultural backgrounds. Yet, there are different actions to enhance learning capacities of communities. Basically, learning capacities of a region relies on the capacity of its members to participate into negotiation and co-operation processes with each other and with government organisations. Thus, most of the community capacity building programmes include supporting civil society organisations and building necessary skills among their staff, training facilitators, supporting entrepreneurship within communities and supporting community leaders (Goss, 2001: 189-90). However, learning is not a linear process. Especially, for communities with lack of culture on participation and cooperation, a process of exploration and testing on participation is required to build self- aware, self-managing communities (Goss, 2001, 191). Similarly, De Visser (2005:133) underlines that the success of public participation does not depend on formal actions to regulate the system but instead on inculcating a culture of community participation by utilising innovation and creativity in actions. In a nutshell, building institutional capacity requires a process of learning for the community whereby experimenting and informal ways of interactions are necessary to enable sustainable participation.

Following the learning process, the second important aspect in institutional capacity is the engagement of actors into cooperation and partnership projects. One essential element regarding this aspect is that the governance mechanism should provide the necessary conditions for actors to reach an agreement over their actions. Therefore, there is a need of a clear framework indicating the rules of engaging with each other. World Governance Survey (WGS) identifies six sub-components to assess the governance framework in different countries (Kjaer, 2004:169):

1) Rules that shape the way citizens raise and become aware of public issues (civil society),

2) Rules that shape the way issues are combined into policy by political institutions (political society),

3) Rules that shape the way policies are made by government institutions (government),

4) Rules that shape the way policies are administered and implemented by public servants (bureaucracy),

5) Rules that shape the way state and market interact to promote development (economic society),

6) Rules that shape the setting for resolution of disputes and conflicts.

This list gives a useful array of aspects for successful engagements in local governance. It is crucial for the actors to have certainty on roles and responsibilities. Actors in partnerships should have recognised and legitimate roles, and different identities and interests should be represented. Moreover, a clear framework is also essential to avoid possible coordination problems which can adversely affect effective partnerships.

On the other hand, the incentives to participate in cooperative projects with political institutions should be tangible for both private and societal actors (Pierre & Peters, 2000: 200). Thus, actors will be more enthusiastic on sustaining the partnerships.

However, a core element which affects directly the engagement of actors is the mutual trust of actors towards each other. Trust is a crucial factor since it facilitates the cooperation and the flow of information between actors in networks (Klijn, 2009: 318). Likewise, Kale et al. (2000:218) argue that 'relational capital'- i.e. the level of mutual trust that arises out of close interaction at the individual level between alliance partners- is an important strategic resource to ensure successful partnerships. Especially, considering the high level of failure rates[6] among private-public partnerships, relational capital appears as a reliable resource against such failures (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Gulati et al. 2000; Osborne et al., 2009:194). Although trust in community is deeply intermingled with socio-cultural factors, informal interactions and 'open networks' seem operational tools to build trustworthy relations in local communities (Bekkers et al., 2011:211).

The last dimension in institutional capacity is the 'governability' of the local community. In the literature, it is possible to find various terms and definitions that address this society related dimension of institutional capacity. In fact, in many studies institutional capacity refers solely to the capacity existing in the society. Nevertheless, this dimension of institutional capacity relies on the assumption that certain social structures in a community are fundamental on its governance performance. One core concept in this discussion is created by Putnam (1994) with the term of 'social capital' which refers to "the features of social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions' (Putnam, 1994:167). According to Putnam, societies with limited social capital will likely perform poorly on democratic governance. Even though we have limited knowledge on how institutions affect the generation of social capital (Hooghe & Stolle, 2003), most of the literature on institutional capacity is drawn on various dimensions

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[6] Different authors give a range changing between 30-70 % of failure for public-private partnerships (see. Duysters et al. 1998; Park and Ungson, 2001; Overby, 2006; Klijn 2009:194)

of social capital. For instance, Car et al. (2002:54) build on this basis the concept of ‘institutional capital’. According to them, institutional capital refers to the social capital in a governance context, and institutional capacity means ‘transforming, creating and mobilising the institutional capital of a place in the collective effort of shaping its future.’ In this definition, institutional capital links three essential elements for social interactions: ‘knowledge resources’, ‘relational resources’ and ‘mobilisation capacity’. Knowledge resources refer to ‘the frames of reference, creativity and knowledgeability, the conceptions of place and identity relevant to governance’. Relational resources comprise ‘the resources of trust and co-operation contained in networks, the nature of bonding elements in them and networks to draw resource, rules and ideas into the effort of collective action.’ Mobilisation capacity, on the other hand, is the capacity of stakeholders in a locality to mobilise the knowledge and relational resources to act collectively for a common goal.

Finally, Cars et al. (2002:200-1) provide a comprehensive summary of list of factors which might have positive and negative influence on local institutional capacity. They cluster these factors as internal and external factors. According to this;

a) factors that help to build local institutional capacity:

- internal: ‘shared intellectual, social and political capital, which is expressed in the ability to widen the search for consensus beyond the immediate issue, grounded in understanding of basic community values and perceptions; sufficient trust in other stakeholders to negotiate trade-offs in the confidence that other parties will deliver on their commitments; organisational and resource support for continuing contact, basic information and collaborative responses to external challenges;

- external: a style of government that recognises and rewards ‘joined-up thinking’ and local collaborative effort.’

b) factors that tend to destroy local institutional capacity:

- internal: lack of investment of time and staff resource in building social and political relationships between local stakeholders and developing common information bases; collaboration narrowly focused on specific issues; lack of a strong base in community values;

- external: a top-down style of government in which connections across departmental boundaries are not recognised; appraisal and performance measurement regimes which allocate funds on the basis of sectional and short-run outputs rather than strategic and cross-sectoral outcomes.

d. Summary

This concluding part gives an array of features, competences and abilities associated with local governance capacity in managerial, organisational and institutional levels. In a nutshell, for successful local governance, actors need cooperation, coordination, mutual learning, and joint reaction to changing conditions. These overarching functions demand new abilities and acquisitions of new competences with regards to the material and human resources, knowledge, regulatory frameworks, information systems, individual qualifications and socio-cultural conditions in local framework. The Table 2.2 presents the list of capabilities associated with high local governance capacity.

Table 2.2 List of capabilities for local governance

Managerial capabilities	Personal skills such as being entrepreneurial, politically active, visionary, empathiser, creative and imaginative; The personal knowledge on how to extract resources; Ability to face challenges in volatile conditions. Leadership which sponsor innovation, pioneer new education and training activities for staff to enable self-directedness and self-driven learning; Clear and simple tasks for employees; Clear processes for planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation; Having a good communication between manager and staff. Leadership which promote boundary-spanning and boundary-scanning; Leadership which can build legitimacy. Leadership with brokerage and linking abilities which promote interrelations among actors; Strategic leadership compliable with a strategic vision;
Organisational capabilities	Being well-aligned with the overall strategy; Sufficient human, financial and material resources;

	Effective working systems; Capable informational & financial systems; Having enable conditions for organisational learning. Good communication mechanisms; Being transparent and accountable; Having links to external knowledge resources; A process of exploration and testing on participation
Institutional capabilities	Trust into private and state institutions; Trust into the members of the community; Having a culture of community participation and a strong base in community values; Being entrepreneurial. Mutually accepted rules on building and sustaining partnerships; Representation of different identities and interests; A framework which indicates rules of engagement with society; Clear incentives for cooperative projects. Shared intellectual, social and political capital
Overarching capabilities	Safe places for mutual interactions; Ground rules and regulatory order for governance; Mutual trust among actors in local governance; The means and actions to resolve disputes; Compatibility and coherence between different governance mechanisms; Legitimate and recognised roles for actors in partnerships~~;~~ Informal interactions and open networks; Collaborative responses to external challenges

2.4 The Relationship between Local Governance Capacity and Decentralisation in Local Governance

This final section of this chapter brings together all the assumptions and findings derived from the literature on capacity and decentralisation in local governance. Firstly, an operational analytical model will be constructed to study local governance capacity where the aim will be to correspond the expectations from local government in terms of governance with the managerial, organisation and institutional capabilities associated with local governance. Secondly, on the basis of the analytical model hypotheses will be derived to explain the relationship between local governance capacity and decentralisation in local governance.

2.4.1 An analytical model for local governance capacity

In this research, local governance is perceived close to the Pierre& Peters' definition as 'steering the actors in localities in order to cover the service provision and demands of citizens, whereas the local government is the *primus inter pares*'. However, this theoretical stance towards local governance does not exclude the role of other actors by limiting their functions as passive bystanders steered by the local government, but also takes into account their relational position. Thus, a model should incorporate both the capacity dimensions of local government as well as the institutional surrounding of the local government.

This theoretical approach towards governance holds the local government responsible for mobilising the resources from the actors in locality and channelling them wisely to the needs of the public. Hence, three fundamental functions are expected from local government; (1) mobilising the resources, (2) decision-making and (3) implementation.

The capabilities deemed for local governance capacity can be clustered under seven categories. (1) Financial capabilities, (2) Material capabilities, (3) Communication capabilities, (4) Planning capabilities, (5) Managerial capabilities, (6) Human resource capabilities, and (7) Socio-economic capabilities or local capabilities. The last category is not under the domain of local government but it reflects the socio-economic capabilities of the surrounding environment.

In reference to the Table 2.2., financial capabilities incorporate the sufficient financial resources as well as the means to extract the financial resources. Similarly, material capabilities incorporate sufficient material resources and effective means to acquire the necessary equipment for service delivery. Communication capabilities include the means, processes and systems for the exchange of the information between the managers, the organisation and the other institutions in locality. Planning capabilities refer to the methods and processes to strategise between the actions, goals and the financial means of the local government. Managerial capabilities refer to the leadership qualities of managers as well the features of the management systems and methods to ensure the effective delivery of actions. Finally, human resource capabilities pertain to the qualitative and quantitative features of the personnel as well the means to enhance the abilities of the personnel.

In fact, the three functions designated to the local government for local governance correspond largely to the abovementioned six categories of capabilities for local governance, thus creating the basis to build up the analytical model for local governance capacity. In a nutshell, 'mobilising the resources' pertains to the financial and material capabilities; 'decision-making' pertains to planning and communication capabilities; and 'implementation' pertains to human resource and managerial capabilities.

Hence, four subcategories can be identified to grasp capacities in local governance including the socio-economic dimension of the surrounding environment: (1) mobilisation capacity; (2) decision-making capacity; (3) implementation capacity; (4) local capacity. Since the first three functional capacities are part of the local government's acts and responsibilities in terms of local governance, they are categorised under 'local governance capacity'. The relational approach towards governance necessitates the local capacity as part of the capacities in local governance but it is not part of the local government's domain and should be categorised on its own.

Mobilisation capacity focuses on the abilities and means of the local government in mobilising the financial and material resources needed for services and functions. Three sub-areas are defined according to the stages in mobilising the resources; (1) the ability in bringing in the financial resources for purchasing, (2) the capability in channelling the financial resources for the purchasing goods and services, (3) the adequacy in financial and material means for municipal functions.

Decision-making capacity indicates the ability in deciding on how to allocate and where to allocate the mobilised resources. The former is a clear indication of planning capabilities. On the other hand, the best decision on where to allocate the resources can only be attained with adequate and effective means of information. Therefore, decision-making capacity should bring together capacity components regarding the planning and communication aspects of local governance.

For a higher capacity in implementation, local governments require higher capacities in management and human resources. The managerial dimension incorporates the individual skills and abilities of the managers, as well as management practices to increase performance in the organisation. Education, experience, collaboration and initiative taking in management and management practices for higher performances are the foci in managerial dimension. Additionally, successful implementation also relies on the quality and the sufficiency of the municipal personnel

Figure 2.2 An analytical model for local governance capacity



2.4.2 The relationship between local capacity, local governance capacity and decentralisation in local governance

This research departs from two research questions (1) how should policy makers decide on the degree of decentralisation in order to get the best outcome on local governance, and (2) how do the capacities existing in local government and in locality affect this outcome. The literature review on decentralisation has contested the arguments suggesting that more decentralisation leads to better governance and instead a pareto optimum is foreseen to ensure the best outcome in governance. It is assumed that if the conditions, which determine the success in decentralised local governance can be understood, the pareto optimum in decentralisation can be designated.

With regards to the relationship between decentralisation and capacity, there are two prevailing debates in the literature. First, whether decentralisation leads to an increase in capacities or certain capacities are preconditioned for the success of decentralisation. Second, how varying degrees of capacity affect decentralisation? Actually, the first debate is partly related with the conceptual feature of the capacity, as capacity is not a static concept and it can change in time due to exogenous and endogenous driven factors. Hence, it is highly likely both arguments are valid in the sense that once decentralisation takes place, local government will develop certain capacities for successful decentralisation while local governments with already existing capacities will perform better in terms of governance. In fact, both debates boil down to the primary question of 'which capacities are associated with decentralisation?' Only after determining the capacities associated with decentralisation, the questions 'how varying degrees of capacity affect decentralisation?' or 'how changes in capacities affect the outcome in decentralisation?' can satisfactorily be addressed.

The literature review suggests that the conditions determining the outcome of decentralisation in local governance are expected to be associated with the local government's capacities and the socio-economic conditions in the locality if the contextual conditions (i.e. socio-cultural and legal framework) are taken as ceteris paribus. Hence, any relation encountered between the capacities marked in Figure 2.2 and decentralisation in local governance, should shed light on the question when decentralisation leads to better governance.

In reference to the theoretical discussion between local governance capacity, local capacity and decentralisation in local governance, the following three hypotheses can be derived regarding the relationship;

H1: Decentralisation is influenced by local governance capacity while the impact of local capacity is limited or insignificant on decentralisation.

H2: Decentralisation is influenced both by local governance capacity and local capacity significantly, and both capacities independently affect decentralisation

H3: Decentralisation is influenced by local capacity while the impact of local governance capacity apart is limited or insignificant

The H1 suggests that there is not a direct relationship between local capacity and decentralisation where the impact of local capacity is only effective via its influence on local governance capacity. In H1, local governance capacity is an intervening variable between local capacity and decentralisation. Therefore, local capacity influences local governance capacity but not directly decentralisation.

H2 suggests that local capacity has also a direct relationship with decentralisation, and in this case the level of local capacity would affect the impact of local governance capacity on decentralisation.

If H1 represents the reality, a decision on decentralisation should depend on the assessment of the capacities in local government. In this scenario, higher decentralisation can lead to better governance as long as there is enough local governance capacity regardless of the degree of local capacity. However, if H2 represents the reality, the socio-economic conditions in the locality should be a matter of concern on implementing decentralisation policies and on the following capacity building practices.

Nevertheless, the literature does not exclude the possibility that the presumed relationship between local governance capacity and decentralisation is shaped by the local capacity and the socio-economic conditions are the main determinant on decentralisation. The H3 would suggest that the relationship between local governance capacity and decentralisation is explained by the degree of local capacity, whereas the relationship between local governance capacity and decentralisation is only determined by the local capacity.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, the main emphasis has been setting out the theoretical framework for analysing the relationship between decentralisation and capacity in local governance. Governance, despite being a popular concept in political science, remains a puzzling concept due to its multiple meanings. In this dissertation, local governance has been defined as steering the actors in localities in order to cover the service provision and demands of citizens, whereas the local government is the *primus inter pares*. In this sense, local governance capacity is determined by the capabilities of local government in managerial, organisational and institutional levels which comprises financial, material, planning, communication, human resources and managerial dimensions. These dimensions are categorised analytically into three functions of local governance, i.e. mobilisation of resources, decision-making and implementation. Furthermore, the socio-economic capabilities existing in the surrounding environment is identified as the local capacity. Decentralisation, on the other hand, can refer to a process or a state to identify the discretion of local government in fiscal, administrative and political dimensions in comparison to central government. The theories on the relationship of decentralisation and local governance suggest that better local governance relies on the accountability, effectiveness and efficiency in public service delivery and responsiveness on local expectations and this link can only be attained effectively if the local government is financially dependent on local resources and has the discretion to implement the decision on public services. Nevertheless, empirical findings in single country cases identified a variety of factors contesting this assumption and suggesting that country case specific conditions need to be taken into account.

In the following chapter, the local administration system in Turkey and its implications on local governance capacity and decentralisation in local governance will be elaborated. The specific conditions in Turkey will provide the context to supplement the theoretical aspects given in this chapter and subsequently the measurement method for the research will be selected.

CHAPTER III- TURKISH LOCAL GOVERNANCE

3.1 Introduction

The third chapter contextualises the theoretical propositions on the relationship between decentralisation and capacity with the institutional and structural conditions of the Turkish local governance. The purpose of this chapter is not only to familiarise the reader with the features of local governance in Turkey, but also to demarcate the country specific factors which might affect the relationship between decentralisation and capacity in local governance.

The chapter starts with an overview of Turkish public administration system. It sheds light on the historical evolution of the local government system in Turkey and elaborates the laws regulating the local government system. A further emphasis will be given on local administration reforms after 2002 which reshaped the local government system. The focus will be on the novelties brought by the reform process and their implication in decentralisation. The subsequent parts will focus on the local capacity and local governance capacity in Turkish case by elaborating respectively the non-state actors in the locality and the capabilities in the local administrations.

3.2 An Overview of Turkish Public Administration

The Turkish public administration system is established on the basis of a strong central authority which presides over localities through a tutelage relation. This system is usually known in public administration literature as ‘Napoleonic’ administrative tradition (Peters, 2008). Some general features of this administrative model are a highly centralised state structure, dependency on deconcentrated central field agencies, and constitutional status of local administration bodies (Hesse & Sharpe, 1991).

Turkey is a unitary state and has two tiers of administration; the central and the local administration. In 1999, as part of the EU membership process, regional development agencies have been created based on NUTS system. However, these agencies do not have administrative competences, and constitutionally they are under the jurisdiction of central authority.

The Turkish administrative scheme is divided into 81 provinces which are governed by a governor who is appointed by the Ministry of Interior. The governor is the highest marked appointee of the central authority in provinces and its main function is to channel between locality and the central authority. Albeit once being the highest decision making authority in provinces, the governor has now a more regulatory position on local issues rather than being the final decision-making authority. Provinces are subdivided into districts which are governed by appointed *kaymakam*s. Local administrations in provinces are represented by the elected local authorities. The principal local administrations are the municipalities. The other local administrations are the Special Provincial Administrations (SPAs) and Villages.

Municipalities are the backbone of local government system in Turkey, with 83.9 % of Turkish population (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2012) lives in municipalities or metropolitan municipalities. There are in total 2950 municipalities in Turkey. Sixteen of them are metropolitan municipalities which have particular jurisdictional powers and structures comparing to others. Yet, all municipalities share the same responsibilities on providing public services in their jurisdiction. Metropolitan municipalities are established in 1984 for larger urban areas where the population exceeds 750.000 inhabitants. In contrast to other municipalities, metropolitan municipalities have two-tiers of administration in which the metropolitan administration (second tier) is vested with the responsibility of coordinating the district municipalities (first tier).

SPAs are public bodies which mostly operate in rural areas outside the jurisdiction of municipalities for the provision of services such as construction of roads, infrastructure, schools and health facilities. SPAs are established following the French example of *département* system. The main legislative body of the SPA is an elected provincial council but the SPA is headed by the governor. Thus, for many years, the status of SPAs has been contested as a local government unit since the governor's direct involvement on decision-making process. Only with recent legislative changes, the status of the governor has been deprived from an administrative to a regulatory position. Villages, on the other hand, are the local administration bodies of small communities in rural areas. They are governed by an elected alderman's council and an elected *muhtar*. Although villages are recognised as public organisations subject to the law on villages (issued in 1924), they don't have allocated financial sources to carry out their own services. Therefore, all village services are delivered by SPAs. The legal framework for each consecutive body is defined by separate laws and determined by general principles on local administrations in the constitution.

In the Turkish constitution, there are two main principles which determine the functioning of local administration system. The crucial one is ‘integral unity in administration’ principle which enables a strong tutelage relation between central authority and local government. The second principle, ‘decentralisation’, refers to the allocation of power to public bodies in functional and territorial bases (TODAIE, 2007:13). The territorial bodies are elected public bodies which are established to cover the needs of habitants in a geographically defined territory (Gözler, 2003:125). These bodies are named as ‘local administrations’. There are four different types of local administrations; i.e. Special Provincial Administration, Municipality, Metropolitan Municipality and Village.

The functional bodies, on the other hand, are public corporate bodies, which are established outside of central hierarchy to cover scientific, economic, trade, social or technical purposes which require a specialised expertise (TODAIE, 2007:13). Thus, on the functional public bodies, ‘decentralisation’ corresponds to service purposes not to a territorial entity.

Figure 3.1: Public Authorities according to ‘decentralisation principle’



Source: TODAIE, 2007:13

3.3 The Evolution of Turkish Local Government

The Turkish public administration system is characterised by the strong bureaucratic administrative tradition which is inherited from the Ottoman era (Ökmen & Yılmaz, 2004). The current system took its roots during the modernisation process of the Ottoman Empire in the mid-19th century[7]. In this period, alongside with the transformation to an administrative monarchy, the local administrations earned legal and constitutional statuses. The implemented

[7] The first municipality is established in 1855 following the Crimean War (Keleş, 2011:136)

changes during this era were largely preserved in the new Turkish republic as well. In the late period of the Ottoman Empire, two schools of thought have emerged within the governing *Ittihat ve Terakki*[8] Party. The first group, headed by Ahmet Riza, was favouring an authoritarian modernisation led by the central authority. The second group, headed by Prince Sabahaddin, was advocating a liberal modernisation by adopting political decentralisation and market economy. Eventually, the former became paramount in the ideological scene, and the centralist modernisation strategy turned into a state policy.

The modernisation in the Ottoman Empire was an autocratic modernisation and the sole purpose was to prevent further dissolution of empire. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge the establishment of local administrations was as an act of embedding the central authority into localities to ensure collection of taxes and to restore order (Ortaylı, 1995). At a time when the Western influence was decisive on the stability of the Empire, the solution of the policy makers was to introduce the European institutions and systems into the traditional administrative system (Ortaylı, 1999). The outcome was an amalgam of two different administrative systems (i.e. the traditional and the French system) and the conflict between different values and norms shaped the trajectory of bureaucratic evolution (Eryılmaz, 2008:12). Unlike the European examples, the local administrations in the Empire had been created by a top-down strategy without having historical ties with the feudal past. In the old system, the local public services were covered by '*qadi'*s[9] and by artisans' guilds (Keleş, 2011:135). Therefore, the local administration in Turkey has relatively a short past comparing to European counterparts, and a grass-root political evolution towards enhanced local rights was absent in the Turkish case.

From the establishment of the republic in 1923 until 1945, Turkey was ruled as a one-party state. Most of the ruling elite of the time originated from the *Ittihat ve Terakki* Party, and the continuity in modernisation strategy was prevalent. The general assumption was that statism and centralisation are needed in order for reforms to take root in the society (Eryılmaz, 1997). Similar to the Ottoman period, the local administrations' functions continued to be dependent on the consent of the central authority. A notable change occurred when first time separate legislations on local administrations took place in 1930s. Although the core functions did not change, the municipalities were delegated some limited rights such as on city planning (Tekeli, 1992). Beside these, in 1930's, 'étatism' had been adopted as part of the development

[8] Ittihat ve Terakki Party (Committee of Union and Progress) governed the Ottoman Empire between 1908-1918
[9] A type of Islamic judge, who is the highest authority in locality and responsible for settling the disputes and overseeing the public services.

strategy. National state planning was introduced and State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) were created to realise two major aims, nation building and industrialisation (Özcan, 2000). In a nutshell, this period can be seen as a peek point in centralist tendencies both in administration and in economics.

The general elections in 1950 marked the end of the single party period, and a new party, the Democrat Party, stayed in power for a decade. The changing conditions on the social, economic and political environment motivated the new government to initiate a comprehensive structural reform in the existing system. The Democrat Party opposed "étatism", and advocated that once private sector is set free from statist policies the economy would flourish (Heper, 1991). Notwithstanding, the SEEs continued to keep their central role on investments and the policies towards private sector had largely failed (Heper, 1991). Moreover, some competences of the local administrations were transferred to the newly established central institutions. Since the multi-party system brought political competition in the local level as well, the central authority tried to constrain local authorities through politically motivated regulations (Eryılmaz, 1995). Thus, some authors argue that the dependency of local administrations on the central authority has even increased (Ökmen, 2008:52). Nevertheless, the shift towards free market economy enhanced the influence of local businessmen and land-owning elites in politics, and the capitalist development prevailed through private entrepreneurships and the alliance with the West and NATO (Özcan, 2000). The Democrat Party government was toppled from power with a military coup d'état in 1960.

The 1961 constitution in the aftermath of the military intervention is esteemed by many because of its underlying democratic principles. For instance, the principle of decentralisation has been recognised by the constitution. Additionally, the central government has been held accountable on sustaining the required financial sources to the local authorities in compliance with their constitutional responsibilities (Ökmen, 2008: 52). The purpose was to secure the local administrations from the frequent direct interventions by the central authority. However, the dependency of municipalities on central authority endured despite enhanced legal rights. The main reason was that municipalities failed to cover the local services due to financial incapacities. In this sense, some scholars argue that governments confined the financial sources to local administrations as a control mechanism (Ökmen, 2008:53). For others, the central authority has failed to cope with increased demands from municipalities whose expenditures have been augmented due to rapid urban growth. Hence, municipalities remained politically and economically weak (Güler, 1992).

In the 1970s, the municipalities have increased their demands towards more public participation and political freedom in the municipal government. The municipalities led by social democrats especially pioneered this campaign. The campaign triggered a hot political debate due to the political polarisation between the right wing parties controlling the central government and the social democrats which were in control of major cities. Additionally, the shift in population from rural to urban areas empowered the position of municipalities. In return, the Ministry of Local Administrations has been established for a short period from January 1978 to November 1979. The principal responsibility of the Ministry was to enhance the financial and administrative capacities of municipalities and to reconcile their demands with the central authority. Although there are various pro- and against arguments on the purpose and function of the Ministry, the need to open a ministry focusing only to the needs of local administrations proved the increasing importance of local administrations in Turkish politics (Keleş, 2011:475). Nevertheless, the worsening economic conditions at the end of 1970s and violent clashes between left and right wing groups paved way to hyperinflation, political instability and street terror, and eventually to another coup d'état in 1980.

Following the coup d'état in 1980, a new constitution came into force in 1982. Despite numerous amendments, this constitution is still the principal document in Turkey. The 1982 constitution is marked by many as an undemocratic constitution which re-established the central control on local administrations. If we compare the constitutions of 1961 and 1982, the principal differences in terms of local politics can be seen in the following aspects (Keleş, 2011: 145-147);

1) The administrative tutelage of the central authority on local administrations is constitutionalised. Even though an unwritten administrative tutelage relationship existed previously, with the 1982 document the administrative tutelage received a legal recognition.

2) A special local administration structure is envisaged for bigger municipalities, which eventually led to the formation of metropolitan municipalities.

3) A special right was granted to the Ministry of Interior to discharge the mayor if there is a crime charge against the mayor or an on-going prosecution against the municipality. This right has been invoked on some occasions for partisan displacements of mayors. Nevertheless, there are examples of court cases which convicted these partisan changes as illegal and reversed the judgement of the Ministry (Keleş, 2011:147).

4) The establishment of union of municipalities has been conditioned onto the consent of the central authority.

It is evident, that the 1982 constitution was an attempt to re-establish the control of the central authority in local organisations and more generally in society. Despite the rigid formulation of the constitution, the 1980s have witnessed liberal policies both in economics and politics which reduced the role of the state gradually.

First of all, the economic crisis in the early years of 1980s called for the reassessment of economic policies. The first general elections after the coup d'état had been concluded with the landslide victory of Motherlands Party (ANAP), which predominantly advocated liberal economic policies. A radical policy reorientation took place, e.g. from import substitution to export promotion; from interventionism to market forces; and from the promotion of SEE's to the promotion of private sector. Furthermore, the state's role in economy was reduced with the privatisation of some SEE's. However, the SEE reform had largely failed, because the legal, institutional, and political base for privatisation was missing (Kjellström, 1990). Especially, the foreign sales had become a contentious political issue. In addition, the block sales of some SEE's were cancelled by the court order on the grounds of illegality.

In 1984 the Metropolitan Municipalities Act was introduced to cope with the pressure from rapid urban growth. With this act the roles and responsibilities of small municipalities and districts, and their relationships with the metropolitan municipality were defined. Consequently, the influence of local elected municipalities on policy-making increased. Furthermore, in 1987, Turkey signed the European Charter of Local Self-Government[10].

The biggest change concerning municipalities occurred with the devolution of the urban planning to municipalities. Municipalities were allowed to deliver building permits with the regulation in 1985. Yet, this new function of municipalities raised severe criticisms by increasing corruption and misuse in planning. For many, this function has turned into 'an instrument of local patronage and political mediation' (Marcou, 2006).

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[10] The Charter was opened for signature by the Council of Europe's member states on 15 October 1985. Turkey signed the charter in 1987, but it became part of the jurisdiction only after 1993. Turkey made reservations to 7 articles in the Chart. These reservations are the following; Article 4.6: 'the manner and timing of consultation should be such that the local authorities have a real possibility to exercise influence'; Article 6.1: 'local authorities must be able to order their own administrative structures to take account of local circumstances and administrative efficiency'; Article 7.3: 'disqualification from the holding of local elective office should only be based on objective legal criteria and not on ad hoc decisions'; Article 8.3: 'according to principle of proportionality, the controlling authority, in exercising its prerogatives, is obliged to use the method which affects local autonomy the least'; Article 9.4, 9.6 and 9.7 'the rules and conditions on the allocation of financial resources to local autorities'; Article 10.2 and 10.3; 'rules and conditions on forming associations between local authorities'; Article 11.1: 'access by a local authority to a properly constituted court of law'

In a nutshell, in 1980s, decentralisation and privatisation policies have gained popularity in line with the global trend. Important structural changes have been initiated which altered the state-controlled development policy towards a more liberal system. Several local services were privatised or encouraged to be privatised.

Nevertheless, the pace of reforms in the administrative system had declined considerably in 1990s, largely driven by three dynamics; the lack of political stability and instability among coalition governments; the armed conflict with Kurdish insurgents[11] had reached its climax and underpinned centralist tendencies; and relations with the EU had lost momentum in the aftermaths of Turkey's full membership application in 1987. The impact of the EU was relatively limited until the Helsinki Conference in 1999 where Turkey was granted candidate status.

In late 1990s and early 2000s, the trajectory has changed parallel to the changes in the abovementioned factors. The EU candidate status, military achievements against PKK and most importantly the 1999 and 2001 economic crises gave impetus to reform studies on public administration system. Hence, the draft acts in 1999 and 2001 were prepared as part of a comprehensive plan to restructure the public administration system. In this frame, the draft act in 1999 aimed an enhanced administrative and fiscal decentralisation in local services (Ökmen, 2008). The draft proclaimed new responsibilities and competences for local administrations and an increase from 15 to 35 % on local administrations' share in overall public expenditures. The revised version in 2001 detailed the issues of reallocation of responsibilities, competences and financial sources between the centre and local administrations. Most importantly, the subsidiarity principle was recognised as the basis of the public service delivery.

Notwithstanding, the political turmoil in the aftermaths of the severe economic crisis in 2001 impeded the coalition government to enact the draft acts. The coalition government was replaced in November 2002, by the one party government of the *Justice and Development Party* (AKP).

Almost after 15 years of coalition governments and political instability, AKP came to power at a time when the candidate status of Turkey for the EU membership had already been proclaimed, the devastating PKK threat was at the lowest level since 1980's and after the serious economic crisis in 2001, the signals for an upwards trend on economic growth were

[11] Namely, with the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party). The PKK is listed as a terrorist organisation internationally by a number of states and organisations, including the United States, UN, NATO and the EU. (not by the UN)

evident. The convenient conditions consolidated with a strong discourse for the EU membership facilitated a swift reform process until the start of the EU membership negotiations in September 2005.

As part of the reform process, new laws on local administrations were enacted, e.g. ‘Special Provincial Administration Law’, ‘Municipality Law’, ‘Metropolitan Municipality Law’ and ‘Local Administration Unions Law’. Additionally, ‘Public Financial Management and Control Law’, ‘Law on the Establishment, Coordination and Duties of Development Agencies’ and ‘Law on Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfer Shares across Special Provincial Administrations and Municipalities’ were implemented to regulate the financial means of local administrations. Through the regulations, structural, functional and financial dimensions of local administrations, as well as the general principles of public administration system, were reshaped from an administrative model towards a regulatory managerial model. Decentralisation, transparency, participation, efficiency and effectiveness in government services were presented as the underpinning principles in the reform process. The field agencies of many ministries have been disbanded in order to devolve their functions to local administrations. The financial and administrative autonomy of local administrations have been guaranteed with legal adjustments. Moreover, the legal status of some public bodies such as development agencies and union of municipalities have been recognised.

3.4 New Regulations on Local Administrations

The reforms during AKP government brought new legal statuses and enhanced administrative and financial competences for local administrations. In this part, the new regulations will be examined by elaborating the new competences and functions of local administrations. Before dwelling in the analysis, a short overview will be presented of the reform process and its influential factors

3.4.1 Overview of the local government reform process

The AKP announced the ‘Urgent Action Plan’ short after the elections with the aim to initiate the economic and social transformation of the country. In compliance with the plan, the official programme on the reform strategy was declared in March 2003. The outcome of the reform process is articulated as ‘efficient, participative, decentralised and transparent public management system’.

A threefold reform strategy has been designed including the changes in the principles of the public administration system, in local administration laws and in the public personnel regime (Erdoğdu, 2003). First, in December 2003, the draft act n°5227 namely 'Law on Basic Principles and Reorganisation of Public Administration' was presented to the national assembly. The act was formulated to set the legal basis for the subsequent reforms. The underlying aspects of the act are listed as following;

- Performance based system and strategy planning are set as essentials for all public administration bodies.
- Service delivery is rearranged on the basis of the subsidiarity principle. Additionally, local authorities put responsible for all local areas where the jurisdiction is not specified in the constitution.
- Duties and competences regarding the services on health, tourism and culture, forest and environment, agriculture and village affairs, social care and children protection, youth and sports, industry and public works are transferred from the provincial organisations of ministries to municipalities, and to the SPAs for areas outside of the borders of municipalities. The provincial administrations of the respective ministries are abolished.
- State enterprises providing the services which are already covered by private enterprises are decided to be privatised or shut down.
- Changes in public personnel regime, working procedures of local assemblies and regional development agencies are announced to take place in subsequent acts.

The draft act was reviewed by the commissions in the assembly and some provisions had been changed. The most important change took place on devolution of powers concerning education services. In the revised draft, the devolution of education services to SPAs has been removed. The explanation was that the SPAs lack the sufficient capacity to cover the required services (Türkoğlu, 2004). The revised draft act was approved by the assembly in July 2004. However, the act was vetoed partially by the President on the basis that some provisions do not comply with 'integral unity in administration' principle. The President sent the draft back to the assembly for further review. According to the constitution, national assembly has the right to send back the act without a single change. In this case, the President has two choices, either to promulgate the act or to refer the law to the Constitutional Court. However, the assembly did not send the act back to the president and even after the change in the presidency[12], the act is still on hold in the national assembly.

The 5227 numbered Public Administration Basic Law was a road map of public management reform process rather than a detailed reform act. The rules on allocation of resources between central and local authorities and auditing of local administrations have been some of the unrevealed issues (TESEV, 2004). The draft act also announced that the uncovered issues would be complemented with additional laws. Nevertheless, the reform strategy of the government has changed after the veto of the president, and instead of a comprehensive piece of legislation, separate laws such as ‘Special Provincial Administration Law’, ‘Municipality Law’, ‘Metropolitan Municipality Law’, ‘Local Administration Unions Law’, ‘Public Financial Management and Control Law’, and ‘Law on the Establishment, Coordination and Duties of Development Agencies’ were enacted subsequently in following three years..

In June 2006, the deputy Prime Minister, Mehmet A. Şahin assessed the reform performance of the government by underlining that ‘32 out of 45 indicated reforms in the Urgent Action Plan’ have been realised within three years. Reforms on ‘redefining liabilities and competences of central authority’, ‘empowering financial structure of local administrations’, ’empowering human sources of local administrations’, ‘transferring some provincial organisations and their personnel to provincial administrations’, are mentioned as non-accomplished objectives related to public management. In the document, the veto of the President on the Public Administration Basic Law is underlined as an important reason why the rest of the anticipated laws had not been enacted. However, the stagnation on reform process despite the change of the president contests the reliability of the argument.

Indeed, the political will for change has been in obvious decline since 2005, for a variety of reasons. For example, 2007 was an election year, and public management reform was definitely not a priority in the run-up to the public vote. Another potential reason is that after 2006, security became an urgent issue in domestic politics. PKK assaults began to ramp up following relatively peaceful years after the capture of the head of the organisation in 1999. Since most of southeastern and eastern Turkey is populated largely by Kurdish citizens, the already heated political discussions around the fear of segregation made the government even more reluctant to take further political action towards decentralisation. Moreover, the

[12] The current president Abdullah Gül was a former minister in the AKP government.

EU membership process appears as another factor in the pace of the reform process. The golden years of reform period, 2002–2005, were motivated by the objective of starting the membership negotiation process, which finally began in September 2005.

Notwithstanding, there were new laws on local governments enacted after 2006. Basically, these laws were meant to fix the emergent contradictions following the first phase of the reform process in the years 2003-2005. Capacity problems, redundant administrations, overlapping competences between local-local or central-local administrations, and coordination problems were some of the vital issues. Hence, in a nutshell the local administration reform process during AKP government can be described as follows;

1st Phase: Structural Reforms (2003-2005)

- Structural Change in Public Administration System
- Increased financial and administrative autonomy for local government
- Transfer of service responsibilities from central authority to local government
- New management practices & values (e.g. performance based budget planning, strategic plans, ex-ante control and ex-post auditing, financial transparency, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability)
- From tutelage to coordination between central and local authority

2nd Phase: Revisions and Adaptations (2006 onwards)

- Fixing the contradictions in the post-reform area. (e.g. capacity problems, overlapping competences, redundant administrations, coordination problems…)
- More streamlined and larger metropolitan municipalities
- Less number of municipalities with larger economies of scales.
- Abolishment of redundant local administrations such as first-tier municipalities or SPAs in metropolitan municipalities.

3.4.2 New Laws on Local Administrations

In this part, the laws affecting the local administration system will be examined. The emphasis will be on administrative and functional regulations of each law, and the way/degree/form it affects the local administration structure and competences.

a) 5018 coded Public Financial Management and Control Law

The law was enacted in December 2003. It regulates the management of public sources, their related institutions and the management process. The new standards and processes are;

- The functioning of the public financial management, rules on budgeting, accounting, reporting of financial transactions and financial control are reorganised.
- Financial transparency, accountability, effective acquisition and efficient use of public resources have become essentials on the public management.
- Initiative-taking among public servants and internal control system for public institutions is encouraged.
- Ex-ante control and ex-post auditing

- All public bodies are held responsible to prepare strategy plans and publish financial statistics. Additionally, the new law introduces performance based budgeting

b) 5393 coded Municipality Law (the revived 5272 law)

The initial draft coded 5272 was presented at the national assembly in 2003, but it was annulled by the Constitutional Court on the basis of the problems with the formality on some provisions. The revised draft was approved by the President and was enacted in July 2005. Yet, the President brought a lawsuit to the Court to annul the provision about the pre-elementary schools. The Court judged the annulment of the provision in 2007.

According to the enacted law, reforms on municipalities are the followings;

- Municipality is redefined as "a corporation established in the statute of public legal entity having powers of self-government (autonomous) both administratively and financially, to meet the local and common requirements of the county inhabitants and the decision maker of which is elected by the electors."[13] Thus, administrative and fiscal autonomy of municipalities have become part of the constitution.
- The minimum required population to establish a municipality is increased from 2000 to 5000 residents. Moreover, the meeting schedule of municipality council has been rearranged from three times per year to once per month.

[13] Translation is taken from the following website, www.turkishlaws.com .

- Smallest local districts called *mahalle*'s have been added to municipal jurisdiction. In return, municipalities have become responsible for the performance of services in *mahalles*.

- New additional services on geographical and urban data systems, environment and environmental health, forestry, parks and green areas, cultural and artworks, tourism, youth and sport activities, social and aid services, as well as services aimed at the development of economy and commerce. Furthermore, opening and operating of pre-elementary school education centres and health facilities has become part of the liabilities.[14] In this frame, provincial administrations of some ministries have been transferred to municipalities. In the absence of delegation of duties and services to other public institutions and corporations, municipalities may undertake additional liabilities. Since a sequence on service priorities is not defined as in the previous law, discretionary power of municipalities has been increased (Eryılmaz, 2008).

- Efficiency and effectiveness on personnel management, financial and performance-based auditing, and participation of non-state actors to the meetings of specialised committees are new processes for municipalities.

c) 5216 coded Metropolitan Municipality Law

The law was enacted in July 2004. The opposition party sent a couple of annulment cases to the Court[15] and as a consequence only some minor changes were adopted. The new law brings the following changes to metropolitan municipalities;

- Administrative and financial autonomy of the metropolitan municipalities is guaranteed under the public law.

- The law strengthens the metropolitan municipalities over district municipalities by extending the list of functions regarding the investment programmes, budget, planning authority, police services, business permits...etc. The functions of first-tier municipalities are restricted with local land use planning, programming on specific activities and management of service delivery in their districts (Marcou, 2006).

[14] This provision was annulled by the Constitutional Court in 24.01.2007. The official statement is 'Acknowledging pre-elementary education part of national education, it cannot be a local demand, thus as a local authority, municipalities cannot be in charge of these services.'

[15] Republican People's Party (CHP)

- Instead of a tutelage relationship with first-tier municipalities[16], a coordinative role is assumed for metropolitan municipalities. An indirect financial control of lower-tier municipalities is prevented by abandoning the input-based budget auditing (Kaplan, 2005). However, the supervisory power of the metropolitan municipality over district municipalities, especially in planning activities, has been extended (Marcou, 2006).

- Metropolitan municipalities are authorised to establish companies in line with their responsibilities. In addition, they are allowed to devolve the managerial rights on enterprises owned by municipalities, such as parking garages or selling stands, to other companies in certain conditions.

d) 5302 coded Special Provincial Administration Law

The first draft was presented to the assembly in March 2004. It was vetoed partially by the President on the basis of 'integral unity in administration' principle. The revised draft was enacted in February 2005. It was brought by the President to the Constitutional Court, which decided in 2007 that the law is not unconstitutional by pointing the ex-ante control.

- The most fundamental change is implemented on the administrative structure of SPAs. In the administrative hierarchy of the SPA, the governor is the head of administration. Yet, since the governor is not an elected figure but an appointed one, the status of SPAs as local governments was disputed for long (Güler,2003). With new regulations, the governor is divested of the position as president of the provincial assembly. The council is empowered to elect its president, and some of the governor's liabilities are devolved to the president. Yet, the administration remains under the authority of the governor, who chairs the executive committee. Furthermore, SPAs' financial and administrative autonomy have become part of the constitution like other local administrations. Hence, the direct control of the central authority on the SPA has reduced.

- Responsibilities and authorities of SPAs increased akin to the municipalities. Yet, their authority on education services declined (Göksu, Aydın & Güney, 2009: 28). Since in previous arrangements SPAs were operating under the direct control of the central

[16] First-tier municipalities are established inside the metropolitan municipal borders and they have the same competences with the district municipalities. Their difference from district municipalities is that the first-tier municipalities cannot have territories outside the metropolitan municipal borders.

authority, the education services were carried out through SPAs under the authority of the Ministry of Education. However, as mentioned above, the education services are not devolved to the local administrations. Therefore, in the new law, SPAs are only in charge of construction and maintenance of elementary and secondary schools.

- The meeting schedule of provincial assembly is rearranged to once a month instead of twice a year. The governor is allowed to delegate some of his responsibilities to district municipalities or to other units within SPAs. Additionally, committee members are authorised to suggest agenda items. In the previous law, the duty was only delegated to the governor.

- Norm cadre system, performance auditing, transparency and more flexibility on management have become part of the SPA's management.

e) 5355 coded Local Administration Unions Law

The opposition party brought a lawsuit for the annulment of some provisions of this law. The Court rejected all annulment requests and the law was enacted in May 2005. The law defines the local administration unions as functional bodies established by local administrations to cooperate over an objective. The most important revision on the law is that local administration unions gained a legal status under public law. The union of local administrations can carry out the functions which are delegated to them by member municipalities. There is not a certain list of functions to be delegated to the unions, but for cross-border projects related with ecology and water management, municipalities are obliged to participate at a union for the purpose of the project. Beside this, the law does not contain revisions on the administrative autonomy or liabilities of the unions.

f) 5449 n^{o} Law on the Establishment, Coordination and Duties of Development Agencies

The law is enacted in January 2006. The opposition party brought a lawsuit for the annulment of some provisions. The argument was basically that the agencies are authorities for a new tier in administrative structure (i.e. regions), which is not defined in the Constitution. The Court rejected all annulment requests by assessing that the agencies are on functional public authority status.

As declared in the Urgent Action Plan, the regional development agencies (RDA) were established in order to develop and implement development strategies for NUTS II level statistical regions which were created in 2002. The law granted a functional public authority status to RDAs anticipating a sustainable regional growth on a competitive basis. The law diminished the monopoly of State Planning Organisation (SPO) on development planning (Bağlı, 2008, p. 205). Nonetheless, the development agencies were meant to operate under the coordination of the SPO. When the SPO transformed into the Ministry of Development, its coordination function on RDAs has been delegated alongside with to the Ministry. Hence, the disputed status of RDAs is solved for good as being formally part of the central government structure.

g) 5779 nº Law on Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfer Shares across Special Provincial Administrations and Municipalities

The law was enacted in July 2008 and it regulates the financial situation of local administrations to match with their new functional responsibilities. Before this legislation, the intergovernmental transfer system was based on the population criterion for both SPAs and municipalities. This legislation has changed the transfer formula for SPAs by reducing the weight of population criterion to 50 % and adding other criteria: geographic size (10%), number of villages (10%), rural population (15%) and development index (15%). For municipalities it reduced the weight of population criterion to 80 % and added another criterion based on development index (20%) to the transfer formula (Tosun & Yılmaz, 2008). An increase of 28% on local administrations' revenues is anticipated with the enactment of the law (TEPAV, 2006)[17].

h) *5747 nº Law on Establishment of District Municipalities within the Metropolitan Municipal Borders*

The act is approved in March 2008. With this law, first-tier municipalities were abolished and municipalities with population less than 2000 residents were downgraded to mahalles or villages. The law streamlined the local government system by removing the overlapping jurisdictions between first-tier and district municipalities and abolishing small municipalities lacking economies of scale and capacities to provide municipal services.

[17] In fact, the change on local service revenues complies with the foreseen percentage.

g) *6360 nº Law on Establishment of 13 New Metropolitan Municipalities and 26 district municipalities.*

The law is enacted in November 2012. 13 provincial municipalities with a population above 750.000 residents were granted the metropolitan municipality status alongside with their district municipalities. Furthermore, the municipal borders of metropolitan municipalities were adjusted to the provincial borders, and thus all municipalities outside the metropolitan municipality borders turned into district municipalities. Until this law, the borders of metropolitan municipalities varied in each case according to the size of the urban area. For Istanbul and Kocaeli, the metropolitan municipal borders had already been equal to the provincial borders. Furthermore, all SPAs within the provinces of metropolitan municipalities were abolished as all rural areas in the province were put under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan municipality. Replacing SPAs, new administrative units called 'Unit of Monitoring Investment and Coordination' were established as provincial agents of central government as part of the Ministry of Interior.

3.4.3 Evaluation of the local government reforms

As part of the reform process, structural, functional, and financial dimensions of local administration have been reshaped to move towards a more decentralised system; the field agencies of many ministries have devolved their functions to local administration. The financial and administrative autonomy of local administration have been guaranteed in law. Moreover, the legal status of public bodies such as development agencies and unions of municipalities has been recognised.

There is a caveat, however, in that these reforms were not intended to alter the imbalance that exists in the balance of power between central and local authorities.[18] It is necessary to acknowledge the introduction of the above laws as a shift in the state administrative system. For instance, the Public Financial Management and Control Law holds all public bodies responsible for strategic planning, and foresees *ex-ante* control and *ex-post* auditing. Additionally, this legislation has introduced performance-based budgeting to all public bodies. Therefore, a proper description of this decentralisation process could be 'the

[18] According to OECD reports, the imbalance between central and local administrations in employment of public servants and revenues did not alter drastically despite legal adjustments (Government at Glance 2009).

reallocation of competencies and responsibilities between the central and local administrations as part of the state reform on the basis of the New Public Management principles.' It is evident that local administration's legislative status and competencies have improved significantly as a result of the reform agenda. Nevertheless, this change is not a mere transfer of power from central to local but a simultaneous change in both central and local administration where the administrative state model has been transformed into one that is regulatory/managerial.

The decentralisation reforms were intended to be instrumental in the anticipated transformation of the administrative system. However, in practice, several paradoxes have emerged due to contradicting factors at legal, political, managerial, and societal levels, which not only shaped the path and nature of decentralisation but also affected the transformation to the managerial state model.

First, although the initial aim was reform, the outcome can be described only as a tweak of the existing legal framework in order to correspond with the implemented changes. As noted above, the constitution defines a tutelage relationship where the central authority delegates the required competencies and resources to the local administration. This definition, especially the clause on the "integral unity in administration," has been instrumental in several lawsuits in the Turkish Constitutional Court aimed at annulling the decentralisation acts. The Court rejected most of the cases by stating that the "integral unity in administration" implies the center can delegate some of its responsibilities to local administration as long as the "administrative tutelage" is preserved. In other words, the administrative and financial autonomy allocated to local administration is evaluated not as devolution but as delegation. However, this perception goes against the philosophy of the anticipated system, because the center preserves actual decision-making authority despite the local administration's administrative and financial autonomy. On the other hand, the European Charter on Local Self-Government, which was ratified by Turkey in 1993, has already accepted the subsidiarity principle (see Article 4), which appears both in the Public Administration Basic Law and in other local administration laws. However, in these court cases the phrase quoted above is considered to be unconstitutional and contrary to the tutelage relationship between central and local government. Since international laws are binding and cannot be taken to the Constitutional Court, this creates a legal contradiction according to some scholars (Keleş 2011: 511). Consequently the legal framework – and primarily the constitution – is important sources of conflict in practice.

Second, bureaucratic resistance and political polarisation between state institutions has crippled the reform process. As mentioned above, several cases against the decentralisation acts were brought to the Constitutional Court by the President and the official opposition. The motivation behind the lawsuits seemed mostly ideological or political, and the foreseen changes were perceived as 'a threat for the existence of the state.' Most of these cases have already been rejected by the Court, or could cause only minor changes in the revised laws. However, in two instances, the allegations of being "unconstitutional" in addition to other opposition resulted in drastic changes to existing legislation. The first was the abolishment of the Public Administration Basic Law following the veto of the President, and the other was the removal of education from devolved services in the drafted laws regarding the remit of local authorities. The former was initiated as an umbrella law in 2003 to establish the essentials of the anticipated system. The draft law described "a transparent, participatory and accountable system where public services are provided rapidly, effectively, efficiently and in quality," and introduced new management tools such as performance-based budgeting and strategic planning for the public administration. Although subsequent laws have been formulated based on these principles, for many the absence of this umbrella law has resulted in inconsistencies. The devolution of education services to local administration drew huge criticisms from opposition groups as being too vital a service to be taken out of state control. Distrust in local administration's ability to ensure secular and 'national' education underpinned the counterarguments. On the other hand, the reform process was enforced only by the government and a small clique of elite civil servants; reforms were not embraced by outside actors and the participation of civil society and the academic world in the reform process was limited (TEPAV 2006). Consequently, political polarisation and fear of segregation focused debate on legislation rather than on the actual impact public services on daily life and this had a negative impact on public support for, and awareness of, the reform process.

Third, lack of capacity and adaptation problems led to a management deficit (UNDP 2008) that has hampered local administrations' ability to make full use of the authority given to them. Indeed, many local authorities were incapable of performing the new responsibilities and managerial tasks introduced with the new laws. One major criticism is the lack of financial means and inability to levy sufficient taxes in local government. In fact, the later reforms were largely designed to enhance the financial capacity of local government. Notwithstanding to the new reforms, the financial outlook in local government did not change drastically, as more than half of all local revenue still originates from the central revenue sources. The weight of central revenue sources is even higher in smaller municipalities and SPAs. This problem was partly addressed with the reduction in the number of municipalities and SPAs. Furthermore, due to time constraints, the earlier strategic plans were prepared without the participatory elements stipulated by law. In some cases, the strategic planning task was contracted out to external actors (TEPAV 2006). That said, it appears that in some cases local administrations were averse to exercising the authority granted to them. For instance, it was noted that municipalities avoid taking responsibility for traffic commissions[4] and prefer to let the old system prevail (TEPAV 2006). Recently, capacity-building projects have been emerging as the priority for the government. In this framework, a number of such projects and training programs are planned in conjunction with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the EU as part of the second Local Administration Reform Programme (LAR II).

3.5 The Discretion of the Central Government over Local Administrations in Turkey

The central government has some discretionary power over local administrations and analysing the extent of this power is important to map the factors affecting local governance. In this part, the administrative, political and financial dimensions of this relation will be examined. The administrative dimension is about the supervision and control responsibilities of the central authorities over local government. The political dimension focuses on the competition of the political parties over local administrations and its impact on local governance. The financial dimension sheds light on the extent that local revenues rely on the consent of the central government, and the financial means of the central government to exert influence in local governance.

3.5.1 Discretion on administrative dimension

According to the constitution, the central government controls and oversees the functions of local authorities to ensure 'the functioning of public services, securing uniform public service, safeguarding public interest and meeting local needs in an appropriate manner' (par.5, Art 127). There are three areas where the central authority exercises control and oversight over local administrations: administrative, budgetary and financial issues (World Bank, 2004). This exercise of power is realised through the requirements of local acts, decisions, local and regional plans, budgets and financial statements (Marcou, 2006).

There are three articles in the constitution which regulate the basis of relations between central and local authority, namely article 123^{r}, 126^{t} and 127^{t}. These articles constitute the principles in which the administrative units operate.

The 123^{rd} article states that: "The administration forms a whole with regard to its structure and functions, and shall be regulated by law. The organisation and functions of the administration are based on the principles of *centralisation* and *local administration*[19]. Public corporate bodies shall be established only by law, or by the authority expressly granted by law." This sentence needs some clarification. These principles refer to the source of administration. In other words, there are two types of public administrations in Turkey, and these are the central and local administrations. The relation between the central and local administrative bodies is described in detail in Article 127. In addition, the article states that the public administrations can only be established and regulated by law.

The 126^{th} article of the Constitution describes the foundation of the central administrative structure; "In terms of central administrative structure, Turkey is divided into provinces on the basis of geographical situation and economic conditions, and public service requirements; provinces are further divided into lower levels of administrative districts. The administration of the provinces is based on the principle of deconcentration[20]. Central administrative organisations comprising several provinces may be established to ensure efficiency and coordination of public services. The functions and powers of these organisations shall be regulated by law". The important point on this article is that 'deconcentration' constitutes the relation between the provincial organisations and central administrations.

Article 127 defines the functioning of the local administrations as followed:

"Local administrative bodies are public corporate entities established to meet the common local needs of the inhabitants of provinces, municipal districts and villages,

[19] The translation of the articles is taken from the official website of the constitution. www.anayasa.gov.tr. The principle of 'centralisation' refers to the 'integral unity in administration' and 'local administration' refers to the principle of 'decentralisation'.

[20] In the original document, this term is called 'yetki genişliği' which means 'deconcentration'. Although, in the English document, this term is translated as the 'devolution of wider powers', it clearly stands for 'deconcentration'.

whose decision making organs are elected by the electorate described in law, and whose principles of structure are also determined by law. The formation, duties and powers of the local authorities shall be regulated by law in accordance with the principle of decentralisation...The central administration has the power of administrative trusteeship over the local governments in the framework of principles and procedures set forth by law with the objective of ensuring the functioning of local services in conformity with the principle of the integral unity of the administration, securing uniform public service, safeguarding the public interest and meeting local needs, in an appropriate manner. The formation of local administrative bodies into a union with the permission of the Council of Ministers for the purpose of performing specific public services; and the functions, powers, financial and security arrangements of these unions, and their reciprocal ties and relations with the central administration, shall be regulated by law. These administrative bodies shall be allocated financial resources in proportion to their functions".

It is clear that the Constitution foresees a tutelage relation between the central and local administrations to sustain the integral unity in the public administration. According to paragraph 4, the Minister of Interior may remove the elected mayor and personnel of local administrations from the office in case of 'offence related to their duties'. Furthermore, 'administrative trusteeship' delineates decentralisation within deconcentration as proved by the decree of Constitutional Court.

The administrative tutelage of central authority over local administration has been notably reduced (except in village administrations) through the new laws on local administrations. In terms of administrative aspects of supervision, the most important change occurred on the discretion of the governor over local administrations. The most striking change is the final decision-making authority of the governor over municipalities on the key issues (e.g. the budget) has been replaced to a regulatory position. According to the new municipal law, the central authority can exercise its discretionary power on the following circumstances;

- The municipalities require the consent of the governor on territorial changes regarding the borders of municipalities and neighbourhood administrations (*mahalles*).
- The veto power of the governor on municipal decisions, including the general budget, has been abolished with the new law. However, all municipal decisions require to be sent to the governor in seven days to become valid. Moreover, the governor has the

right to litigate the case to an administrative court within ten days following the decision.

- In case of serious disturbances in public services, and if the mayor is not able to overcome the problems, the Ministry of Interior delegates the responsibility to the governor to re-establish the order.
- To appoint the general secretary in the metropolitan municipalities, the consent of the Ministry of Interior is required.
- The mayor can be removed from the post by the decision of the Council of State[21]. Additionally, the Ministry of Interior can remove the elected members of municipalities on the basis of the Article 127 in the constitution (Keleş, 2011:402).

Furthermore, the new law on SPAs has altered the overarching authority of central administrations on SPAs. Prior to this law, the governor was the president of the decision-making body, the provincial assembly, and therefore had direct impact on decisions. With the new laws, the governor is no longer the president of the assembly, but since it is the head of executive committee in the SPA, the assembly is obliged to discuss the issues which are brought up by the governor. Moreover, the governor can send back decisions to the assembly for reconsideration and in case of disputes has the right to litigate the case to the administrative court.

Moreover, a complete change has occurred on the supervision and control mechanisms of the central authority over local administrations. In the previous system, the control mechanism was functioning through the prior approval of deliberations of municipal councils and of the budget by the governor. Additionally, the Minister of Interior had the right to cancel other decisions taken by local governments. Financial control, on the other hand, was exercised by the Court of Accounts. The new system replaces this control mechanism with modern auditing practices. This system foresees an internal audit through the selected figures from the municipal council or external private auditors, and *ex-post* external audit by the Court of Accounts. The purpose of this new system is to enhance performance functions in public services.

The essential purpose of the new internal control mechanism is to foster municipal capacities in public services (Baltacı & Yilmaz, 2006). Two means of internal control are described in the law on public financial management. One of them is through the internal

[21] This is the supreme court for administrative justice.

auditors. Since the internal auditors are selected by the mayor, their neutrality is an issue of question. The other internal control mechanism is through the supervisory committee whose members are selected from the municipal council and/or from specialised independent institutions. The supervisory committee presents its report to the municipal council.

The external control mechanism is conducted by the Court of Accounts and the Ministry of Interior. The ministry is in charge of overseeing the administrative unity of activities. The Court of Accounts, on the other hand, controls the financial accounts and supervises performance management of local administrations.

The financial control is the most effective control mechanism on municipalities, especially for those municipalities with limited financial resources (Ekici & Toker, 2005). There are different means for central authority to exert the financial control. First of all, some financial aids are allocated on the basis of conditionality. These aids are not subject of objective criteria and cannot be utilised outside the allocation purposes. Secondly, in case of corruption charges, the mayor or the Ministry of Interior, with the consent of the Prime Minister, can call for investigation of all accounts of the charged municipality.

In sum, the new laws are in favour of the local administrations by reducing the administrative discretion of central authority. Yet, there are criticisms arguing some provisions are supplementing the discretion of the Ministry of Interior on local administrations. For instance, Marcou (2006) claims that according to the article 30(b) of the new municipal law, the Ministry of Interior can request the Council of State to dissolve the municipal council without a need of investigation or prosecution, if the later 'has taken decisions on political issues not related to the functions conferred on the municipality'. In that case, the Council of State shall decide on the fate of the municipal council within one month from the request. Moreover, the Ministry of Interior can ask the Council of State to postpone any new meeting of the municipal council until the final decision. Therefore, their argument is that the new provision can be an instrument for the minister to apply pressure upon local governments.

Considering the strengthening position of the Ministry of Interior, it can be argued that the changes in laws partly foresee a shift in administrative control mechanism. The new system empowers the position of the elected central and local figures while reducing the discretion of appointed bureaucrats in administration. However, this shift brings the political dimension of relations to the forefront which is discernible through rather indirect actions. For instance, the political parties who are controlling the central government are more inclined to apply strict control over the financial resources of the municipalities governed by other political parties. Other than that, the central government is usually easier to pursue investigations over the municipalities of opposition parties on the basis of corruption charges. These 'indirect' ways of intervening into local administrations will be discussed more thoroughly as part of the political and financial aspect of the relations.

3.5.2 Political Discretion

The growing political importance of municipalities has altered gradually the relations with the central authority. Controlling municipalities, especially metropolitan municipalities, has become critical objectives for political parties. There are several reasons for it. First of all, more than 80 % of the overall population is living in municipal jurisdictions. Hence, the municipalities have a better reach to a majority of electorates. Secondly, most of the political parties in Turkey, assign their candidates for municipal elections through the central executive board's decision. Therefore, the mayors are closely attached to the party politics for future political career. This direct impact on municipal candidates also affects the perceptions of electorates on general elections. For instance, the poor performance of social democrats in Istanbul metropolitan municipality in early 1990s was punished in the next general elections by the drop-off in their votes[22]. On the contrary, the social aids spearheaded by the municipalities governed by conservative, religious political parties were instrumental on the election victory of Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in 1995. Thirdly, the municipalities are usually perceived by the politicians as a showcase to promote their own political career. The Prime Minister Recep T. Erdoğan, for instance, was the mayor of Istanbul from 1994 to 1998 and his acclaimed performance prepared the ground for his future political career.

Because of all the reasons listed above, political actions via municipalities are popular political means for political parties to outmanoeuvre each other. There are various examples of the pressure from central government towards the municipalities controlled by opposition parties. Especially, the dependency of municipalities on the central government in terms of investments and economic development have been articulated frequently in different local elections to promote the local candidates supported by the political party(ies) in the government (Keleş, 2011: 410). On the other hand, Tekeli (2004) points outs another type of

[22] In the general elections of 1991, the Social Democrat Public Party (SDHP) won 21% of the votes. In the following elections in 1995, only 11% of votes were gained by the Republican People's Party (CHP) which succeeded SDHP.

political tension between the elected local party members, the mayor of the municipality and the members of the national assembly. According to the law, the mayors are not allowed to be the head of the political parties in localities. Thus, the attempts of local party members to use municipalities for their own political agendas, occasionally leads to tensions with the mayor who is responsible for urban politics.

Furthermore, corruption investigations towards local administrations governed by opposition parties are often perceived as part of political struggles. A recent example is the case of corruption charges upheld against the municipalities during the AKP government. In following 3 years after 2009 local elections, 945 out of 2947 municipalities have been prosecuted with the corruption charges. It is striking that even thought most of them belong to AKP municipalities, the distribution of charges among the political parties is rather unbalanced. While 25% of AKP municipalities were prosecuted, 50% of CHP and BDP municipalities, and 1/3 of MHP municipalities has been subject of investigations[23].

In sum, political struggles among political parties constitute an important dimension of the relations between the central and local authorities. Therefore, it is essential to take into account the distribution of political parties among municipalities while assessing the choices made by municipalities on public services.

3.5.3 Financial Discretion

A major part of political discretion of central authority is embedded into the financial aspects of relations. Local governments are highly dependent on the general budget. Therefore, transfer of shares and loans from central authority have been subject of criticism as the means of political control on local administrations.

Local governments have four different sources of income: (1) local revenues, (2) shared taxes, (3) grants and transfers from central government, and (4) loans. Among the income sources, only local revenues are collected directly by the local administrations. Shared taxes are basically distributed as transfers from the central budget. The rest, grants and aids, are allocated from the central budget with the consent of the central authority. The grants and

[23] The distribution of charges among the political parties in the assembly is as following: AKP 406, CHP 271, MHP 131, BDP 50, the rest 123 (Günaydın, 2012).

aids from central government are the main source of revenues for SPAs and the Union of Municipalities[24].

General tax revenues are transferred to local administrations based on the following calculation:

- 2.85 % to municipalities outside of metropolitan municipalities, according to population and development criteria[25]
- 2.50 % to the district municipalities of metropolitan municipalities
- 1.15 % to the SPAs according to the population, geographic size, number of villages, rural population and development index.
- 5 % of general taxes collected within the metropolitan municipality borders and an additional 30 % of the shared taxes allocated for the district municipalities will be transferred to metropolitan municipalities.

There are two channels for local administrations to reach the share in general revenues. While the Ministry of Finance allocates the 5 % share of metropolitan municipalities, the other local administrations receive their shares from Bank of Provinces[26] (İller Bankası). The Bank of Provinces also provides grants and loans for local administrations through the fund of local administrations where 3.53 %[27] of the general tax revenue is reserved for this purpose. The problem with reaching the funds is the Bank withholds a 2 % management fee and also exercises control over capital investment grants and loan financing (LAR II report on Turkey, 2011).

According to the old Municipal Income Law[28], municipalities did not have any taxation authority. Their income was dependent on the shares from some certain taxes which were distributed through the Bank of Provinces. From 1981 onwards, municipalities were allowed gradually some taxation power. Moreover, the financial system based on the shares from certain taxes has been replaced with predetermined percentage from overall budget to

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[24] See the Appendices

[25] Provinces/districts are divided into five development categories: there are 363 municipalities in the first group (least developed) which gets 23% of 20% and 673 municipalities in the 5th group (most developed) which gets 17% of 20%. Then a municipality in each group receives its share proportional to its population within the group (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011).

[26] The Bank of Provinces is established as a public corporate body in 1933 to provide financial and technical assistance to local administrations. The stakeholders of the bank are SPAs and municipalities. The bank has obtained a private corporate status in 2011 under the Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation.

[27] This fund is shared as following; 3% to Fund of Municipalities, 0.28% to Fund of SPAs and 0.25% to Fund of General Directorate of Local Administrations.

[28] The law was enacted in 1948.

the local administrations. In 1984, this percentage has been designated as 10.30 %. However, this number has decreased gradually in the last 30 years with subsequent regulations to the level of 4.53 % in 2001 (Keleş, 2011: 357). The recent reforms have improved this situation only slightly. Especially, the gravity of the population criteria on shared taxes causes inequalities both in regional and provincial level. Municipalities with bigger population and development level can levy higher income with local resources whereas for some others the personnel cost can surpass their local revenues (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011).

There is a control mechanism by the central authority on local debts. Municipalities and affiliated corporate organisations, whose half of the capital is controlled by the municipality, require the consent of the Ministry of Interior to take up domestic loans exceeding over 10 % of their determined budgets. Furthermore, loans from external sources require the consent of the Treasury.

Comparing to other OECD countries, Turkey has one of the lowest ratio of the local tax revenue according to GDP[29]. Furthermore, only limited taxation autonomy is given to local administrations. According to 2011 data, 78% of local taxes are based on tax-sharing in which the revenue sharing can be changed unilaterally by the central government, whereas for the rest of the local taxes the central government set the rate and the base of the local tax (see OECD Tax Autonomy statistics). In Turkey, there are seven taxes assigned to municipalities (i.e. environment cleaning, advertising, communication, electricity and liquid petroleum gas consumption, fire insurance, entertainment and property taxes), and only in property taxes the municipalities have the discretion on tax level. On the other hand, SPAs do not have any taxation authority; they receive only a share from the real estate tax.

The real level of fiscal decentralisation is not only determined by the size of the central revenue in local revenues but also by the central control over the allocated funds (discretionary or mandatory); the fiscal requirements on the recipient local governments (matching or nonmatching); the local spending autonomy (earmarked or non-earmarked (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). In this sense, Turkey is one of the few OECD countries where the intergovernmental transfer shares are categorised only as discretionary. According to the 2010 data, 58 % of earmarked transfer shares from general budget are all categorised as discretionary and non-matching and the rest of intergovernmental shares are categorised as not earmarked and discretionary (see OECD statistics on Intergovernmental Grants by Type-

[29] According to the 2013 data, local tax revenues correspond to 2.6 % of the GDP whereas the OECD average is 3.9 (see OECD Revenue Statistics 1965-2014)

percentage of total grants revenue). These data indicate that despite the formula-based new arrangements, the transfer shares from the general budget depend on the central government's discretion. Thus the own source revenues are the only budget items to be considered in terms of financial autonomy in local government

3.6 Non-state actors in local governance

The purpose of this part is to shed light on the involvement of non-state actors (i.e. citizens, private sector and civil society organisations) in local governance. The means of participation, the willingness to participate and the factors affecting their involvement will be the focal points of analysis.

3.6.1 Citizen participation in local governance

The participation of non-state organisations and citizens in local governance is relatively limited in Turkey. Largely, their functions are limited to consultancy rather than actual decision-making or policy implementation.

There are basically three means for citizens to participate in local governance mechanism: mahalles, urban councils and special committees of the municipal council. Additionally, regional development agencies can be considered as another way where non-state actors can be involved in local governance mechanism.

Neighbourhoods are governed in Turkey with a traditional institution called *mahalle*, which is headed by the locally elected *muhtar*. Muhtars are elected by the fellow residents of a neighbourhood to organise the basic bureaucratic functions in the mahalle. Some of the responsibilities of the muhtar comprise registering the residents, providing IDs and birth certificates. At this point, it is important to explain that the function of the muhtar in mahalles is different from the muhtars in the villages. Muhtars in villages are highest civil servants in villages and they have compulsory tasks to provide the basic needs in public services, whereas muhtars in the cities have only responsibilities on official paper works.

The new provision in municipal law enhanced the function of the muhtar in local governance by allowing them to participate in the special committees of the municipal council to express opinions on locally related issues. It is expected from the muhtar to operate as a linkage between the neighbourhoods and municipal decision-making mechanism (Marcou, 2006). Furthermore, the muhtar is also a member of urban councils.

The second institution for citizen participation is a rather recent formation which is called ‘urban councils’. Urban councils are formed in 2006 inspired by the Local Agenda 21 programme of the UNDP. Urban councils are ideal examples described by governance literature as they serve as a platform to exchange ideas among the urban stakeholders. The members include the representative of the central authority in localities (governor or district governor), the representative of the mayor, representatives of public institutions, muhtars, representatives of political parties, representatives from the city universities, representatives of trade and labour unions and other civil society organisations. Their core functions are improving the democratic participation in urban governance, supporting sustainable development by preparing plans and strategies, supporting civil society institutions in the locality, supporting the active participation of different social groups in the local decision-making mechanism such as youth, elders and women. Although the legislation depicts a wide array of governance functions for the urban councils, their actual participation is limited with providing opinions to be discussed in the municipal council.

The third means for participation are the special committees in the municipal assemblies. Muhtars, representatives of public law professional organisations, universities and civil society organisations can participate without voting rights in the special committees to express opinions. The reports prepared by these commissions are presented to the municipal assemblies whose meeting are open now to the public following the changes in municipal law.

Albeit not being a local organisation, regional development agencies (RDAs) are other forms of governance institutions in Turkey. RDAs contribute to local governance by fostering the cooperation between public, private and civil society organisations on regional development. The organisational structure of RDAs consists of a development council, an administrative board and a general secretariat. The development council is the advisory body and it is composed of representatives of public and private sector and civil society organisations. Another function of the development councils is strengthening the bonds among the stakeholders and ensuring their participation in economic development. The development council advises to the administrative committee which is the decision-making body and headed by the governor of one of the constituting provinces in the NUTS-1 area. Unlike other examples so far, members of private and civil society institutions are allowed to participate in the administrative committee. Thus, RDAs can be perceived as the only compelling example of a fully-fledged governance institution. Its activities are subject to private law which provides a considerable flexibility on their functioning. However, the central discretion is still eminent on the selection of the participating non-state organisations. Therefore, the representation of local interests is a subject of dispute.

3.6.2 Private sector organisations in local governance

The regulations on public-private partnership (PPP) in Turkey are initiated relatively in an early period comparing to other countries (Tekin, 2010). The law no. 2886 on the State Bidding Law set a new framework for public procurement in 1984, and the subsequent law no. 3096 enabled the private sector involvement into power plant projects (Tekin, 2010). However, the first concrete example of a PPP model was implemented with the general law on Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) in 1994. This law allowed private sector involvement in areas of transportation, energy and water supply and treatment (Tekin, 2010).

The legal framework for public procurement has been reformed in 2002 with the Public Tender Law numbered 4732 and the Public Tender Agreements Law numbered 4735 to harmonise the legislation with international and the EU standards (GLG, 2011). The legal changes on public tendering implemented the standards and procurement instruments (e.g. framework agreements, electronic procurement and electronic auction) inaugurated with the EU directives on public procurement. However, some differences still remain according to the expert opinions including the areas of 'types of contracts, use of restricted procedure, application of negotiated procedures and direct procurement, methods for estimating the value of contracts and aggregating contracts, technical specifications and standards, publication of procurement notices, procedure and criteria for qualification of participants, procedure and criteria for contract award (selection of the best tender), existence of national preferences, and restriction of foreign-company participation' (GLG, 2011). A recent legislative study prepared by the Ministry of Development (*the draft law on PPP*) targets the shortcomings on current tendering standards and introduces a legal framework for PPP (GLG, 2011). Some innovations introduced with the draft law include a legal definition of the PPP, standards and rules for establishment of a PPP, resolution of disputes, tendering, risk-sharing and an implementing role in the PPP project cycle (GLG, 2011).

Although the legislations on PPP models have a longer past in Turkey, there is neither a PPP specific law nor one single supervising governmental authority on PPPs (GLG, 2011).

Several legislations have been implemented to provide a legislative ground to different types of PPPs in Turkey. In total, there are five different models of public-private cooperation in Turkey; Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Build-Operate (BT), Transfer of Operational Rights (TOR), Long Term Rent (LTR) and Built-Rent-Transfer (BRT). The implementation and planning of PPPs incorporate different functions by several state institutions. In this sense, State Planning Organisation (SPO) does the macro-economic planning, the Treasury secures the state guaranties, the Ministry of Finance deals with the budgetary issues and Public Procurement Agency supervises the tenders (Tekin, 2010). PPPs can be formed by the Privatisation Administration through TOR, BOT and other concessions; by the line ministries through BOT, BO, BRT and TOR; by the municipalities through BOT, BO and other concessions (Tekin, 2010).

There is a close relation between PPPs and privatisation projects in Turkey. In many privatisation processes, PPP mechanisms are integrated as part of the privatisation project (Tekin, 2010). The transactions for privatisation are regulated according to the Privatisation Law n° 4046. In the law, two methods are defined for privatisation process. The first one is through bargaining negotiations which are held separately with each eligible bidder. The second method is through the auction procedure. The Privatisation Administration applies usually the former as an initial stage to consider different bids before awarding the tender with the auction procedure (GLG, 2011). In terms of privatisation in public services, municipalities can cooperate with private entities by incorporating for capital investment and contracting out public service provisions (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). The laws on local administrations authorise the municipal councils and general city councils to establish corporate entities, to grant concessions, to use BOTs and to privatise public service provisions. The Privatisation Law allows the granting of operation rights in infrastructure facilities to private entities up to 49 years. The areas allowed for private sector cooperation include as provision of drinking water, wastewater management, public transportation and solid waste management. Concessions can be granted in these areas with the consent of the Council of State and approval of the Ministry of Interior (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011).

In general, PPPs are mainly concentrated on energy (e.g. electric production and distribution companies) and transportation sectors (e.g. motorways, bridges, airports and ports). Especially, in energy sector nearly a quarter of the total electric generation in Turkey is produced through PPPs (Tekin, 2010), while the biggest privatisation projects[30] have been completed during the AKP period. During 2005-2006, the biggest revenue from privatisations is collected. Among many of the privatised companies, Turkish Airlines, Tüpraş (gas), Erdemir (steel & coal), Türk Telekom (communication) are the biggest enterprises in their sectors.

Nevertheless, the PPPs are not widespread at the local level (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). The report prepared by the Local Administration Reform programme in Turkey explains the reasons for limited private-public cooperation to be the following,

- Differences in management culture between public and private sectors
- Inadequate assessment of the tasks of the public and private sectors
- The risks of the investment and the operation are not properly identified and shared
- Lack of administrative expertise at the local level to manage complex projects leads to mismatch in expectations and inadequate contractual obligations
- The overall regulatory framework does not support transparent decision making, proper external audit, and design of exit strategies. The absence of a comprehensive legal framework and lack of institutional support from the central government hinder the wider usage of PPPs
- The disorganised state of current regulations governing PPP models and the absence of any supervising governmental authority to guide public entities through this complex public service procurement mechanism
- Additionally, certain difficulties for internationally bankable transactions exist under the current legal framework. There are ambiguities in contract negotiations and without a 'build' element in the project the only option for transferring an existing infrastructure facility to the private sector is through the rigid concession method (GLG, 2011). The main problem of the concession method is the strict interpretation of the Council of State's on transaction conditions delimitates the viability of some projects. (GLG, 2011)

[30] Around 8 billion $ in 2005-2006 and 5 billion $ in 2007-2008 are collected as privatisation revenues. (TR Prime Ministry Privatisation Administration)

3.6.3 Civil society organisations in local governance

The appearance of civil society organisations as an actor in Turkish local governance system is a considerably recent phenomenon. Historically, the civil society organisations in Turkey were limited primarily with trust foundations (so called waqf), trade unions and business associations. However, an important change in the trajectory occurred following the 1995 United Nations Human Settlements (Habitat II) conferences held in Istanbul. Especially, the launch of the Local Agenda 21[31] programme in 1997 laid the foundations of civil society involvement in local governance.

The first cases of collaboration between civil society organisations and governmental actors occurred after the earthquakes in 1999. The inadequacy of municipalities on search and rescue operations paved way for the collaboration with relevant civil society organisations.

The EU candidacy in 1999 brought a new dynamism to the activities of civil society organisations, as well as their involvement in local governance. Especially, the EU grants allocated for civil society institutions boosted the number of new NGOs. The EU is a major supporter of CSOs in Turkey through various programmes and funds. The projects which are financed by the EU are largely focused on the fields of education, health care, urban development, and fight against poverty. Additionally, the Law on Associations has been renewed in 2005 which eased the rules on establishment and financial activities of civil society organisations. Thus, the association numbers are growing constantly since then following the decrease in 2004[32]. According the Directorate of Associations' statistics, most of the associations are concentrated in the most populous and developed cities[33]. Thus, it seems that there is a close correlation between the development level of the city and the number of associations existing in it.

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[31] The UNDP Turkey's website explains the purpose of the Local Agenda 21 as followed: "In response to the global mandate as contained in Chapter 28 of Agenda 21, the Local Agenda 21 Program was launched in 1997 in Turkey under the auspices of UNDP Turkey and Capacity 21, and coordinated by IULA-EMME. The programme, encompassing 59 partner cities as of October 2004, reflects a decentralised and enabling approach, based upon networking and collaboration among equal partners. Based on community participation, local stakeholder involvement, establishment of local partnerships and decentralisation of the local decision-making process, the LA21 Program of Turkey has provided a unique opportunity for the enhancement of local democracy and for practical implementation of the concepts of "good governance" and "sustainable development" in Turkey".

[32] In 2004, the number of active associations dropped from 71.832 to 69.439. According to 2015 data, there are 105.201 active associations in Turkey (Ministry of Interior, Department of Association)

[33] The four biggest cities have the highest percentage of active associations per province: Istanbul 20.02 %, Ankara 9.59 %, İzmir 5.47 % and Bursa 3.98 %.

A research conducted by Hirai (2007) provides some useful insights on the general features of CSOs in Turkey. According to the findings, a majority of civil society organisations in Turkey are social support groups (26.9 %) and mutual organisations (16.5 %). Especially community support organisations are the mot popular type of associations. The other leading civil society organisations are education (11.7 %) and occupation (10.3 %) focused organisations (Hirai, 2007).

The study shows that in terms of local governance activities, 'serving to the public' (43.5 %) and 'informing society for public interest' (20.1 %) are perceived as responsibilities of CSOs. CSOs are predominantly interested in 'regional and local development policies' (30.8 %) and 'education and sport policies' (28.4 %). Other notable policy areas are 'environmental protection' (13.4 %), 'local governance' (11.2 %) and 'health and welfare' (14.7 %). The relation with the public authorities is mostly defined in terms of inspection instead of participation in decision-making. Only 8.2 % of participating associations answered as participating into decision-making processes. Lastly, the research examines the relation of CSOs with political parties. CSOs are predominantly (around 80-90%) disclaiming any sort of relation with political parties. Yet, there are some associations which openly favour one type of political party. Among them, AKP has the biggest support with 11.4 %, followed by CHP with 9 %.

An important channel for CSOs to participate in local governance is the urban councils. As previously mentioned, through urban councils various CSOs can participate into the meetings of provincial assemblies. Albeit they have no right to vote in the assemblies they can express their opinions and discuss suggestions of local administrations in the formal meetings. However, informality is still dominant in the relationships between governmental agencies and CSOs (Çaha, 2010).

Lastly, a research by YADA foundation (Keyman, Yeğen, Çalışkan, & Tol, 2010) clusters the most common problems faced by voluntary organisations in Turkey under eight categories:

1) *Infrastructural problems:* A major problem faced by voluntary organisations is the insufficient financial sources. Other problems under this category include the insufficient human resources, managerial incapacities and lack of institutionalisation.

2) *Problems with voluntary people and members*: The lack of responsibility among members, insufficient professional staff and lack of communication.
3) *Relations with the public bodies:* The lack of formal relations with public bodies, the impact of partisanship and patronage on the relationship with public bodies, the lack of trust by public bodies in voluntary organisations..
4) *Intraorganisational problems*: The lack of trust, personal conflicts and weak social relations among the members.
5) *Interorganisational relations between voluntary organisations:* The lack of communication and coordination among voluntary organisations and lack of institutional platforms to enable interactions among voluntary organisations.
6) *Relations with target groups and society:* Lack of public relations activities, the absence of communication channels with society, the prejudices of target groups against voluntary organisations, lack of reach to local TV channels and other communication means and absence of feedback mechanism from target groups.
7) *Relations with media:* mainstream media's favouritism among voluntary organisations; media's indifference against the activities carried by voluntary organisations.
8) *Conceptualisation of 'civil society' among voluntary organisations*: The lack of awareness among voluntary organisations on their roles and duties within the concept of civil society, unwillingness to get involved into lobbying and interest representation, and a narrow perception on civil society organisations limiting them only with voluntary organisations.

To sum up, the CSOs' involvement in local governance is largely delimited with opinion-giving. There are some good examples of CSO's participation in local governance activities which are usually through the urban councils. However, their involvement in policy implementation is limited and there are only individual cases for this matter.

3.7 Capabilities of local administrations

The final part of this chapter will elaborate the local governance capacity in Turkish local administrations by following the categorisation presented in the previous chapter. According to it, the local governance capacity will be elaborated in terms of capabilities in financial, material, communication, planning, managerial and human resource aspects.

3.7.1 Financial capabilities

Financial capabilities indicate the adequacy of the local government in covering the expenditures with allocated revenue sources. The findings in Turkey depict a complex picture on this matter. Primarily, the differences in financial capacities vary depending on the type of local administration, population, geographical position and economic development of the given territory.

To start with, according to 2015 data the revenues of local administrations correspond to 10.59 % of the general public revenue which did not change significantly since the implementation of new laws on local government (see Figure 3.2). Table 3.1. shows that the revenues are highly dependent on the shares and funds from the central budget. In municipalities almost half of the revenue is stemmed from the shares from central revenue whereas SPAs are largely dependent on funds from central government. The difference is that while municipalities collect their shares by a certain formula and without any conditionality, the funds for SPA's are conditional and they can be utilised only for specific purposes. A further distinction exists between municipalities and metropolitan municipalities in terms of allocation criteria. While the former predominantly depends on the population criteria, the latter is funded additionally by the place of origin. Other allocation criteria (e.g. development index) are relatively more important for SPAs comparing to the municipalities. Therefore, the allocation criteria in tax sharing directly influences the financial capabilities of local administrations.

Figure 3.2 Budget Balance in Local Administrations (2004-2015)



Source: Ministry of Finance

Table 3.1: Revenue shares in local administrations

Revenues	*Municipalities*	*Affiliated Agencies*	*SPAs*	*Unions*	*Total Local Administrations*
1.Own-source revenues	34,9%	82,1%	5,7%	26,4%	37,7%
Tax revenues	13,5%	0,0%	1,5%	2,5%	8,8%
Enterprise and property revenues	15,4%	80,5%	3,1%	23,4%	24,7%
Contribution to public expenditures	1,3%	1,0%	0,6%	0,4%	1,1%
Capital revenues	4,6%	0,7%	0,5%	0,2%	3,1%
2.Shared revenues	58,7%	6,2%	26,6%	8,8%	42,7%
Shares from the central government budget tax revenues	49,8%	5,3%	25,0%	1,0%	36,4%

Other shares	8,9%	0,9%	1,5%	7,7%	6,2%
3.Donations and aids	1,4%	5,3%	63,7%	57,2%	14,4%
Donations and aids from the central budget	0,4%	0,0%	44,6%	10,9%	8,2%
Other donations and aids	1,0%	5,3%	19,0%	46,3%	6,2%
4.Other Revenues	5,0%	6,4%	4,0%	7,6%	5,2%
Collections from receivables	2,5%	4,6%	0,0%	3,2%	2,5%
Interest and Penalties	2,5%	1,7%	4,0%	4,5%	2,7%
Total	100%	10%	100%	100%	100%
Total by type of local governments	*62,8%*	*17,1%*	*17,1%*	*3,0%*	*100,0%*

Source: Péteri & Sevinç (2011)

Another distinction in financial capabilities is caused by the different abilities in raising own-source revenues. The own-source revenues originate from following sources (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011);

- Taxes collected by local administrations: property taxes (land, building) advertising tax, entertainment tax, communications tax, fire insurance tax, electricity and liquid petroleum gas consumption tax and environment cleaning tax.
- Municipality fees: occupation fees, permission fee for working on holidays, freshwater sources fee, commissioners fee, building user fee, land development fee, business opening permit fee, examination license and report fee, and health document fee.
- Public expenditure contribution to sewage and road expenditures by the users of the construction of the infrastructure of road, sewage and drinking water.
- Enterprise and property revenues: revenues from sale of goods and services, property use and operation permit revenues, rent income, state economic enterprise revenues, State Bank Revenues, service provision revenues of local administrations, other institution profits.
- Capital revenues: Sales revenues from movable and immovable property, security and other asset sales.

‘Tax revenues’ and ‘Enterprise and Property Revenues’ have the biggest share in the own-source revenues of municipalities. Among the local taxes, the property taxes constitute

75% of all tax revenues (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). There are two factors which directly affect the revenue by property taxes: the value of the local property and the value of the land. Thus, there is a correlation between the development level of the province and the amount of own source revenues (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011).

Fees are another important source of revenue for municipalities. It is noteworthy to say, on both of these revenue sources, municipalities have the right to determine the actual prices within the upper and lower limits set by the central government (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). Municipalities decide on the exact prices according to the economic and social variations among districts. Similar to the tax revenue, the economic activity and development level of the province is an important determinant in the fee revenues, as the construction fee (25 %), occupation fee (18 %), wholesale market fee (12 %) and building user permit fee (9 %) have the biggest shares (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011).

The third element in municipal own revenues is the contributions to specific services such as road construction, sewage investment or drinking water. The contributions are collected from the landowners and they cannot exceed the 2% of the tax value of the estate. The revenues under this category are only 1.4 % of total municipal revenues and the metropolitan municipalities are the main beneficiaries (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). The rest of the income originates from the rents and sales of the properties. Revenues from the building sites are the primary source of income under this category as corresponding to the 3.3 % of the total revenue (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). Yet, only metropolitan and metropolitan district municipalities are able to generate substantial income from the sales of building sites. Rent income, on the other hand, largely relies on immovable properties (around 80 %) and it is an important source of income for smaller municipalities.

In terms of expenditures, according to 2015 data, 10,75 % of all public expenditures are spent by the local government (see Figure 3.2). Almost half of the expenditures of local administrations are allocated for utility and communal services. The second biggest item in expenditures is the cost of administration (see the Table 3.2.) Nevertheless, there is a clear distinction in expenditures on services between SPAs and municipalities. In particular health, education and security have the biggest share in SPAs' expenditures. Given that in the past the SPAs have been the extension of central authority in local level and the governor is still the head of administration, the services used to be assumed by the central government are largely delivered now by the SPAs. On the other hand, services such as environment and housing are predominantly delivered by municipalities and associated organisations.

Table 3.2: Expenditures in local administrations

Services	*Services Total*	*Municipalities*	*Affiliated agencies*	*SPA's*	*Unions*
General Public Services	*35.2%*	67.8%	7.0%	21.0%	4.2%
Economic Affairs	*22.0%*	63.9%	24.8%	7.3%	4.0%
Housing and Communal Amenity	*21.5%*	54.9%	37.7%	3.8%	3.6%
Environmental Protection	*7.5%*	86.4%	12.2%	0.4%	1.0%
Education	*4.2%*	6.3%	0.0%	92.9%	0.8%
Recreation, Culture, Religion Services	*3.7%*	87.0%	0.0%	12.7%	0.3%
Public Order and Security	*2.9%*	88.5%	1.3%	10.1%	0.2%
Health care	*1.6%*	47.0%	0.1%	52.7%	0.3%
Social Security, Aid	*1.2%*	83.9%	3.0%	12.7%	0.4%
Defence	*0.1%*	25.9%	17.2%	56.9%	0.0%
Total	*100.0%*	*64.1%*	*17.0%*	*15.6%*	*3.2%*

Source: Péteri & Sevinç (2011)

LAR II report suggests that the financial resources of municipalities are usually insufficient to cover the public services and administrative duties (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). This eventually leads to exceeding the debt limits for many municipalities.

According to Kurtuluş (2006), the majority of municipal services are sustained with domestic debts, which are financed by further debts. There are different forms and sources of debts for local administrations. They can find money through loans from domestic and international banks, state loans, bond issue, accumulation of arrears or private-public partnership schemes (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). According to 2010 data, the total debt to income ratio set by the laws is above the limits in all types of municipalities, and half of the current debts in municipalities have short-term obligations (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). This ratio points out deterioration in short term debts which were around 30 % in the period between 2005-2010 (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011).

The assessment report of the IV. Financial Management in Local Administrations Forum[34] (2011) highlights some urgent needs on financial management of municipal expenditures. The report identifies the following problems:

- The central transfers and current resources on financing local services are inadequate.
- The inapplicability of cost-benefit analysis for public goods such as water, transportation, heating and environment and different local service costs are impeding effective pricing on public services.
- The inefficient financing of public services due to lack of prioritisation on public provision.
- The ineffective use of public revenues to supplement the objectives on service provision.
- The inadequate legislative bases are impeding effective tax collection.
- The union of municipalities are institutionally incapable and have lack of financial contribution from the member municipalities.
- Lack of capable personnel and efficient accounting systems.

In short, studies suggest that the size and the economic development of provinces influence the financial capabilities of municipalities. The LAR II report points out there are high differences in per capita own source revenues between developed regions such as Istanbul, East Marmara, Aegean, West Anatolia and other less developed regions Additionally, the similar differences are also observable between larger and smaller cities. While the local tax to total revenue ratio is much higher in bigger cities, the smaller cities and municipalities are more dependent on national budget transfers[35]. The difference is so striking that for the least developed cities, even the cost of collecting revenues could be a financial burden simply because of lack of revenue-raising capability and high local service costs. For instance, in the most underdeveloped five provinces (Ardahan, Muş, Ağrı, Şırnak and Kilis), the cost of financial services (including the collection costs, the total financial administration, accounting costs of municipalities) is even above their own source revenues (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011).

[34] The forum is organised by the Treasury

[35] Provinces Muş, Ağrı and Hakkari have the lowest tax to total revenue ratio while İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir have the highest (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011).

3.7.2 Material capabilities

There are two aspects which are essential to assess the material capabilities of local administrations. First of all, it is necessary to evaluate if all departments are equipped with the required materials to carry out their responsibilities. Especially the level of computer services, the physical conditions of departments and acquisition of necessary software and machines are important indicators of material capabilities. Secondly, in case the departments need certain goods and services, they should be able to purchase easily through public procurement. Inevitably, the flexibility in purchasing is closely linked with financial capabilities. However, the effectiveness in purchasing increases with less red tape and effective methods in public procurement. On the other hand, the municipalities do not necessarily need to purchase the good and services but through effective partnerships with other municipalities and local institutions they can meet their needs without the limitations of the financial capabilities.

Starting with the first aspect, local governments need adequate means of work for their activities. These means can vary from the basic physical conditions of work environment to the holdings of advanced machinery and computer technology. There is not a general framework provided by the state setting the minimum standards for office materiel and machineries that the local administrations should possess for efficient service delivery. Furthermore, the data provided by municipalities are not consistent in each case as well. For instance, the KENTGES project (2011) which is conducted among 2954 municipalities found out severe inconsistencies on the number of registered buildings and infrastructure that the municipalities hold. A general conclusion drawn by the study is that the municipalities lack the required capacity and infrastructure to provide satisfactory input on inventory and statistical data on their material capabilities. Thus, it is not easy to evaluate the capabilities on physical means by objective sources. A solution can be relying on the perception of municipalities on their material needs.

On the other hand, the innovations in public provision and in e-government services created a concern on the adequacy in computer and online services. In this regard, a survey by the General Directorate of Local Administrations (2011) points out that 97 % of the population lives within the service area of a local administration which has a website. Similarly, the 9th E-Government Measurement and Benchmarking Survey (2010) by the EU supports the findings on the rapid development in Turkey in terms of technological competences. According to the survey, in 89% of cases? Turkey has carried its services into the electronic environment which is above the EU-27 average with 82%. Additionally, Turkey has a competent level on online sophistication of services with 91% which is slightly above the EU-27 average. The survey also evaluates the back office applications and horizontal enablers in electronic environments by focusing on 9 different elements, i.e. 'authentic sources', 'electronic identity', 'electronic payment', 'open specifications', 'single sign-on', 'architectural guidebooks', 'catalogue of horizontal enablers', 'secure e-delivery' and 'e-safe'. By enabling 6 out of 9 services (i.e. authentic sources, electronic payment, open specification, single sign-on, secure e-delivery and e-safe) Turkey scores an average service capability on this section as well.

In fact, comparing to the early 2000s, the technological capabilities of public administrations have increased notably. Although there is a global transformation in public services due to technological achievements, the prioritisation of ICT investments and the initiation of comprehensive projects such as the E-Transformation Turkey[36] and FATIH[37] have been most influential on the remarkable change. In the last decade, a four-fold increase has been realised on ICT investments from 526 million TL in 2002 to 2 billion TL in 2011 (SPO, 2011) With the inauguration of FATIH project, the ICT investments on education sector will reach to 4,9 billion TL (SPO, 2011).

Despite these remarkable achievements in public administration sector, the differences among local administrations have been considerably high. For instance, according to the KENTGES survey (2011), the rural and district municipalities do not even possess the basic machines to perform the urban strategies defined by the central government. The difference between the municipality types is so remarkable that while metropolitan municipalities score around 80% in 'technical' capabilities, the provincial municipalities score around 30 % and

[36] The e-transformation of Turkey was initiated in February 2003. The State Planning Organisation (SPO) was assigned to co-ordinate the project. A new institutional structure was formed by introducing e-Transformation Turkey Executive Board, e-Transformation Leaders and an Advisory Board (Telli, 2011).

[37] The following information is given in the story published by the newspaper Today's Zaman: "Undertaken by the Ministry of Education and supported by the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the Movement to Increase Opportunities and Technology (FATIH) Project is expected, once finalised, to be in use in 570,000 classrooms in 42,000 schools all around Turkey. According to government plans, teachers will be able to instantly access any document around the world they may need for their class, projecting it on the interactive smart board. The project will also facilitate long-distance learning programs while encouraging a gradual transition to e-textbooks and other electronic-learning materiel for each class. In the second component of the project, there will be 110 in-service training centres connected to each other through a network that covers Turkey's 81 provinces for educator training purposes, where all the participants will able to interact with each other live through teleconferencing. The last component is the establishment of a secure and appropriate network infrastructure for all the schools across the country. FATİH was first introduced at a ceremony attended by Erdoğan in November 2010. (Today's Zaman, 2012)

the other rural and district municipalities score less than 5%. Nevertheless, the technical capabilities in this survey incorporate personnel related qualifications on the targeted area with the material capabilities for the given services.

The survey of the Ministry of Interior (2011) lists the weak points of e-government services in local administrations as following:

- Lack of trust in the security systems ensuring the personal data registered for the e-government services.
- Inadequate legislative framework and regulations ensuring the security of personal data on online services.
- The websites of local administrations are offering information services rather than interactive services.
- Some e-government mechanisms are usually limited with the services provided by the central authority and their online systems do not extend into local services.
- Not all municipalities hold a centralised IT mechanism necessary to provide the e-government services.

In a nutshell, the studies point out, the material capabilities of local administrations vary horizontally and vertically among the types of local administrations. Especially smaller local administrations do not always have the necessary equipment and infrastructure to provide the services. The technological capabilities, on the other hand, are enhancing in public administrations but the implications on local level are relatively limited. The inadequacy of legislative framework and the absence of a unified e-government mechanism containing municipal services are notable factors with the current situation.

Moving to the second aspect, sharing equipment between municipalities is limited with certain sectors (e.g. water management, waste management, environment...etc.) and is not a popular practice (Jackson & Üskent, 2010). It seems there are two aspects to be considered in this regard. First of all, there are different interpretations of the law on Union of Local Administrations. Even though the law allows municipal partnerships, municipalities are not clear about the extent of the law due to a Courts of Account's opinion on forming partnerships (Jackson & Üskent, 2010). This impedes further initiatives to form municipal partnerships to supplement material needs. Secondly, sustaining municipal partnerships requires a certain extent of capacity in terms of staff capability and personnel costs. Apparently, for many municipalities the relative cost of partnerships is a handicap on this sort of initiatives (Jackson & Üskent, 2010). Yet, informal cooperation among neighbouring municipalities is taking place instead of formal partnerships (Jackson & Üskent, 2010).

In terms of purchasing goods from public or private sources, there are three options for local administrations to supply their needs. The first option is the State Supply Office (*Devlet Malzeme Ofisi*) which is a state economic enterprise affiliated with the Ministry of Finance and the central procuring agency for public bodies. The second option for municipalities is opening-up their own private enterprises to supply their needs, and purchasing their goods from them. The third option is procuring the goods and services through private companies. Turkey has a central procurement agency, i.e. the Public Procurement Agency, to supervise and facilitate the procurement procedure for public bodies. Turkey is currently preparing a new law to incorporate some EU procurement methods to its own legislation. The current legislation is largely compatible with the old EC Directives and contains the general procurement rules and procedures (Bianchi & Guidi, 2010). Yet, there are deficiencies in the legislation. For instance, the privately owned utilities are not covered by public procurement rules while publicly owned utilities such as State Economic Enterprises need to follow the general public procurement provisions (Bianchi & Guidi, 2010) Furthermore, the current system does not include e-procurement which is becoming a preferred option in public procurements in the EU (SIGMA, 2010).

According to the 2009 statistics on public procurement in Turkey, 2.431 local and regional authorities procured goods and services which is the equivalent of one fourth of all public contracts in 2009[38] (SIGMA, 2010). However, these numbers do not include low-value procurements which have an estimated number of 125.000 (SIGMA, 2010). Thus, low-value procurements which are a convenient way to purchase goods and services for departments seem as a more preferable option.

To sum up, partnerships among municipalities and procurement of goods and services from private sector are not much developed means of purchasing for municipalities. Yet, the high number in low-value procurements and popularity of informal partnerships among municipalities point out that there are ways of purchasing goods for municipalities outside of state sources and in time these alternative sources might gain importance.

[38] Regional and local authorities awarded 25.482 public contracts in total 98.142 contracts.

3.7.3 Communication capabilities

The most important notion in relation to communication capabilities is the flow of information inside the organisational structure and outside of the organisation with citizens and other institutions. In this regard, it is essential to integrate new information technologies into the existing organisational structures and to build social communication with local governance actors. Thus, in this part three aspects will be elaborated about the communication capabilities of local administrations in Turkey. First, intra-organisational communication mechanisms, i.e. the communication between municipal management and organisation and inter-departmental communication, will be examined. The emphasis will be on the effectiveness of the existing mechanisms for intra-organisational communication. Second, the communication between society and local administrations will be examined. Especially, the capacity of e-government mechanisms and effectiveness of the means to build social interaction will be part of the inquiry. The last step will focus on the communication with the central government and with the union of local administrations.

The intra-organisational communication in local administrations has two different dimensions. The first one is the relationship between the heads of organisation with the councillors and the other one is between the managers and the civil servants. According to the findings of LAR II, there are problematic relations on these lines. According to the assessment report (2010), only some municipalities have line-management structures whereby Heads of Units can meet regularly under the supervision of the Deputy Mayor while for others there is not an adequate communication mechanism between the mayors and civil servants. Additionally, for some municipalities 'the physical nature of the offices' or 'bureaucratic bottlenecks' appears as obstacles on building effective communication mechanisms (LAR II, 2010). There is also a lack of awareness and cooperative attitude in top-management to promote the sharing of the information within the organisation. The remarkable finding is that despite the fact that municipalities are usually equipped with capable ICT infrastructure, due to the unwillingness to share information or disregarding the storing of information, the management information systems are not operating adequately (LAR II, 2010). The lack of mutually agreed descriptions on tasks and responsibilities, and the managerial deficiencies to cultivate the most from the inter-departmental meetings emerge as other barriers on building effective communication within the administrative body.

On the other hand, the relations between the councillors and mayors or civil servants are also handicapped by several capacity related issues. It appears that in most of the municipalities, councillors rarely or not at all meet with the civil servants. In addition to this, there is a lack of guidelines and training possibilities for councillors how to establish this particular relationship. In fact, in most of the municipalities, councillors are neither knowledgeable of their responsibilities, nor have the technical capabilities to conduct their responsibilities (LAR II, 2010). Inevitably, this situation hampers their essential internal control function on municipal activities. Nevertheless, in most of the municipalities communicating with the mayor is not a significant problem for councillors.

Moving on to the second aspect, there are again two dimensions to be assessed in the external communication with the society. The first one is the existing participation mechanisms for citizens in local governance. As previously mentioned, citizens can participate in local governance mechanism through elected councillors, muhtars and urban councils. Secondly, the e-government system is an alternative source to communicate with local administrations.

Starting with the relation between councillors and citizens, in many municipalities there is neither a particular mechanism nor guidelines to facilitate the communication with citizens (LAR II, 2010). Eventually, the councillors are rarely meeting with their electorate if they are meeting at all. It appears as well that the residents have little information on what a councillor does (LAR II, 2010). Clearly, the existing communication mechanisms with residents are inadequate and not properly functioning. The picture is almost the same with regard to communicating through urban councils. The LAR II report indicates that the members of urban councils meet seldom or not at all with elected municipal councillors. There are only some ad-hoc committees initiated by urban councils to monitor the activities of municipalities but there is not a formal mechanism to facilitate meetings between these two groups. Also, there is some criticism against the propositions prepared by the urban councils as being irrelevant with the municipal council’s agenda (LAR II, 2010). Moreover, several municipal respondents complain that the confrontational attitudes of civil society organisations are damaging a constructive dialogue. Yet, these problems are in fact outcomes of not functioning communication channels not the source of it. Along the same lines, the good experiences are not prevalent in citizen participation through muhtars. In some cases, with the mayor’s initiative, muhtars can find easier access into the municipal decision-making. However, these examples are sporadic as in other cases muhtars complain about the absence of participation opportunities (LAR II, 2010).

It seems that the existing participation mechanisms for citizens are not satisfactory. Thus, citizens usually prefer to bring their complaints and opinions directly to the mayor (LAR II, 2010). Indeed, most municipalities have one form of direct communication mechanism between the mayor (or deputy mayor) and the citizens. For instance, many municipalities have public desks for the questions and complaints directed by the citizens. Moreover, some municipalities provide local TV and newspaper services which can be an alternative source of information for citizens. Nevertheless, the findings of LAR II programme point out the public awareness on structures, responsibilities and functions of local administrations are limited which is an indication of poor communication between local administrations and citizens. The good examples of functioning communication mechanisms are limited to the cases and they are mostly implemented with the initiative of the mayor.

The e-government mechanisms are other means for building effective communication with the community. Especially, at the second term of AKP government, there have been great emphases on e-government transformation of public services. For instance, the e-government gateway project initiated in 2008 was to enable a one single entry for the provision of public services. Since 2010 there are 246 governmental services accessible from an online single source (SPO, 2011). According to 2011 data, at least one participatory online application (e.g. online surveys, voting, interactive discussions, etc.) is provided in the website of municipalities which corresponds to the 87 % of the total population (Mahalli İdareler Genel Müdürlüğü, 2011). Also, an interactive city guide is provided over the website covering 80 % of population (Mahalli İdareler Genel Müdürlüğü, 2011).

However, the effectiveness of e-government is partly dependent on the capacities existing in the society. In this sense 'e-government readiness' is an important indicator to assess the willingness and capability of society to embrace e-government mechanisms. The most notable evaluation method on 'e-government readiness' is developed by United Nations Public Administration Programme (UNPAP) which is publishing the E-Government Readiness Index (EGRI) since 2003. The index evaluates the capacities on online service, telecommunication and human capital. According to the 2010 index, Turkey ranks 69 in e-government development which is a poor performance compared to European countries. Additionally, Turkey and Italy show the lowest increases in individual usage of Internet according to the OECD data (Telli, 2011). In fact, the national statistics on e-government in Turkey shows a low ranking in households with Internet connection (34%) and Internet user individuals (37.6 %) (SPO, 2011). By and large, citizens in Turkey prefer face-to-face interaction in public offices[39] instead of online services (SPO, 2011). Compared to OECD countries, Turkey is the second last regarding the percentage of businesses using the Internet to interact with public authorities and the lowest on the percentage of citizens using the Internet to interact with public authorities (Telli, 2011).

Yet, there is the other side of the medallion which is not that depressing for Turkey. First of all, Turkey has a high level of young population (almost half of the population is under 24) and the level of Internet usage among young people is distinctively higher compared to the country average[40]. Secondly, the Internet usage has a positive correlation with literacy and education level. Thus the regions with high level of education and development level perform higher in rankings of e-government readiness. Thirdly, contrary to the individual level, the private enterprises have competent levels in terms of e-government readiness according to the EU standards. The percentage of enterprises with broadband connection is 89% which is above the EU-27 average with 86% (SPO, 2011). Additionally, the online sophistication in business is quite above the EU-27 average. Fourthly, despite the low rankings in e-government usage among individuals and private companies, the satisfaction rates for e-government services has raised from 63,3 % in 2008 to 95,7% in 2010 (SPO, 2011). Again, this rate is above the EU average.

In sum, the statistics indicate the importance and the usage of e-government services will most likely increase rapidly in the coming years, and it might be an important mean of communication and service allocation in local governance. As mentioned previously, the improvements on e-procurement and a unified system on e-governance incorporating the municipal services can foster the efforts on e-government.

The last aspect of communication capabilities is about the communication with the central government and with the union of local administrations. The most urgent problem on this relation is the absence of an information database connecting local administrations with the central authority. Thus, the communication between the municipalities and central government is generally limited with personal links, and usually works through the affiliated political parties.

In fact, there are some on-going attempts to create a unified databank connecting local and central information sources. The most promising project on that matter was initiated by

[39] According to the 2009 data, 64.4 % of citizens responded as the ‘preference to meet face to face’ as the main reason on not choosing to use e-government services.
[40] The Internet usage for the age group 16-24 is 76.6 %, which is almost double of country average.

the Ministry of Interior and TODAIE[41] in 2001, namely the 'YerelBilgi Project'. The aim of the project is to create a single databank to pool all the information provided by local organisations of central authority, local administrations and affiliated enterprises. However, the project is not realised so far and it was postponed due to software problems, the inadequacy of stakeholders on using the system and the complexity of the system on data entrance (Baruş, 2010). In 2009, a new phase has started on the project. New software has been prepared and the usage of the system has been simplified. The current aim in the project is to commence the first data applications starting from 2011 (Baruş, 2010). If the project can be fully operationalised, it will undoubtedly facilitate the communication gap between local authorities and central government.

On the other hand, with the act on unions of local authorities, the unions of municipalities and SPAs have been recognised as public bodies. Two nationwide unions, one for municipalities and one for SPAs, were allowed to be formed and all respective local administrations are recognised as the natural members. The main function of these organisations are to defend and protect the interests of their members, to participate in lobbying activities, to develop awareness and to provide trainings to their members on related fields. This new initiative has the potential to be an important mean of communication among the local administrations. Furthermore, the LAR II report (2010) points out that the municipalities are willing to cooperate with the Union both on their relations with central government and also with each other. In addition, the regional unions of municipalities (e.g. Union of Marmara Municipalities) are also gradually gaining importance as platforms to share information and to build partnerships among its members.

3.7.4 Planning capabilities

The recent reforms foresee new planning functions for local administrations. In a nutshell, local administrations are embarked with the planning responsibilities of strategic plans, performance programmes, budgets and accountability reports. The main purpose of these planning activities is to establish an effective financial management and service delivery in local administrations.

[41] Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East (TODAIE) is a public body inaugurated in 1952 to conduct research on public administration and to provide trainings to civil servants.

The legal basis of strategic planning has been introduced in 2003 with the Public Financial Management and Control Law (PMC Law). The new obligations presented by the law have been reaffirmed later in the separate laws. The first strategic plans by local administrations were expected until July 2006. However, the short application period without any prior preparation had adversely affected the purpose of strategic planning by disregarding participation and learning processes thus the quality of first strategic plans was unsatisfactory.

According to the article 9 in PMC Law, the strategy planning should include setting the mission, vision and the strategic goals; defining measureable outcomes and performance targets with predefined indicators; and the supervision and evaluation stages. The strategic planning process should be prepared with the participation and cooperation of the shareholders. On this regard, the Handbook of Strategic Planning for Public Institution (2006) prepared by the SPO[42] explains various analysis methods for each stage of strategic planning. Additionally, strategic planning should be integrated into the budget preparation process by adopting performance criteria for objective setting. Because of that, another guidebook prepared by the Ministry of Finance (2005) explains the basics of performance based budgeting. The guidebook suggests that the adoption of performance based budgeting is the link between strategic planning and budget preparation. The system anticipates for each public organisation to decide on yearly performance targets and to designate the activities and their budgets to reach the objectives. The success criteria for each activity should be indicated in the performance charts to evaluate the results. Lastly, the guidebook foresees an activity based costing for budgeting process.

Nonetheless, the actual practices on planning are far from the intended ones. Both national and international observers report substantial discrepancies in planning processes. For instance, the 2010 assessment report by LAR II highlights that the managers and councillors in the municipalities do not think that strategic planning is linked into the operational effectiveness of the administrations. The pilot studies demonstrate the strategic plans are usually prepared as academic practices without any participation from internal or external sources. Furthermore, the report underlines that there is a very little sense of ownership by lower level managers over the plans thus the plans do not serve for management purposes.

[42] The State Planning Organisation was restructured as the Ministry of Development in 2011.

Another report on performance budgeting (Çatak & Çilingir, 2010) conducts a system analysis on performance budgeting in Turkey and sheds light on the current problems within the system. The report argues that the performance budgeting system in Turkey performs poorly and the level of progress is low. The problems and their causes are given in the report as following;

- *Inadequate and incomplete legislation* caused by deficiencies and ambiguity in strategic planning, performance programming, budgeting and accountability reporting regulation; preparation of investment and operational budgets as separate documents; preparation of performance programmes and budgets as separate documents; short coverage period of performance programmes; short budget approval period by Parliament; and unaligned complementary legislation.
- *Incomplete and unclear performance budgeting methodology* caused by ambiguity in the performance budgeting approach; lack of a systematic approach for strategic planning; deficiencies and ambiguity in the performance programming methodology; ambiguity in linking strategic plans to higher-level policy documents, performance programmes to strategic plans, budgets, accountability reports and detailed expenditure programmes to performance programmes; lack of programme classification; ineffective performance budgeting documents in determination of budget ceilings; appropriations of administrations and ambiguity in rules and procedures of budget negotiations.
- *Weak co-ordination and guidance* caused by two regulatory administrations (i.e. Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Finance) in the performance budgeting system; inadequacy of the assessment of the strategic plans and performance programmes; insufficient guidance for strategic planning and performance programming processes; disconnected performance budgeting legislation and disconnected budget negotiations.
- *Improper and ineffective implementation* caused by delays in the budget calendar; lack of activity-based costing, feasibility analysis, risk assessment and cost accounting.
- *Disabling administrative and external factors* such as organisational problems of the Strategy Development Departments; insufficient political ownership and supervision; lack of infrastructure to obtain, track and evaluate performance data; inadequacy of the e-budget system.

In sum, even though the planning responsibilities delegated to local administrations are considerably enhanced, the practices can remotely meet the expectations. The reasons are both systematic and organisational. Nevertheless, a well-functioning planning process in local administrations has a great potential to contribute to overall capacity as well.

3.7.5 Managerial capabilities

Managerial capabilities of local administrations incorporate the functional and technical capabilities held by the senior managers and head of the units. Besides these, institutional arrangements on managerial functions should be considered as part of the managerial capabilities as well. Yet, some of these institutional arrangements have been elaborated previously as part of the communication and planning capacities. Therefore, to avoid repetition, the focus in this part will be on personal qualities and other institutional arrangements.

There are some general management skills, regardless of which sector is in it. For instance, the type of leadership, a certain level of education and knowledge are crucial to assess the managerial capacities. Unfortunately, there is no official statistics on the education levels of mayors. However, a study on managerial capacities should evaluate the education levels and the occupational knowledge of the managers. In terms of occupational trainings, there are some limited training programmes available by the Union of Municipalities of Turkey, by the Ministry of Interior and some private companies. In addition to this, some international actors such as the UNDP and the EU are organising occasional projects to enhance the managerial capacity in municipalities. Yet, there is not a single accredited training programme targeting managerial capacity and the number of municipalities able to benefit from these trainings is low.

Furthermore, the motivation is an important subject on leadership qualities. A sort of awarding mechanism through promotion or increased income is essential to motivate the staff. Yet, as a result of overstaffing and politicisation in municipalities, most of the managers serve in the same positions for many years, clearly hampering their desire to try new approaches (LAR II, 2010). According to the studies, managers are not seen as ‘result-oriented’ or as ‘problem-solvers’ but ‘doing the minimum to maintain their positions’ (LAR II, 2010). Another concern raised about managers is that they don’t take any initiatives and they do whatever the mayor asks them to do. This naturally impedes a well-functioning management system. Yet, this is partly related with the absence of performance-monitoring systems. The studies show an automated system to monitor and evaluate the performances is required in the municipalities (LAR II, 2010).

There are some efforts to increase the motivation of the staff, as undertaking staff satisfaction surveys and organising social events (LAR II, 2010). Furthermore, some municipalities enable the posts in municipal companies with additional benefits for their senior managers (LAR II, 2010).

Another important subject related to the managerial capabilities is the cooperation and coordination between the head of units and the mayor. Again, differences in political affiliations have a substantial influence on that matter. Mayors have to cooperate usually with the heads of units who are elected as the candidate of other political parties. Given the party politics are influential on the municipal levels, political calculations affect directly the roles and responsibilities in the administration. On the other hand, the municipalities usually lack a commonly agreed Terms of Reference for the units which either leads duplication of the work or for certain works not to be undertaken by any units (LAR II, 2010).

To sum up, political affiliations and inertia among managers due to lack of career opportunities incapacitates the managerial capabilities of local administrations. Studies suggest that there is a need of substantial training and awareness programmes to enhance personal capabilities and functioning managerial systems inside the municipalities.

3.7.6 Human resource capabilities

Human resource (HR) capabilities are associated with the sufficiency of the personnel equipped with necessary skills and qualities to achieve the stated objectives. Number of the personnel, received trainings, skills, gender dispersion, and motivation are some important aspects to be considered on evaluating HR capabilities. Also, the HR capabilities are closely related with the quality of the HR management (HRM), which is essential for the efficient allocation of human resources. Therefore, the existence of HRM rules and the efficiency of HRM system are equally important for HR capabilities.

According to 2011 data, there are approximately 2,583,000 public employees in Turkey, of whom approximately 75.2 % are in central government, 10.2 % in local governments and 14.6 % in state enterprises (SIGMA, 2011). According to the 2010 statistics of the Ministry of Interior, 224.041 people are employed in municipalities. There are four different categories of employment statuses in municipalities; public servants, contracted personnel, permanent and temporary workers, of which 76.618 people are working as public servant, 13.520 as contracted personnel, 124.347 as permanent and 9.556 as temporary worker. The working and employment conditions of each category are described in the Civil Servants Act No. 657. The act was implemented in 1965 and since then there have only been some minor changes in the civil service system. There are concerns about it as being out of date in some respects. During the AKP period, the renewal of the law has been brought up as part of the general public management reform plan but at the moment the old law is still in effect.

The 2011 assessment report of SIGMA underlines that the following policy actions are needed to improve the current civil service system: "narrowing the scope of the civil service, including a more precise delimitation of the boundaries between politics and administration; improving the merit-based system for recruitment and management; establishing a unitary, simpler, transparent and fair salary system; reinforcing rights and duties of civil servants; using mobility and training as important human resources management tools; cutting favouritism and patronage; eliminating the abuse of temporary appointments as a way of circumventing normal recruitment and promotion procedures; abolishing the immunity of civil servants and the permission system for being prosecuted; emphasising impartiality as a fundamental civil service value; regulating the right to strike; removing restrictions on the freedom to unionise; increase social dialogue." The absence of a central management unit to ensure common standards by preparing public service policies and the political polarisation among civil servants are other important weaknesses of the system, which are impeding professionalism in public services and paving the way for the nepotism and partisanism.

On the other hand, the inefficiency of public service employment is a striking problem in all public services. The public employment is not balanced among departments and not equally distributed across the country. One reason is that the legal restrictions are impeding the internal mobility among departments (SIGMA 2011). Another reason is the absence of HRM systems both in local and central level. There is neither a single line ministry with the sole responsibility of HRM function (OECD, 2011) nor ministries have the capacity and skills to develop accurate human resource management (SIGMA, 2011). The recently established HRM departments inside the ministries are mainly in charge of record keeping practices rather than developing embedded strategies (SIGMA, 2011). Similarly, the lack of established

HRM mechanisms and the absence of legal restrictions on the level of employment resulted with overemployment in many municipalities.

A report prepared by the General Directorate of Local Authorities in Turkey (2010) arrays the reasons of overemployment in municipalities as following: "irrational employment policies; the absence of any regulation on personnel expenditures; the practicalities in recruitment procedures; the transfer of 117.533 temporary workers to permanent positions following the implementation of the Act no. 5620[43]; and the additional personnel[44] transferred to local administrations following the abolishment of General Directorate of Village Services in 2005". The uncontrolled employment policies in municipalities throughout the years have turned into a huge financial burden especially for smaller municipalities. Additionally, the changes in population census system in 2007[45] have adversely affected municipalities in less developed areas whose residents migrated in bigger cities while officially being registered in their hometowns. Considering the transfer shares from the general budget are largely decided by the population criterion, the financial burden of overemployment in those municipalities with declining population has become even more overwhelming.

However, there are some efforts to deal with overemployment problem in public institutions. A noteworthy development occurred in 2007 with the adoption of 'norm cadre' system for municipalities and affiliated agencies. The system sets the standards and the ceiling number for each post and type of personnel to be employed thus trying to prevent inefficient employment of the personnel. Each year, the Ministry of Interior is publishing the number of norm cadre for each municipality based on the population range and economic activities. Furthermore, the Law no. 6111 has been enacted in 2011 to transfer the redundant workers in municipalities into the provincial organisation of the Ministry of Education and to the police headquarters. However, there are some concerns against the law that it might be subjective on the selection process. The reason is that the norm cadre personnel are not excluded and the list of the redundant workers is to be prepared by the municipalities even though an independent commission will evaluate it later. Another change in terms of HRM

[43] The act was implemented in 2007 to prevent the arbitrary employment of workers in temporary positions for long periods. The act prohibited the employment of temporary workers for longer periods than 180 days. Moreover, the salaries and minimum employment periods of temporary workers have improved parallel to the changes in employment statuses.

[44] 31.646 out of 43.274 people are still employed in local administrations. (General Directorate of Local Adm., 2010)

[45] The new census system is designed on the basis of residence addresses of the citizens instead of a one-day enumeration on a 'de facto' basis. The main purpose of the system is to prevent the population overcount which was usually the case in the traditional system.

occurred with the presentation of performance criteria in the new local administration laws, wherein each public body has been assigned to adopt performance assessment measures. Yet, the performance assessment is used mostly for career progression and contract renewal, and it is not linked to pay (OECD, 2011).

Despite the overemployment problem there is a lack of qualified staff in most municipalities. This is partly due to the training programmes adopted in municipalities. The Training Needs Assessment (TNA) Report (2010) of the LAR II programme underlines some crucial findings regarding the training needs in local administrations:

- There is a lack of coordination among various training providers and no commonly agreed training courses or packages. Also there are no recognised standards and no system for accrediting trainers.
- There is an uneven balance between the elected councillors and administrators in access to trainings. The elected councillors lack even the basic trainings on their legal duties to control and supervise municipal actions, and the administrators are not trained on how to cooperate with and support elected councillors.
- Trainings for local administrations are implemented by a 'supply-led' approach rather than 'demand-led', where the managers are selecting the training topics for their staff. Thus, most of the training programmes do not cover the real training needs demanded by the personnel.
- Few of the local administrations have the capacity within their HR departments to assess and monitor training needs.

Lastly, the other indicators of the qualified staff are interrelated with the profile of the individuals in local administrations. The TNA report presents both positive and negative findings in this regard. According to the report, 18.3% of women are serving in administrative positions and 9.1% in elected positions, which is low compared to the EU average. Similarly, in the 2014 local elections, only 2.92 % of mayors and 10.72% of councillors are elected from women candidates[46]. Yet, the experience level of managers (63% of the managers in the administrations have between 10 to 30 years of experience) and high usage of Internet for work purposes, (80% of the managers are using internet for 6 hours or more each week) indicate that there is good potential to implement successful learning activities in the administrations.

[46] See www.kadinkoalisyonu.org

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter touched upon some important aspects which need to be taken into account before proceeding with the methodology chapter. First of all, the public administration system relies on the control of local administrations by the central authority and there are direct (i.e. based on law) and indirect (e.g. corruption charges, discretion on funds from central budget) means for central authority to enforce this control mechanism. Secondly, party affiliation seems as an important factor which is affecting both the municipal decision-making and also the relations with the central government. Thirdly, municipalities in economically developed regions have more advantages to raise income by own source resources and through owned economic enterprises. Similar to financial capabilities, empirical findings show that communication and human resource capabilities are also related with the economic development and size of the municipality. Thus, it is logical to expect that the local governance capacity will be correlated with the local capacity in Turkish case. Fourthly, different type of local administrations shows significant differences in terms of capabilities and reliance on central government. Despite the legal changes, SPAs are still highly dependent in practice on central authority both on decision-making and implementation. On the other hand, studies show that different types of municipalities have varying degree of capacities in terms of local governance. In other words, metropolitan municipalities have usually larger capacities from provincial municipalities and provincial municipalities have larger capacities than district municipalities. Therefore, in terms of capacities it is important to compare the same type of local administrations.

In sum, the influence of central government, party affiliations, socio-economic development, size and type of local administrations appear as primary factors which can have an impact on the relationship between local governance capacity and decentralisation in Turkish case. In the next chapter, I will address the questions regarding the methodological aspects of this research and the data collection strategy. Subsequently, in Chapter V the data analysis and the interpretations of the statistical findings will be presented.

Chapter IV- Methodology

This dissertation explores the relationship between capacities for better local governance and decentralisation in local governance. Three alternative research hypotheses are formulated to describe the assumed relationship between the local governance capacity, local capacity and decentralisation.

H1: Decentralisation is influenced by local governance capacity while the impact of local capacity is limited or insignificant on decentralisation.

H2: Decentralisation is influenced both by local governance capacity and local capacity significantly, and both capacities independently affect decentralisation.

H3: Decentralisation is influenced by local capacity while the impact of local governance capacity apart is limited or insignificant.

Hence the methodological choices shed light on the (1) presence of a relationship and (2) the degree of relationship between these concepts separately and jointly. Furthermore, local governance capacity is not a unified concept but rather a quintessence of the mobilisation capacity, decision-making capacity and implementation capacity of local government. Any study on the relationship between decentralisation and capacity should indicate the influence of each subcategory under local governance capacity but also the influence of their interaction with each other. Finally, capacity and decentralisation are multifaceted concepts and any given relationship should be controlled on the influence of other explanatory factors. Therefore a reliable study on the relationship between these concepts should reflect on external variables with a possible influence on decentralisation and capacity.

In the light of this, this dissertation has the following research objectives;

Objective 1: Determine the relationship between the core concepts.

Objective 2: Determine the degree of relationships between the core concepts separately and jointly.

Objective 3: Control any possible external variable on the assumed relationships.

In a nutshell, Chapter IV focuses on the research design and the chosen methods to accomplish the research objectives. Choices made in data sampling and unit of analysis;

operationalisation of the concepts; data collection strategy and instrumentation; methods in data analysis and concerns on reliability and validity will be elaborated in this chapter.

4.1 Research Method and Design Appropriateness

The research objectives inherently favour a quantitative research design. As Creswell (2003) suggests, in case the problem is identifying factors that influence an outcome, the utility of an intervention, or understanding the best predictors in outcomes, then a quantitative approach is the best choice for the researcher. Creswell describes the pillars of a quantitative research design as following:

> *"A quantitative approach is one in which the investigatory primarily uses postpositive claims for developing knowledge (i.e., cause and effect thinking, reduction to specific variables and hypotheses and questions, use of measurement and observation, and the test of the theories), employs strategies of inquiry such as experiments and surveys, and collect data on predetermined instruments that yield statistics data* (Creswell, 2003)*"*

However, the quantitative research design has its own limitations. The structured data collection instruments for quantitative research usually fall short in capturing intangible or abstract notions. Especially measuring capacity encompasses several intangible elements which are difficult to interpret in quantifiable data. Moreover, the rigidity of quantitative data collection method can easily fail to capture other influential factors. Therefore, qualitative responses will be supplemented with the statistical findings in order to attain more insight on the mechanism and to complement the big picture on how the concepts are mutually affecting each other.

One of the main handicaps of quantitative research design is securing the adequacy in sample size. The basic principle of "more is better" in statistical analysis is not easily attainable in social sciences, especially if the unit of analysis is not individuals. Statistical inferences based on the population of public bodies or states are inevitably restricted by the possible data size. Similarly, this research is also restricted by the number of existing municipalities in terms of possible data size.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is increasingly becoming popular in social sciences especially in case of limitation with data sizes. QCA enables the researchers to drive causal inferences based on data and is perceived to be a bridging method between qualitative and quantitative approaches. QCA is recommended as preferable option in comparison to quantitative research methods if the researcher strives on understanding the causal conditions of a complex phenomenon or event based on set of factors. The findings of QCA enable the researcher to address various questions such as, 'under what conditions a certain event/phenomenon occurs?' or 'which conditions are sufficient for a certain outcome to occur?'. If we adopt this mentality to this research, a possible research question would take the shape of "under which capacity conditions higher decentralisation occurs?". Although this research question has similarities with the research interests, the central research question of this research revolves around the degree of influence of local capacity and local governance capacity on decentralisation. Measuring the degree of influence is best addressed with the regression analysis. Nevertheless, QCA presents a viable alternative for future researches, especially for studying the causal inferences between sub-elements constituting the local governance capacity and higher decentralisation.

4.2 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis is provincial municipalities. As discussed in Chapter III, Turkey is allotted into 81 provinces governed by provincial and metropolitan municipalities. There are in total 16 metropolitan municipalities and 65 provincial municipalities[47]. Metropolitan and provincial municipalities differ in terms of organisational structure, administrative and financial discretion. Therefore a comparison on provincial level should exclude metropolitan municipalities. Previous chapter indicated that smaller municipalities usually lack the basic capacities, thus data collection in the level of district or first-level municipalities would most likely result with lots of missing data to address satisfactorily various aspects of local governance capacity. Hence a comparison among provincial municipalities appears as the most logical choice for this research.

The organisational structure of provincial municipalities varies in each case. Yet, in each municipality the mayor is the highest authority in management and the deputy mayors are in charge of the management of different departments. Usually, in each provincial

[47] After the implementation of 6360 numbered law on the status of 14 provincial municipalities in March 2014, Aydın, Balıkesir, Denizli, Hatay, Malatya, Manisa, Kahramanmaras, Mardin, Mugla, Ordu, Tekirdag, Trabzon, Sanlıurfa and Van, municipalities are changed into metropolitan municipalities. However, during the field research, these municipalities were still provincial municipalities, thus they are part of the analysis.

municipality, there are two or three deputy mayors, and with the mayor they form the managing body of the municipality.

The decision-making body of the municipality is the municipal assembly, which is composed of elected councillors. Councillors usually belong to political parties and they are selected according to the share of votes their parties have received in the local elections. In 2009 local elections, the distribution of provincial municipalities among the political parties[48] has been as following:

AKP (Justice and Development Party): 36 provinces

CHP (Republican People's Party): 11 provinces

MHP (Nationalist Movement Party): 8 provinces

BDP (Peace and Democracy Party): 7 provinces

Independent: 2 provinces[49]

Others: 1 (Sivas) province

4.3 Operationalisation of Variables

The research hypotheses require the operationalisation of three key variables, local governance capacity, local capacity and decentralisation. This part presents the choices and arguments on the operationalisation of these variables. Several potential external factors which may have an exogenous influence on the relationship between capacity and decentralisation in local governance were highlighted in the previous chapter. These factors are categorised under external variables and the choices on operationalisation are explained in the final part of this section.

4.3.1 Local Governance Capacity

The theoretical approach towards local governance in this research highlights two domains for the capacities in local governance. The first domain is about the capacity components possessed by the local government, and the second domain captures the relational

[48] The list indicates the number of provincial municipalities whose mayor was a candidate from the associated political party.
[49] The mayors of both provinces have joined in AKP in 2013. So the total number of provincial municipalities governed by the candidates from AKP has increased to 38.

capacity components existing in the surrounding environment. The former is categorised under 'local governance capacity' and the later is categorised under 'local capacity'.

Local governance upholds the local government responsible on mobilising the resources from the actors in locality and to channel them wisely to the needs of the public. For clarification, actors in locality do not necessarily need to be located within the jurisdictional area of the local administration, but any institution involving into local governance affairs can be considered as an actor in locality. For instance, if a central government institution is responsible on providing loans to local administration, it will be considered as an actor in locality.

Based on this definition, three fundamental functions are expected from local governments in terms of governance; (1) mobilisation of resources, (2) decision-making and (3) implementation. These functions are expected to correspond to the six key dimensions to locate the required capabilities, i.e. financial, material, communication, planning, human resources and managerial dimensions (see Figure 2.3). In a nutshell, mobilisation capacity focuses on the financial and material dimensions of capacity; decision-making capacity focuses on planning and communication dimensions of capacity; and implementation capacity holds on human resources and managerial capacities.

Yet, this logical construct of local governance capacity entails a significant challenge to overcome in terms of measurement. Since all the three functional capacities under local governance capacity include several indicators, measuring local governance capacity as a single variable would require a larger sample size than 65 provinces for sensible statistical inferences. Yet, treating the local governance capacity variables separately would enable to explore what variations of capacities are functional in terms of decentralisation. Therefore, in this research local governance capacity will not refer to a single variable but the theoretical construct influenced jointly by mobilisation, decision-making and implementation capacities.

a. Mobilisation Capacity

Mobilisation capacity focuses on the abilities and means of the local government in mobilising the financial and material resources needed for public services and administrative functions. Three sub-areas are defined according to the stages in mobilising the resources; (1) the ability to bring in the financial resources for purchasing, (2) the capability to channel the financial resources for the purchasing goods and services, (3) the adequacy in financial and material means for municipal functions.

The first sub-area focuses on the ability of municipality to generate income from its own sources. Two indicators are selected; (1)‘property taxation’, which is the biggest contributor to the municipality tax revenues and (2) ‘utilisation of immovable’, which indicates the ability of the municipality to generate income from municipality’s immovable. ‘Property taxation’ is measured by the ratio of property tax collected to registered taxpayers. ‘Utilisation of immovable’ is the ratio of revenue generated by the immovable owned by the municipality to the overall value of the immovable. These indicators show municipality’s capability to generate income by focusing on the two most important items affecting municipality’s own-source revenues (i.e. tax revenues, and enterprise and property revenues). Both of the indicators are expected to be in the same direction with the mobilisation capacity.

The second sub-area incorporates the indicators capturing the ability of the municipality in channelling its revenues for purchasing goods and services required for public services. Two questions are important in this regard; (1) ‘what is the financial flexibility in purchasing goods and services?’, and (2) ‘how good is the public procurement system?’. The financial flexibility decreases when the compulsory administrative expenditures (e.g. personnel cost, social security cost, ...etc.) hold a big share in the overall expenditures or when the short-term debt level is too high. Hence three indicators are picked for this stage; (1) debt structure, (2) public procurement and (3) purchasing power. ‘Debt structure’ is measured by the ratio of short-term debts (with a due date less than a year) to long-term debts. ‘Public procurement’ is a 5 point Likert-scale variable composed of 4 items; (a) the sufficiency of public procurement in supplying the needs of the municipality, (b) the speed of public procurement, (c) specialised personnel in public procurement and (d) e-procurement infrastructure. ‘Purchasing power’ is measured by the ratio of the expenditures on goods and services to the overall municipal expenditures. ‘Debt structure’ is expected to be in adverse relation with the mobilisation capacity, as higher ratios would indicate the municipality has lesser flexibility to buy goods and services due to debt obligations. Other two indicators are expected to be in the same direction with mobilisation capacity. Here, higher purchasing power and higher share of the expenses on goods and services would indicate a higher capability in purchasing resources needed for better governance.

The third sub-area focuses on the financial and material adequacy for the delivery of public services. Three indicators are selected: (1) material adequacy in public services, (2) adequacy of financial resources, and (3) physical and technical adequacy in administration. ‘Material adequacy in public services’ is measured by the mean score of mayors’ responses on a 1 to 5 satisfaction scale about the material adequacy in 14 municipal services. ‘Adequacy of financial resources’ is measured by the responses of mayors on an ordinal scale of 1 to 5. ‘Physical and technical adequacy’ is a 5 point Likert-scale variable and measured by the mean score of 5 Likert items on adequacy in; (1) computer and computer hardware, (2) technical equipment and machinery, (3) internet connection and computer software, (4) physical condition of civil servant's offices, (5) physical condition of manager's offices.

Albeit not being part of the statistical analysis, one final element in mobilisation capacity is municipal partnerships and whether they substitute the formal ways on purchasing goods and services. A relevant question put forward in the survey is whether the municipalities form municipal partnerships to supplement their material needs and what is the degree of importance in covering material needs. The responses to this question will provide insight on the extent the municipal partnerships provide an alternative and viable model in covering municipality’s needs. It is noteworthy to mention that except ‘debts structure’, higher scores imply better results for each indicator.

Table 4.1 Mobilisation Capacity Variables

TYPE	CODE	VARIABLE	DIMENSION
Mobilisation Capacity	MOB1	Property taxation	Financial
	MOB2	Utilisation of immovable	Financial
	MOB3	Debt structure	Financial
	MOB4	Adequacy of financial resources	Financial
	MOB5	Purchasing power	Material
	MOB6	Physical and technical adequacy	Material
	MOB7	Material adequacy in public services	Material
	MOB8	Public procurement	Material

b. Decision-making Capacity

Decision-making capacity indicates the ability in deciding on how to allocate and where to allocate the mobilised resources. The ability in deciding on how to allocate is a clear indication of planning capacity. The municipalities should strategize between their means and needs, and apply this strategy to a feasible budget plan. In a nutshell, the success in strategic planning, performance budgeting, and the importance of strategic and performance plans on actual decision-making are selected indicators to evaluate the capacity on planning.

'Success in strategic planning' is the mean score of mayors and deputy mayor's response from 1 to 5 on the evaluation of the last strategy-planning process. The deputy mayors are asked to evaluate four aspects with regards to strategic planning; (1) describing the vision, mission and strategic goals, (2) identifying measurable outputs and performance indicators for goals, (3) monitoring the implementation of the strategic plan, (4) evaluation of the implementation of the strategic plan. Additionally, the mayor is asked to evaluate the success of the last strategic planning. The mean score of 5 items are registered as the data for the 'Success in strategic planning'. 'Performance budgeting' is measured by the mean score of 7 Likert-items on performance budgeting; (1) timing in budget planning, (2) integration of budget plans with performance plans, (3) implementation of performance criteria on budget negotiations, (4) coherence with strategic planning, (5) integration of activity-based costing, feasibility analysis, risk assessment and cost accounting in budget plans, (6) adequacy of equipment to monitor and assess performances, (7) adequacy of an e-budget system. The 'importance of strategic plan and performance plans on actual decision-making' indicator is selected to evaluate to what extent the plans are important on decision-making process of mayors. This indicator shows if the strategic plan and performance plan are part of the decision-making process in municipal actions or whether the decisions are made according to individual priorities of the mayor or with other political motives.

The best decision on where to allocate the resources can only be attained with adequate and effective means of information. In order for the decision-makers to attain the most accurate information, the organisation should have the capacity on sharing the information, storing the information, and effective horizontal and vertical communication. Not only information attained by the organisation but the interactions with Urban Councils and muhtars can also be source of information with decision-makers. Additionally, the decision-makers should employ the instruments to collect the data on segments of society and demands of citizens. Although the spread of paper sheets could be an instrument of collecting data, online data collection methods via webpages are becoming more widespread and more influential. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the capacity of e-government and e-participation means and the number of visitors in municipality's website.

Hence, to capture the communication dimension of decision-making capacity 7 variables are selected. 'Intra-organisational communication' is the mean score of 7 Likert items; (1) communication among departments, (2) communication between deputy managers and directors, (3) share of information inside the municipality, (4) adequacy of IT systems, (5) storing of information, (6) division of work and collaboration among departments, (7) communication between civil servants and councillors. 'Importance of local representatives on decision-making' is the mean score of mayor's assessment on the importance of Urban Council and muhtars' influence on the formation of the municipal programme. 'Data sheets' and 'Citizen polls' indicate the number of the spreadsheets and polls conducted in 2012. 'e-government system' is the mean score of dummy variables on online services that are available in municipality's website. Each service is registered as 0 or 1. It comprises 8 services; (1) transaction with taxes, fees,.etc., (2) business search, (3) reaching personal documents, (4) company registration, (5) statistical information, (6) applying for permits and licences, (7) personal statements on finances and taxes, (8) information about zoning status. This indicator shows the sophistication in e-government services. 'e-participation system' indicator is the mean score of dummy variables on e-participation means in municipality's website. Each variable will be registered as 1 or 0. It includes 7 variables; (1) announcement of municipal decisions, (2) announcement of projects, (3) announcement of plans, (4) broadcasting municipal sessions, (5) social media tools, (6) opinion polls, (7) white desk. 'Visitors of the website' is measured according to the Alexa Traffic Ranking indicating the frequency of visitors in the website in which lower ranks mean higher number of visitors. Therefore, the relationship of this indicator with decision-making capacity variable should be in opposite direction.

In sum, the following variables are selected to measure capacity in decision-making. All variables except e-participation system are expected to be in the same direction with decision-making capacity.

Table 4.2 Decision-Making Capacity Variables

TYPE	CODE	VARIABLE	DIMENSION

Decision-making Capacity	DM1	Success in strategic planning	Planning
	DM2	Performance budgeting	Planning
	DM3	Importance of strategic plan and performance plans on actual decision-making	Planning
	DM4	Intra-organisational communication	Communication
	DM5	Importance of local representatives on decision-making	Communication
	DM6	Data sheets	Communication
	DM7	Citizen polls	Communication
	DM8	E-government system	Communication
	DM9	E-participation system	Communication
	DM10	Visitors of the website	Communication

c. Implementation Capacity

For a higher capacity in implementation, local governments require higher capacities in management and in human resources. The managerial dimension incorporates the individual skills and abilities of managers and as well as management practices to increase performance in the organisation. Education, experience, collaboration and initiative taking in management and the management practices to increase performances are the focal points in terms of managerial capabilities.

In total 6 indicators are selected to measure managerial capabilities. 'Education level of the mayor' is a categorical variable for the education level of the mayor. 'Years in office' consists of the number of years spent in the mayor position and it indicates the experience as a mayor. 'Initiative taking in management' is the mean score of the mayor's responses on the level of initiative taking by the deputy mayors and directors. 'Collaboration in management' is the mean score of responses collected by the mayor and deputy mayors about the degree of collaboration between deputy mayors and directors and deputy mayors and mayor. 'Management practices' is measured by the mean score of 3 Likert items; (1) practices to increase motivation among staff, (2) trainings on leadership and management, (3) practices to increase initiative taking in directors and other personnel. Finally, 'seniority in directors' captures the seniority of the directors in occupation. 5 clusters are identified divided by a scale of 5 years of occupation and for each corresponding cluster a weighting number is given (0-5 years= 1; 5-10 years=2; 10-15 years=3; 15-20 years=4; above 20=5). The number of directors on each cluster will be multiplied with the corresponding weight number. The total sum will indicate the seniority level in management.

Successful implementation also relies on the quality and the sufficiency of the municipal personnel. Several variables will be incorporated to assess the quality of the personnel such as seniority, specialisation, formation and technical expertise. Yet, adequacy in human resources cannot be fully grasped without evaluating how it fits to the overall need. Therefore, the indicators on the effectiveness of human resource management system and employment policies will be integrated into the measurement.

In total 8 indicators are selected for human resource capabilities. 'Seniority in personnel' captures the years of occupation among personnel by following the same formula for 'seniority in directors' indicator. 'Norm cadre' indicates the adequacy and efficiency of staff number inside the municipality by taking the ratio of norm cadre to the total number of employees. As explained in Chapter III, norm cadre indicates the number of personnel designated for municipal functions. In this variable, values over 1 would indicate there is more staff in the municipality than it is deemed necessary for the existing functions. Values less than 1 would indicate an understaffing situation. The optimal values should be close to 1. Technical personnel are important for the delivery of specialised services inside the municipality, and 'Technical personnel' indicator is measured by the ratio of the number of technical personnel to the total number of municipal personnel. Similar to 'norm cadre' indicator, more is not always better for this indicator since values closer to 1 would indicate overstaffing in terms of technical personnel. Therefore, both variables could create non-linear relationships with other variables which would require logarithmic transformation before factor analysis. 'Specialised personnel' grasps the education and expertise level of the personnel by taking the ratio of the personnel with a postgrad or equivalent vocational training degree to the total number of personnel. 'Personnel in municipal companies' is measured by the ratio of personnel employed in municipal companies to the overall number of personnel. This variable is important to consider the impact of employment outside the municipality on implementation capacity. 'HR management system' is a Likert-scale variable by taking the mean score of 7 Likert items: (1) functionality of HR management system, (2) sufficiency of HR management system, (3) coherence of the HR management plans with the municipality's needs, (4) competence of HR department, (5) implementation of HR strategies, (6) monitoring and assessing the training need, (7) trainings meet the municipality's needs. 'Employment policies' indicator is measured by the mean score of 4 Likert items; (1) sufficiency in personnel number, (2) sufficiency in qualified personnel number, (3) efficiency of employment policies, (4) match of new recruits the job criteria. The final variable, 'Formation' indicates the average hour of occupation training received by the personnel. The respondents for this indicator are asked to provide the hours of occupation training provided to municipal personnel in 2012 and the number of personnel benefited from the trainings.

All indicators are expected to be in the same direction with implementation capacity. However, for 'norm cadre' and 'technical personnel' indicators, the degree of relationship might be reduced due to non-linear relationships with other variables. Therefore, logarithmic transformation of both variables will be controlled before factor analysis.

Table 4.3 Implementation Capacity Variables

TYPE	CODE	VARIABLE	DIMENSION
Implementation Capacity	IMP1	Education level of the mayor	Management
	IMP2	Years in Office	Management
	IMP3	Initiative taking in management	Management
	IMP4	Collaboration in management	Management
	IMP5	Management practices	Management
	IMP6	Seniority in directors	Management
	IMP7	Seniority in personnel	HR
	IMP8	Norm cadre	HR
	IMP9	Technical personnel	HR
	IMP10	Specialised personnel	HR
	IMP11	Personnel in municipal companies	HR
	IMP12	HR management system	HR
	IMP13	Employment Policies	HR
	IMP14	Formation	HR

4.3.2 Decentralisation

In the majority of comparative empirical studies, decentralisation is operationalised as the extent of the sub-national government's influence/discretion/share over administrative, political and fiscal dimensions. The comparison of political and administrative dimensions is only useful if the purpose of the study is to draw inferences about the differences on institutional and regulatory frameworks. This dissertation compares the same types of local administrations in a single country case. Hence, administrative and political dimensions of decentralisation won't be relevant for the level of comparison. Consequently, fiscal decentralisation is the only feasible option to focus on operationalisation and to indicate decentralisation in local governance.

OECD Fiscal Decentralisation Database provides a wide array of possible indicators to measure fiscal decentralisation in comparative studies among country cases. The OECD database keeps the data on 14 dimensions to compare the fiscal decentralisation level. These are; 'tax autonomy', 'intergovernmental transfer', 'expenditure', 'revenue', 'tax revenue', 'intergovernmental transfer expenditure', 'intergovernmental transfer revenue', 'user fees', 'tax revenue as a share of total revenue', 'intergovernmental transfer revenue as a share of total revenue', 'balance', 'debt', 'fiscal rule indicators', 'the recurrent tax on immovable property'. 'Tax autonomy' is a composite indicator evaluating the fiscal discretion of sub-national governments over their own taxes. It is a useful indicator for country comparisons, yet it is not suitable for comparative purposes within a single country case where same tier of local administrations share an equal discretion over own taxations. For similar reasons, 'fiscal rule indicators' and 'the recurrent tax on immovable property' are not suitable indicators for this study. 'Balance' and 'debt' indicators measure respectively the level of net lending/ borrowing, and the level of the consolidated liabilities according to the GDP. These variables are similar to 'expenditure' more suitable for country comparison cases. The rest of the variables are related with the revenue structure of the sub-national governments. The local administrations in Turkey have two key categories in terms of revenues, own-source revenues and intergovernmental transfer shares. The rest of the revenues do not have significant impact in terms of financial decentralisation. The intergovernmental transfer shares are allocated from general budget based on a formula without any discretion from central government. Therefore, the extent of intergovernmental transfer shares does not necessarily influence the financial autonomy of local governments. In light of this, the ratio of own source revenues to overall revenues, is the only significant element in the Turkish case to compare financial self-reliance and local autonomy of provincial municipalities. Hence, decentralisation variable will be framed as the financial autonomy and self-reliance of local government. It will be operationalised by measuring the ratio of own-revenues to overall revenues.

4.3.3 Local Capacity

The relational understanding of governance suggests that the local government should have access to sufficient socio-economic resources for better governance. In that sense, the local capacity variable refers to the socio-economic development of the locality. Measuring socio-economic development can incorporate tangible indicators such as GDP, life expectancy, levels of employment, or more intangible elements such as freedom of association or participation in political parties or civil society organisations.

In this dissertation, the data for the local capacity variable are taken from the Ministry of Development's study 'the Socio-Economic Development Ranking Survey of Provinces and Regions (SEGE-2011)'. In this study, 61 indicators from 8 subcategories are utilised to create an index to rank the socio-economic development level of all provinces. Table 4.4 lists the indicators for the subcategories of demographics, education, health, employment, competition and innovation capacity, fiscal capacity, accessibility and quality of life.

Table 4.4 Indicators of SEGE-2011

Demographic Indicators	
1	Population density
2	Fertility rate (between 15-49)
3	Dependent young population rate (0-14 years old)
4	Net immigration rate
5	Urbanisation rate
Education Indicators	
6	Literacy rate
7	Literacy rate in woman population
8	Secondary education schooling rate

9	Vocational and technical schooling rate
10	Provincial YGS[50] success rate
11	Ratio of university or equivalent degree graduates in 22 + years old population
Health Indicators	
12	Number of hospital beds per 100.000 people
13	Number of doctors per 10.000 people
14	Number of dentists per 10.000 people
15	Number of pharmacies per 10.000 people
16	Ratio of green card[51] holders in the province
Employment Indicators	
17	Unemployment rate
18	Labour force participation rate
19	Ratio of population in working age (15-64) to overall population
20	Ratio of manufacturing sector in social insured employment
21	Ratio of social insured employment to overall population
22	The average daily earning
23	The average daily earning- Woman
24	Employment rate
Competition and Innovation Capacity	
25	Share of the province in Turkey's export
26	Export amount per person
27	Number of manufacturing companies (share in Turkey)
28	Ratio of registered companies in manufacturing sector

[50] National University Entry Exam
[51] Green cards are distributed to those without any social security coverage to receive public health services free of charge

29	Electricity consumption per person in manufacturing sector
30	Number of production parcels in organised industry zones (share in Turkey)
31	Number of small enterprises (share in Turkey)
32	Total capital in the new enterprises (share in Turkey)
33	Foreign capital enterprises per 10.000 people
34	Trademark application per 100.000 people
35	Patent application per 100.000 people
36	Rate of post-graduate and doctorate degree holders in 30+ years old population
37	Agricultural production value per population living in rural area.
38	Number of certified beds in touristic facilities (share in Turkey)
39	Amount of incentivised investments (share in Turkey)
Fiscal Capacity	
40	Bank credits in the province (share in Turkey)
41	Saving deposits in the province (share in Turkey)
42	Amount of bank deposits per person
43	Active online banking individual users per 1000 people
44	Active online banking business users per 1000 people
45	Budget revenues per person
46	Provincial tax revenues (share in Turkey)
Accessibility	
47	Asphalted road ratio in rural area
48	Distance of the province to the nearest airport
49	Broadband users per household
50	GSM subscribers per person
51	The value of the province in terms of goods per km on national highways

52	The ratio of total railway lines to land surface area
Quality of Life	
53	Rental total space in shopping malls per 1000 people
54	Rate of the population benefited from sewerage services to total population
55	Household electric consumption per person
56	Number of cars per 10.000 people
57	CO_2 average value
58	Particulate matter (smoke) average value
59	Ratio of population without social security coverage to overall population
60	Number of convicts per 100.000 people
61	Number of suicide cases per 100.000 people

Table 4.5 presents the index value and the ranks of the provinces in terms of socio-economic development according to SEGE-2011.

Table 4.5 SEGE-2011 Development Index of Provinces

Rank	*Province*	*Index Value*	*Rank*	*Province*	*Index Value*
1	İstanbul	4,5154	42	Malatya	-0,0785
2	Ankara	2,8384	43	Afyon	-0,0797
3	İzmir	1,9715	44	Artvin	-0,1046
4	Kocaeli	1,6592	45	Erzincan	-0,1056
5	Antalya	1,5026	46	Hatay	-0,1302
6	Bursa	1,3740	47	Kastamonu	-0,1471
7	Eskişehir	1,1671	48	Bartın	-0,1976
8	Muğla	1,0493	49	Sivas	-0,2208
9	Tekirdağ	0,9154	50	Çorum	-0,2405
10	Denizli	0,9122	51	Sinop	-0,2479

11	Bolu	0,6394	52	Giresun	-0,2564
12	Edirne	0,6383	53	Osmaniye	-0,2892
13	Yalova	0,6263	54	Çankırı	-0,3312
14	Çanakkale	0,5999	55	Aksaray	-0,3671
15	Kırklareli	0,5923	56	Niğde	-0,3761
16	Adana	0,5666	57	Tokat	-0,3821
17	Kayseri	0,5650	58	Tunceli	-0,3892
18	Sakarya	0,5641	59	Erzurum	-0,4327
19	Aydın	0,5597	60	Kahramanmaraş	-0,4677
20	Konya	0,5308	61	Ordu	-0,4810
21	Isparta	0,5272	62	Gümüşhane	-0,4814
22	Balıkesir	0,4764	63	Kilis	-0,5733
23	Manisa	0,4711	64	Bayburt	-0,5946
24	Mersin	0,4636	65	Yozgat	-0,6079
25	Uşak	0,3737	66	Adıyaman	-0,9602
26	Burdur	0,3684	67	Diyarbakır	-1,0014
27	Bilecik	0,3634	68	Kars	-1,0923
28	Karabük	0,2916	69	Iğdır	-1,1184
29	Zonguldak	0,2758	70	Batman	-1,1203
30	Gaziantep	0,2678	71	Ardahan	-1,1384
31	Trabzon	0,2218	72	Bingöl	-1,1920
32	Karaman	0,1864	73	Şanlıurfa	-1,2801
33	Samsun	0,1579	74	Mardin	-1,3591
34	Rize	0,1550	75	Van	-1,3783
35	Düzce	0,1056	76	Bitlis	-1,4003
36	Nevşehir	0,1029	77	Siirt	-1,4166

37	Amasya	0,0510	78	Şırnak	-1,4605
38	Kütahya	0,0198	79	Ağrı	-1,6366
39	Elazığ	-0,0103	80	Hakkari	-1,6961
40	Kırşehir	-0,0211	81	Muş	-1,7329
41	Kırıkkale	-0,0687			

Source: Turkish Ministry of Development, 2013

4.3.4 External Factors

In the light of Chapter II and III, the following external factors are selected as control variables for the relationship between decentralisation, local governance capacity and local capacity.

Population: It has a direct impact on intergovernmental transfer shares (a weight of 80%) and intergovernmental transfer share is the most important budget item for most municipalities. Since decentralisation variable is calculated by the ratio of own-source revenues to all revenues, population may have an impact on decentralisation via its impact on the dividend. However, LAR II report suggests that municipalities with bigger population can levy higher income with local resources, thus population can also have an impact on own-source revenues. In the meantime, access to a larger pool of human and financial resources would be possible with higher population which can influence the local governance variables. In sum, population is a crucial external variable to control any impact on the relationship between decentralisation and capacity.

Political diversity: Provinces governed by opposition parties could be less willing to cooperate with central government, or central government might pursue uncooperative policies towards local governments. This can have an impact on the relation between local governance capacity and decentralisation. Thus, in order to understand this impact, a proxy variable will be added into the equation on the provinces governed by opposition parties. This binary variable will be given the value '1' if the mayor is from AKP, and '0' if the mayor belongs to an opposition party.

Party affiliation: Different party affiliations inside the municipalities can cause unwillingness for cooperation among managers or inefficiencies in functioning. This variable indicates the extent that the governing party is dominant in municipal management. Its measurement will rely on the percentage of votes the governing party received in the 2009 local elections.

Influence of central government: The theoretical and contextual chapters suggest that the competences owned by the local government do not necessarily indicate the 'real decentralisation'. Rather, central government can impose its influence via indirect means on the political, administrative and fiscal discretion of local government. Therefore, it is essential to control if the influence of central government has an impact on the presumed relationship between decentralisation and local governance capacity. Two assumptions can be built on the impact of central government's influence on the relationship between decentralisation and local governance capacity.

The first assumption is that central government can influence the decision-making process of local government which can adversely influence the decision-making capacity in local governance by undermining the citizen based communication or intra-organisational communication. Additionally, the influence of central government in local governance can undermine the importance of strategic planning on municipal decisions.

A second assumption is that the central government does not necessarily get involved in local governance to influence the decision-making of local government, but in case the local government lack the necessary capacities for better governance, the local government can look for the central government's involvement in local governance. In that case, the influence of central government can increase if there is a low level of local governance capacity or local capacity.

Since the influence of central government on municipal decisions cannot be addressed on objective basis, the perception of mayors on the influence of central government in financial, administrative and political dimensions will be evaluated to measure the variable. The influence of central government will be traced in eight areas, namely own source revenues, aids, loans and credits, municipal partnerships and collaborations with CSOs and private companies, decision-making on municipal services, administrative activities, implementation of municipal services, and investment decisions. Each mayor is asked to grade the influence of central government on each selected area in a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 depicts the lowest and 5 the highest influence from the central government. The influence variable will be measured as a Likert-scale variable by the mean of the cumulative scores.

4.4 Data Collection Strategy

The primary data collection instrument is surveys that have been distributed to mayors and deputy mayors in provincial municipalities. Two separate surveys were prepared, one for the mayor and the other for the deputy mayor. The mayor's survey incorporates mainly opinion-based questions, whereas the deputy mayor's survey contains a large extent of technical and factual questions. Even though there are usually several deputy mayors inside the municipality, only one survey is prepared addressing to deputy mayors. The decision on who should fill the survey has been left unaccounted, as some questions require the collection of the data from various departments inside the municipality. The surveys were conducted between January and June 2013. They were posted to the mayor's office and were collected via post or e-mail. The other data sources are the official documents and information published by the municipalities or by the relevant state institutions. Data collected both from surveys and other sources comprise the data from 2012. The details of the data sources are specified in the indicators list (see Appendices).

25 questions are directed to mayors and 37 questions are directed to deputy mayors. The questions are clustered according to financial, material, communication, planning, managerial and human resource capabilities and decentralisation. Most of the questions are using a 5-point Likert-type scale asking the respondent to give a value between 1 and 5. There are also some semi-open and open questions that will be used to elaborate the numerical responses or to attain more insight on the process of inquiry. Additionally, one broad open question is directed to mayors for personal evaluation on the capacity of their municipalities. The responses for this question and other received remarks will be used to provide a rationale on interpreting the findings in data analysis and for further discussions. Both original surveys in Turkish and their translations into English can be found in Appendices. Further aspects about validity and reliability on data collection are addressed in the last section of this chapter.

4.5 Data Measurement

Indicators are selected to measure capacity, decentralisation and external variables. Table 4.6 shows the coding list for the selected indicators. The indicator list is available in the Appendices.

Table 4.6 Coding List of Indicators

Characteristic of the indicator	**Explanation**
Code number	The acronym for the variable and the serial number.
Name	Name of the indicator in a concise form.
Clarification	Definition of the indicator in detail.
Relevancy	Description of why this indicator is relevant to the dimensions and categories.
Type	Type of the indicator in reference to the given categories
Instrument	Survey or other statistical data
Source of data	Mayor or Deputy Mayor, the corresponding question in the survey, or the source of the data
Measurement level	Nominal, ordinal, interval or ratio
Unit of analysis	The measurement level in which the data is explained.

The majority of the indicators are measured by the values of Likert type questions at 5 point-scale. Even though the range of scales can vary from 3 to 11 values, most psychometric studies apply 5 or 7 point Likert scale for measurement. In principle, the response error should diminish with higher levels of measurement, as the measurement bias would be lower. The measurement bias occurs if the respondents cannot find the corresponding value for their assessment and is forced to pick the closest value. However, with higher number of same level of Likert type questions in a survey, the scale of questions matters less. The difference between 5 and 7 point Likert-scale is relatively more important in larger samples sizes, that is why the difference will be negligible for the sample size of this dissertation. Additionally, to reduce the respondent's fatigue, 5-point Likert scale is opted in the questionnaires.

The measurement of Likert type questions have been much debated in the literature because while the ordinal nature of Likert items is widely accepted, in practice many researches treat them at interval scales. The argument for pro-ordinal scale is, that numbers are anchored with verbal labels which do not necessarily imply equal distances between integers. A common formulation of Likert type question asks the respondents to select a statement where each statement is numerated on a scale (see Table 4.7). In this setup, the researcher cannot argue that the distance between 'strongly disagree' and 'disagree' is equal to 'neutral' to 'agree'. Thus any descriptive statistic or further analysis such as factor analysis or regression would be statistically not interpretable.

Some of the confusion here arises from the interchangeable usage of the concepts Likert-scales and Likert-item or Likert-type item (Clason & Dormody, 1994; Boone & Boone, 2012; Uebersax, 2006). A Likert-scale is composed of Likert-type or Likert-items and unlike Likert-item data, Likert-scale data can be analysed at interval measurement scale (Boone & Boone, 2012). An explanatory example would be that while the questions on a multiple-question test are categorised under 5 options (a, b, c, d, e), the test scores are treated at interval level (e.g. 90 out 100).

The majority of indicators addressed by Likert-type questions combine at least two items into a Likert-scale data by taking the mean score of constituting items. There are only two variables (MOB4 and IMP1) used as single- item measures and they are registered in the indicator list as ordinal.

The reliability of the internal structure of Likert-scale items will be reported by providing Cronsbach's alpha score. There are some aspects to be aware of while interpreting the results of Cronsbach's alpha score. First of all, alpha score does not only depend on the magnitude of the correlations among the components, but also on the number of components in the scale. Scales with larger numbers can misleadingly give higher scores, while average correlation might remain the same. Second, two scales, each measuring a different aspect, when combined together can give higher alpha scores without necessarily measuring the same attribute. Third, a significantly high number on alpha coefficient score may indicate redundant items which probably measure the same attribute rather than a common attribute. Nevertheless, the Cronsbach's alpha coefficient will provide an idea on the internal structure of the variables which in the later stage will be analysed with factor analysis.

4.6 Data Analysis

Following the data screening methods, the data will be analysed by employing exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to retain the factors representing local governance capacity variables which will be taken into regression analyses afterwards.

The aim in factor analysis is to discern the latent factors underlying the measured items and to compare the construct of the retained factors with the theorised variables for mobilisation capacity, decision-making capacity and implementation.

Maximum likelihood (ML) and principal axis factoring (PAF) are most commonly used methods and usually give the best results on factor extraction (Costello & Osborne, 2005). According to Fabrigar et al., (1999) ML yields more efficient results if the data is relatively normally distributed ML, otherwise PAF should provide more reliable results. Nevertheless, both extraction methods would serve for the purpose of the research.

The number of factors to be retained will be decided based on the Kaiser's criterion (selecting the factors with an eigenvalue above 1) and on a screen plot. In case there is more than one factor to be retained, the result will be rotated to reveal the simple structure of items. There are basically two categories of rotation methods, orthogonal and oblique rotation. The decision on rotation method relies principally on the perception of the correlation between the produced factors. Orthogonal rotations produce factors that are uncorrelated and thus easier to interpret. Oblique rotation takes into account the correlation of produced factors and thus enables a more realistic interpretation of the reality despite the relative complexity on the interpretation (Costello & Osborne, 2005). Tabachnick & Fidell (2007, p. 646) argue that;

> *"Perhaps the best way to decide between orthogonal and oblique rotation is to request oblique rotation with the desired number of factors and to look at the correlations among factors…if factor correlations are not driven by the data, the solution remains nearly orthogonal. Look at the factor correlation matrix for correlations around .32 and above. If correlations exceed .32, then there is 10% (or more) overlap in variance among factors, enough variance to warrant oblique rotation unless there are compelling reasons for orthogonal rotation."*

An alternative method to EFA would be principal component analysis (PCA). Although both methods of analysis are similar, there are some underlying differences in their epistemological background. While EFA produces factors that cause variables, PCA produces components which are aggregate of variables (University of North Texas, 2014). The decision on which method to employ, however, usually relies on the theoretical structure built for the observed variables. In that sense, while EFA aims to reveal the latent factors of the observed variables, PCA relies on the assumptions that the observed variables have a linear inference with the anticipated variable. Methodologically, PCA aims to find the most variance of the observed variables, whereas EFA analyses the covariance (Suhr, 2014). One major methodological difference is that PCA does not discriminate between unique and share variance unlike EFA (Costello & Osborne, 2005). This carries the risk of producing inflated values of variance accounted for by the components, when the factors are uncorrelated and communalities are moderate. (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Gorsuch, 1997; McArdle, 1990).

There are two issues that need to be addressed before applying EFA for variable reduction. First of all, it is important to decide how many items to take in the factor analysis. Two factors are important in this decision: (1) the items should have a certain degree of communality (or correlation), (2) the ratio of number of items to sample size. The degree of communality between variables refers to both the overall correlation among the variables and also the binary correlations. One suggested test to check if a given data set is suitable for factor analysis is Bartlett's test of sphericity (LAERD, 2014).

For the strength of the binary correlations, a correlation matrix will be created. A popular technique in correlation analysis is Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient (PCC), which measures the degree in linear correlation by giving a value between -1 and +1. In this scale, -1 suggests a perfect negative correlation, whereas +1 is perfect positive correlation and 0 is no correlation. Pearson's model is less sensitive to non-parametric relations between variables and assumes linear relationships between continuous variables. In the literature, Polychoric correlation analysis is recommended if the dataset contains ordinal and categorical variables.

Secondly, sampling adequacy is important to be considered. There are different arguments on the minimum requirement on sample size, and the choices are also very much dependent on the theoretical backing of the variables and the nature of the data (Fabrigar et al., 1999; Costello & Osborne, 2005). A general rule of thumb on sample size is a subject to item ratio between 5:1 and 10:1. However, there is a lot of research which reports the results of factor analysis with subject to item ratio 2:1 or less. Costello & Osborne (2005) suggest that a larger dataset can help to decide whether or not to drop an item, provided that the following problems emerge in the data; (1) if item communalities are above 0.8, (2) if there are several strong cross loader items (an item that loads at 0.5 or higher on two or more factors) and (3) a factor with fewer than three items. In addition to the sample to item ratio, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test will be applied to ensure the adequacy in sample size.

Following factor analysis, the newly created mobilisation capacity, decision-making capacity and implementation capacity variables, along with other local capacity and decentralisation variables will be taken into correlation and regression analysis. The correlation analysis will be important to discern the direction of the relationship between factors (see Objective 1).

The degree of relationships between variables will be measured by a series of regression analyses and the best fitting model between decentralisation and capacity variables will be pursued. An alternative model to multiple regression analysis could be structural equation modelling (SEM). SEM has advantageous over multiple regression analysis especially on causal modelling or path analysis, and a further research with SEM could bring further insight on the findings of this study. However, at this stage the aim is to explore the impact of variances on the dependent variable (i.e. decentralisation) based on the linear combinations of capacity and other external variables.

It is important to control any conditional effect among local governance capacity variables on decentralisation. For instance, the effect of implementation capacity on decentralisation can increase (or decrease) for different values of decision-making capacity or mobilisation capacity. It is important to understand the interaction between local governance capacity variables with regards to decentralisation, because it would directly affect the formulation of capacity building practices. Therefore, the impact of local governance capacity variables will be also modelled along the interaction terms.

In the last stage, the models will be controlled by the selected external variables (i.e. population, political diversity, party affiliation, influence of central government) and any extraneous relation will be controlled.

To select the best fitting regression model, the assumptions of ordinary least square (OLS) regression will be tested prior to the analysis. The OLS regression has the following assumptions; (1) linear relationship, (2) multivariate normality, (3) no or little multicollinearity, (4) no autocorrelation, (5) homoscedasticity. In case there is a violation of the assumptions of normality, alternative regression models such as Generalised Linear Models (GLM) or Tobit regression will be tested.

4.7 Reliability and Validity

Surveys are one of the main sources of data collection in social sciences, and all surveys are affected by certain biases on sampling, response and measurement stages. Total Survey Error (TSE) is a collective method to address sources of all possible errors occurring during a survey-based research. Although TSE does not suggest a single uniform design, it identifies some categories which should be addressed on each research design.

Basically, TSE refers to sampling and non-sampling error occurring throughout a survey-based research. Non-sampling errors can be broken down into three further categories such as coverage error, non-response error and measurement error.

Total Survey Error = Sampling Error + Coverage Error + Nonresponse Error + Measurement Error (Gideon, 2012, p. 40).

Sampling error occurs when the sample of cases does not fully represent the whole population. The cause of sampling error could be either the bias on selecting the cases, or the selected cases do not reflect the variance on population. Nevertheless, in this research the targeted population is all provincial municipalities and the sampling error is not necessarily an issue to be addressed as part of TSE.

Coverage error occurs, when the population of interest is missing from the sampling frame of the target population. Coverage error can manifest itself when sampling frame does not include a part of the target population (i.e. under coverage) or when ineligible units are part of the sampling frame (Groves et al., 2004, p. 54). In this research the population of interest are the mayors and deputy mayors and/or the head of departments. The sampling frame is constructed on the basis of the addresses of the municipalities and the surveys are addressed to the name of the mayors. Throughout the research, the follow-up calls were conducted with the assistants of the mayors or the heads of staffs. Coverage errors can be broken down further into coverage bias and coverage variance. Coverage bias occurs when elements in the population are systemically excluded from the sampling frame (Gideon, 2012, p. 42). A possibility of the coverage bias is if other people than the addressees fill out the surveys, especially on the opinion-based questions. To mitigate this risk, a foreword is added about the study and who should fill out the surveys. Furthermore, all the official addresses of the municipalities are found either from the website and from relevant government websites. Three weeks following the posting of the surveys, follow-up calls were made with each municipality to ensure the surveys arrived to the addressees. In case the addressees did not receive the surveys, the surveys were sent via email to the head of staff or assistants of the mayors. Only in one case, the surveys failed to be sent to the target, as the municipality did not have any working email or a fax reachable from abroad lines.

Nonresponse error occurs when the sample individuals choose not to respond to some of the questions (item nonresponse) or all questionnaire (unit nonresponse). A systematic nonresponse of a category of participants could lead to bias as the survey statistics may not be representative of the population parameters (Gideon, 2012, p. 43). The nonresponse bias can be calculated as the differences between respondents and non-respondent means multiplied by the nonresponse rate. There are several statistical techniques to mitigate the impact of nonresponse. In case of unit nonresponse, weighting techniques can be adjusted to compensate the nonresponse bias. For item nonresponse, single or multiple imputation techniques are useful to prepare the data for statistical analysis. Nevertheless, techniques such as weighting or imputation can increase the uncertainty on our results by replacing the bias with variance (Gideon, 2012).

In this research, municipalities could have been reluctant to share information about financial and budgetary questions, even though the new law on public financial management stipulates that this information should be transparent. In case there is a low-response rate on budget related questions, additional information will be sought from the sources of the Ministry of Finance which keeps these data for all municipalities. Furthermore, to increase the response rate, a letter signed by the Secretary General of Union of Municipalities of Turkey has been attached to encourage the respondents in participation. Similarly, a pre-test has been conducted with the experts from Union of Turkish Municipalities to ensure that the survey questions are clear and without any ambiguity.

In case there are missing surveys from municipalities, the socio-economic differences and differences in party affiliation will be controlled on non-responded municipalities with a statistical significance test. If a bias is detected, weighting options will be utilised.

As far as the missing data is concerned, depending on the missing sample size, it can be treated either with data imputation methods or with the elimination of the indicator. The decision on which option to take will depend on the response rate.

Measurement error occurs when there is a difference between the estimated value and the real value of the target variable. There are four sources of measurement error; (1) questionnaire, (2) mode of data collection, (3) characteristic of the interviewer, (4) characteristics of respondents. More than one of theses sources can be the cause of the measurement error at the same time (Gideon, 2012, p. 45). According to Gideon, there are various factors which could cause measurement error on survey results such as “poor question wording, unclear question instructions, erroneous skip patterns, lengthy questions, inadequate response options, the topic of the questionnaire, timing, sponsorship, confusing visual designs, data collection methods, interviewer characteristics, faulty interviewer training, interviewer actions (whether indicated by the training or unforeseen behaviours), interviewer expectations, respondent reactions (whether to the topic or to the interviewer appearance), social pressure in the interviewer-respondent interaction, and respondents’ memory erosion among many others”

Given that the surveys are directly sent to addressees without the involvement of any surveyor, psychological factors due to the interaction between the interviewee and interviewer are not a subject of inquiry in this research. However, the downside is any measurement error as potential misunderstanding of the respondent will not be corrected on the spot by a surveyor. As a precaution, the experts in the Union of Municipalities of Turkey have assessed the surveys. Furthermore, most of the questions are formulated in closed or semi-closed questions in Likert-scale form, in order to minimise variances on the responses. To minimise the measurement bias due to wording of statements for each numerical value, the respondents are asked to pick a number from 1 to 5 where ‘1’ is stated as the lowest degree and ‘5’ is the highest degree for the statement without necessarily stating the verbal equivalent of each numerical value.

To avoid any social pressure on the deputy mayors or other lower ranking managers, the questions on the second survey are largely formulated as factual questions rather than opinion-based. The opinion-based questions are addressed usually in the questionnaire for the mayors. Among the few opinion-based questions directed to deputy mayors (e.g. Q13 and Q14/3 in both surveys), the same questions are directed to mayors to reduce the risks on measurement bias. In terms of any bias due to sponsorship, the Union of Municipalities of Turkey is a largely independent body whose main objective is to voice the problems or needs of the municipalities to central government. Therefore, the sponsorship of the Union of Municipalities is not expected to indicate any bias on responses. Social desirability could be a matter of concern as mayors are asked to self-evaluate on the capabilities in different areas. However, the questions can hardly be regarded as politically sensitive and the collected data on opinion-based questions will be taken either into factor analysis or will be used as supplementary information to control the findings of the statistical analysis. Therefore, any impact of social desirability is expected to be minimal.

There are several attempts to measure TSE with statistical modelling, but to this day there is not a single straightforward method to compute a measure of TSE (Gideon, 2012, p. 48). TSE provides a theoretical framework to understand potential errors which could undermine the accuracy of results and serves as a useful map to consider on a survey design.

For the reliability of the statistical analysis or internal validity, several data screening methods, ex-ante and ex-post tests and normality checks will be run to ensure the reliability of the data. The details of precautions that are to ensure the statistical validity will be elaborated in the next chapter.

In terms of external validity, it should be taken into consideration that country cases have their idiosyncratic aspects which need to be adjusted to the model. In this research as well, these aspects were influential on selecting control variables and indicators. Therefore, it should be underlined that this research can be applied in other country cases as long as the country idiosyncrasies are taken into account.

CHAPTER V- DATA ANALYSIS

The fifth chapter presents the findings attained via the data analysis of the research conducted on the provincial municipalities in Turkey. The chapter starts with a description of the data, informs the reader on the data collected from the municipalities and displays the municipalities that participated in the survey. The subsequent parts in the chapter deal with the missing data problem and data screening. Subsequently, the data will be analysed by factor analysis, correlation and regression analyses. The final part of the analysis focuses on the interpretation of the relationship between decentralisation and capacity, including the elaboration of local capacity and other explanatory variables' influence on the governance capacity and decentralisation. The results of the findings will be enriched by the qualitative responses collected through the surveys and the graphical display of the responses which are not included in the statistical analysis.

5.1 Overview of the Field Research

The majority of the data for the analysis have been gathered from the surveys with the mayors and deputy mayors in provincial municipalities. Over a duration of 8 months in 2013, out of 130 surveys distributed in 65 provincial municipalities, 24 municipalities sent both surveys back, 9 municipalities sent only one survey back, either from the mayor or the deputy. Hence, with a total number of 33 surveys, the field study had a response rate of 51%.

It is important to say a couple of words on the personal experience and challenges encountered throughout the field research. Even though engaging with high-ranking public officials for research purposes has always been a challenging task for researchers, a research on this scale was a particular challenge given the geographical extent of the target area and the complexity of hierarchical structures in Turkish public administration. First of all, the unfeasibility of conducting surveys from first hand in 65 provinces necessitated in most cases the reliance on intermediary agents in municipalities for distribution, application and collection of the surveys. These agents have varied from personal secretaries to executive assistants or deputy mayors depending on the internal organisation of the municipality. Without an initial personal contact, relying only on phone conversations and e-mail exchanges, the fieldwork required extensive time on follow-up calls and a diligent research on finding the key people.

I am not disregarding the possibility that some surveys might have been filled out not by the mayor personally but instead by an executive assistant or a similar respondent. It is virtually impossible to ensure the genuineness of the opinion-based answers of the addressee. But, as a precaution, clear written and oral indications were provided to respondents on how to complete the surveys.

Secondly, the stiff hierarchy in some municipalities has often necessitated several contacts with different respondents to climb up within the hierarchy. In some municipalities this procedure was particularly easy given the absence of an initial personal acquaintance, yet in some it was almost impossible. One observation is that some municipalities are keen and have more awareness in participating in these sort of studies, whereas for others the executives were unwilling to cooperate and more suspicious towards the survey.

Another remark is also necessary about the difficulties encountered on the dispersion of the surveys. As mentioned previously, the surveys were dispatched via mail to municipalities addressing the mayors. Unfortunately, out of 130 surveys about half of them failed to reach their destinations, either as a result of a defect in postal services or internal delivery mechanisms inside the municipalities. Thus, more than half of the surveys were resent via email to intermediary agents. It was relatively easy to conduct the research via emails, as most municipalities possessed a basic level of competency. However, there have been cases in which the municipalities have failed to provide a functioning e-mail address, and particularly in one case the municipality did not have any functioning e-mail address or a fax number despite their genuine interest to participate in the study.

Lastly, some remarks can be made for the quality of responses and the extent of responses to represent the country case. The length of the surveys and especially the frequency of questions asking for factual data from different departments have augmented the challenge in conducting surveys. Nevertheless, the quality of responses in the majority of surveys has been highly satisfactory. Remarkably, except a few cases, all factual data were provided thoroughly and in almost half of the surveys the respondents were willing to provide feedback and additional comments about the questions and relevant issues. Given the genuine answers and high attention in filling the surveys, it can be said that the issues concerning capacity and decentralisation are vital concerns for Turkish municipalities.

Furthermore, the responses from the provinces are not restricted to a certain geographical area or socio-economic level but rather they are well dispersed. The socio-economic level of non-participating provinces is compared with the participating provinces in

Table 5.1. The socio-economic development value of each province is measured according to the SEGE-2011 index scores. The t-test of a comparison of responders (Dev) and non-responders (Dev0) does not indicate a statistically significant relationship between the response rate and socio-economic differences.

Table 5.1: t-test of non-responses

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Dev	33	-0.2148455	0.121462	0.6977461	-0.4622555	0.0325646
Dev0	32	-0.3005969	0.129639	0.7333489	-0.6011937	
combined	65	-0.2570615	0.088212	0.7111881	-0.514123	
diff		0.0857514	0.1775113		-0.2689767	0.4404795

diff = mean(Dev)-mean(Dev0) t = 0.4831

Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 63

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.6846 Pr(T > t) = 0.6307 Pr(T > t) = 0.3154

Additionally, the dispersion of responses among political parties is close to the overall results of 2009 local elections. Only BDP is relatively underrepresented in the data list with only one municipality.

Table 5.2 and Map 5.1 display the features of municipalities participating in the study.

To conclude, taking into account the extent of the study and the above-mentioned challenges, the current response rate and the quality of the responses can be deemed as an achievement and satisfactory for further analysis. A comparison of socio-economic characteristics of responders and non-responders suggest that these characteristics are not likely to limit the generalizability of results to all Turkish provincial municipalities.

Table 5.2 Participated municipalities

Name	Population	Governing Party (in 2013)	Surveys received
Adıyaman	217.463	AKP	Both
Afyonkarahisar	186.991	AKP	Both

Aksaray	186.599	AKP	Both
Amasya	91.874	AKP	Both
Ardahan	19.075	AKP	Both
Artvin	25.771	CHP	Both
Bilecik	51.260	AKP	Both
Bitlis	46.111	AKP	Only from the Deputy
Bolu	131.264	AKP	Both
Burdur	72.377	AKP	Both
Çanakkale	111.137	CHP	Both
Çorum	231.146	AKP	Only from the Mayor
Denizli	525.497	AKP	Only from the Deputy
Giresun	100.712	CHP	Only from the Mayor
Gümüşhane	32.444	MHP	Only from the Mayor
Kahramanmaraş	443.575	AKP	Both
Karabük	110.537	MHP	Both
Karaman	141.630	AKP	Both
Kars	78.100	AKP	Both
Kastamonu	96.217	AKP	Both
Kütahya	224.898	AKP	Only from the Mayor
Manisa	309.050	MHP	Both
Mardin	86.948	AKP	Both
Muğla	64.706	CHP	Both
Muş	81.764	AKP	Both
Niğde	118.186	AKP	Both
Rize	104.508	AKP	Only from the Deputy

Sivas	312.587	BBP	Both
Tokat	132.437	AKP	Only from the Mayor
Trabzon	243.735	AKP	Both
Uşak	187.886	MHP	Both
Van	370.190	BDP	Only from the Mayor
Yozgat	78.328	AKP	Both

AKP: Justice and Development Party; CHP: Republican People's Party; MHP: Nationalist Action Party; BDP: Independent Democracy Party

Map 5.1 The distribution of responses among provincial municipalities[52]



[52] Dark green: Both surveys received; light green: only one survey received; red: no surveys received; white: metropolitan municipalities (not included in the study).

Map 5.2 The results of 2009 local elections



AKP: Justice and Development Party; CHP: Republican People's Party; MHP: Nationalist Action Party; ANAVATAN: Motherlands Party; DSP: Democratic Leftist Party; DP: Democrat Party; DTP: Democratic Society Party; SP: Felicity Party; BAĞIMSIZ: Independent Candidates; DİĞER: Others

Source: www.secimanketleri.org

5.2 Data screening

The data from the surveys and other sources have been registered to the data file (see Appendices) according to the codebook in Chapter IV. The raw data contains several missing values to be dealt with prior to further analysis. Several dimensions with the data will be controlled as part of data screening to ensure that the assumptions hold for further analysis and to avoid any measurement errors.

5.2.1 Missing Data

A quick glance at the data set reveals that there are several missing values for more or less each variable. Considering that most of the missing values are unit nonresponse caused by the absence of one survey (either from the mayor or the deputy mayor) from the province, a pattern in missing values is apparent. Apart from the missing data caused by the absence of surveys, the missing values are random and less than %10 for most variables (see Table 5.2.). There are only two variables with considerable high number of missing values, MOB2 and

MOB6. A closer check on them is required in order to avoid any bias in non-observed data. MOB2, a variable about utilisation of immovable, is the ratio of generated income from immovable per year to the overall value of immovable owned by the municipality. The value generated by immovable is not necessarily a data kept by the municipalities which is required on the preparation of the budgetary plans. Therefore, the extra work needed to collect or to find the data for the question might be the reason for the lack of responses. MOB6 is a variable to capture the physical and technical adequacy in municipality. The variable is the mean score of 5 Likert-items capturing the adequacy in (1) computer and computer hardware, (2) technical equipment and machinery, (3) internet connection and computer software, (4) physical situation of civil servant's offices, (5) physical situation of manager's offices. There could be several reasons for the lack of responses, but since it is an opinion-based question directed to deputy mayors and/or head of departments about the physical conditions of the municipality, the respondents might have been reluctant to provide a genuine answer. Furthermore, from one municipality the survey has been received with missing the page including the information for the variable.

There are several ways to deal with missing data. An easy and safer way is listwise or pairwise exclusion of missing cases. However, considering the limitations on the sample size, listwise exclusion of cases with only one survey would have resulted in a decrease in sample size of around 30%, which is an extreme loss in the data sample. Therefore, data imputation appears as a viable option to deal with missing data.

Table 5.3 Missing Values

	All provinces			**Provinces with both surveys**		
Variables	# of missing values	% of missing values	total # of variables	# of missing values	% of missing values	total # of variables
MOB1	5	15	33	0	0	24
MOB2	11	33	33	5	21	24
MOB3	6	18	33	0	0	24
MOB4	4	12	33	1	4	24

MOB5	0	0	33	0	0	24
MOB6	10	30	33	4	17	24
MOB7	3	9	33	0	0	24
MOB8	9	27	33	2	8	24
DM1	9	27	33	0	0	24
DM2	7	21	33	0	0	24
DM3	5	15	33	0	0	24
DM4	8	24	33	1	4	24
DM5	3	9	33	0	0	24
DM6	7	21	33	1	4	24
DM7	7	21	33	1	4	24
DM8	0	0	33	0	0	24
DM9	0	0	33	0	0	24
DM10	0	0	33	0	0	24
IMP1	0	0	33	0	0	24
IMP2	0	0	33	0	0	24
IMP3	3	9	33	0	0	24
IMP4	10	30	33	1	4	24
IMP5	8	24	33	1	4	24
IMP6	8	24	33	2	8	24
IMP7	8	24	33	2	8	24
IMP8	7	21	33	2	8	24
IMP9	7	21	33	1	4	24
IMP10	6	18	33	1	4	24
IMP11	7	21	33	1	4	24

IMP12	10	30	33	1	4	24
IMP13	7	21	33	1	4	24
IMP14	5	15	33	1	4	24
DEC	0	0	33	0	0	24
INF	3	9	33	0	0	24
Pop	0	0	33	0	0	24
PolDiv	0	0	33	0	0	24
Party	0	0	33	0	0	24
Dev	0	0	33	0	0	24

There are different methods in data imputation, which can be categorised as single imputation methods and multiple imputation methods. Single imputation methods primarily aim to estimate and replace the missing data by implementing several methods such as relying the last observed variables (hot-deck methods), taking the mean of all observed variables (mean imputation) or regressing the observed variables to variables with missing data to replace the missing values. One common problem with single imputation methods is that they tend to neglect the error terms while replacing the unobserved data and treat the imputed data as genuine. Therefore, especially in cases of large percentage of missing values (such as 30%), single imputation methods can lead to underestimation of variability and might result with too optimistic significance tests and confidence intervals (StataCorp, 2013).

Multiple imputation (MI) methods, which have been developed to overcome the vices of single imputation methods create multiple imputations for each missing data. MI has been embraced widely thanks to the advancements in computer technology since it was first time proposed by Donald B. Rubin in 1987. According to Rubin (1987) there are three distinct advantages of MI over single imputation methods: (1) MI increases the efficiency of estimation, (2) MI can produce easier valid inferences by combining complete-data inferences in a straightforward manner; and (3) MI allows the "straightforward study of sensitivity of inferences of various models for nonresponse simply by using complete-data methods repeatedly". By doing so, MI enables the researcher to control the reliability of the estimations in subsequent analyses. There is one considerable advantage of single imputation over MI, and that is its simplicity in calculation, data storing and analysis (Rubin, 1987:18). Nevertheless, these disadvantages have become almost obsolete with the advancements in statistical analysis programs.

Despite the relative advantages of MI over single imputation, I will adopt single imputation to replace the missing values as one practical problem is arising in the planned analysis following the imputation. In this research, I want to apply factor analysis to combine various indicators into a few factors of local governance capacity variables. In further steps, the attained aggregate variables will be included in the regression analysis. Considering that the primary purpose of MI is to preserve the uncertainty resulting from imputations, most statistical programs combine the imputed datasets only after the main analysis, which in most cases is a sort of regression analysis. Factor analysis requires a combination of created multiple imputation datasets prior to the actual analysis, that in a way diminishes the initial advantage of MI to enable the control of uncertainty brought by imputations. Therefore, STATA, which is the statistical program adopted in this research, does not include the factor analysis as part of the estimation in MI. There is one caveat of implementing imputation prior to factor analysis. Fitting missing data through regression techniques can lead to unrealistic high correlations thus manufacture factors (Wulder, 2014). To avoid any misinterpretation of the created variables, it is imperative to refer to the composition of each variable if it is backed by a theoretical standpoint.

Hence by using the regular variables of MOB5, DM8, DM9, DM10, IMP1 IMP2, DEC, Dev a set of imputed variables are generated. A normality check for the imputed data is needed especially for the variables which are taking a value between 1 and 5, as the values will be rounded off to the nearest acceptable number. Nevertheless, there are only a few variables needed to be rounded off and their distance to the acceptable numbers is significantly limited. The complete list of the variables can be found in the Appendices.

5.2.2 Internal Consistency of Likert Scale Variables

Cronbach’s alpha score of the variables are controlled for the reliability of internal structures of Likert scale variables. The alpha scores provide the estimate of reliability, where a score between 0.7 and 0.9 is treated as acceptable and any score lower than 0.5 is interpreted as unacceptable. Nevertheless, higher alpha coefficient does not imply unidimensionality, which is an important condition for internal consistency, and alpha scores are sensitive to the length of the construct because with smaller number of index items, the value of alpha reduces. One way to control unidimensionality is running factor analysis. The result of factor analysis shows that the index variables are unidimensional except for IMP4, IMP5 and IMP13 where the cumulative score is above 1, which indicates a spurious solution. However, these three variables contain the least items and we can deduct that very few factors are taken in factor analysis for a valid solution. Similarly, the Cronbach's alpha coefficients (see Table 5.4.) of the four variables with least number of items score either around the acceptable level, or lower. The only variable with an alpha score relatively lower than the acceptable limit and with a spurious solution in factor analysis is IMP4. This variable is the composite score of the same question directed to mayors and deputy mayors about the level of collaboration in management. Therefore, it is certain that the index variable is covering the same construct.

Table 5.4 Cronbach's alpha scores

Variable	Cronbach's alpha score	Number of items in the scale
MOB6	0.7405	5
MOB8	0.6991	4
DM1	0.8417	5
DM2	0.8150	7
DM3	0.8224	2
DM4	0.8550	7
IMP4	0.5489	3
IMP5	0.7005	3
IMP12	0.7366	7
IMP13	0.6945	4
Inf	0.8665	8

5.2.3 Common Source Bias

The majority of variables rely on the self-reported data collected from the mayors and deputy mayors at a specific time, thus a check on the extent of Common Method Bias (CMB) would increase the reliability of findings. Harman's one-factor test and confirmatory factor analysis are the most common methods to test the presence of common-method effect. To test if the common source bias is a concern on the reliability of the research, the opinion based 1 to 5 scaled 11 variables (i.e. MOB4, MOB6, MOB 7, MOB8, DM1, DM2, DM3, DM4, DM5, IMP3, IMP4, IMP5, IMP6, IMP7, IMP12 and IMP13) are taken in an exploratory factor analysis without any rotation. Harman's one factor test suggests that if one single factor explains more than 50% of variance, than the effect of common source bias could lead to Type 1 or Type 2 errors on the observed relationships between constructs. The result of the test gives one factor which has a cumulative score of 0,43 that corresponds to a 43% of variance. Although this is a lot of variance to be explained by one single factor, it is within the acceptable limits.

5.2.4 Normality & Linearity

Normality assumption is important for significance testing, especially with small sizes, i.e. less than 200 samples. The normality of variables is controlled visually via histograms and Skewness-Kurtosis test. Despite the relatively lower sample size, skewness-kurtosis test results for all variables between -1 and 1, and the visual display of normality curve on frequencies usually gives a fair shape of bell curve. Only for the variables MOB2, DM6, DM10, IMP14 and MOB8, the skewness appears to have a bigger impact on the distribution of data, where only the last one is negatively skewed.

Factor analysis assumes linear relationships between variables and determines orthogonal lines to capture the largest amount of variance. Therefore, any non-linear relationship would fail to capture the best fit for the given data. The most common way to examine if there is a non-linearity between two variables is to apply a scatterplot matrix and to see any peculiar non-linear shaped formations. But, the limited number of observations and the number of pairwise combinations needed to scan all variables encumber a thorough graphical examination of the data. Some pairs of variables with the abovementioned-skewed variables suggest that a logarithmic transformation might fit better to data. However, any logarithmic transformation did not improve the overall correlations coefficients with polychoric correlation analysis. Also, the verifications of the linearity and normality do not necessarily call for a statistical analysis, but a logical assessment on whether there is any condition that could violate the linearity assumptions among variables. In that sense, 'norm cadre' and 'technical personnel' variables (iIMP8 and iIMP9) were suspected in terms of non-linearity. However, the visual study of the data did not point out a clear non-linear relationship with other variables. Similarly, logarithmic transformation of these variables did not have a drastic impact on correlation coefficients, thus the variables are kept as they were.

5.3 Factor Analysis

The aim of factor analysis is to detect latent factors under three categories of local governance capacity. It is expected to find the latent variables, which could be treated as mobilisation capacity, decision-making capacity and implementation capacity for each set of variables.

Prior to the analysis, the factorability of variables and the suitability of sample size are checked with some ex-ante tests. The factorability of variables is tested by the Bartlett's test of sphericity (LAERD, 2014). The results of the test suggest that for all three sets of variables we can reject the null hypothesis that the variances between variables are equal. Thus, there are workable correlations to apply factor analysis.

Table 5.5 Bartlett's Test of Sphericity

Bartlett's test of sphericity			
	Mobilisation Capacity	Decision-making Capacity	Implementation Capacity
Chi-square	70.407	112.046	150.853
Degrees of freedom	28	45	91
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000
H0: variables are not intercorrelated	Reject the H0	Reject the H0	Reject the H0

For the evaluation of sampling adequacy, a statistical method called Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy will be adopted. The results of KMO test are usually interpreted within the following ranges; 0.90: "marvellous"; 0.80: "meritorious"; 0.70 "middling"; 0.60 "mediocre", 0.50 "miserable", and below 0.40 "unacceptable" (Kaiser, 1974; Rasli, 2006). The results of the test suggest that despite the low KMO numbers for DM and IMP, the results are in the acceptable range. KMO scores are sensitive to sample size to number of items ratio, which is for DM a little higher than 1:3 and for IMP a little higher than 1:2.

Table 5.6 KMO- Test

	KMO
MOB	0.647
DM	0.479
IMP	0.443

Following the ex-ante tests, the intercorrelations of each set of variables are studied with correlation matrixes. The strength of correlations is controlled with polychoric correlations matrixes. The absolute value of correlation coefficients less than 0.2 would indicate a no relationship or a negligible relationship, and an absolute value above 0.4 indicates strong relationships. Any variable without any binary correlation coefficient more than 0.2 will be exempted from the analysis. The correlation matrix of each type of capacity is given in the following tables.

Table 5.7 Polychoric Correlation Matrix- Mobilisation Capacity

	iMOB1	iMOB2	iMOB3	iMOB4	MOB5	iMOB6	iMOB7	iMOB8
iMOB1	1							
iMOB2	***0.3932***	1						
iMOB3	-0.0671	0.0771	1					
iMOB4	**0.4964**	0.1560	0.1805	1				
MOB5	0.2129	-0.0302	0.1876	***0.3236***	1			

iMOB6	**0.4000**	**0.4063**	0.0516	***0.3260***	-0.0001	1		
iMOB7	**0.5633**	**0.4038**	0.1593	**0.5717**	***0.3190***	**0.6162**	1	
iMOB8	-0.2757	-0.0919	0.1937	-0.1521	***0.3409***	-0.1615	0.1123	1

Table 5.8 Polychoric Correlation Matrix- Decision-Making Capacity

	iDM1	iDM2	iDM3	iDM4	iDM5	iDM6	iDM7	DM8
iDM1	1							
iDM2	***0.3513***	1						
iDM3	**0.4870**	0.0915	1					
iDM4	0.1898	**0.4611**	0.044	1				
iDM5	0.1917	-0.0761	***0.2675***	0.0672	1			
iDM6	0.0631	0.0182	-0.1323	-0.0501	0.1034	1		
iDM7	0.3992	**0.5389**	-0.0234	0.1781	-0.0915	**0.428**	1	
DM8	**0.5254**	***0.3083***	-0.174	-0.0361	0.0765	0.1838	0.1473	1
DM9	**0.4232**	***0.2761***	0.1352	***0.3397***	0.1587	0.1431	***0.2507***	**0.4415**
DM10	**-0.6433**	-0.151	-0.1878	-0.0733	***-0.2776***	**-0.4158**	**-0.4123**	**-0.5075**

	DM9	DM10
DM9	1	
DM10	**-0.5219**	1

Table 5.9 Polychoric Correlation Matrix- Implementation Capacity

	IMP1	IMP2	iIMP3	iIMP4	iIMP5	iIMP6	iIMP7	iIMP8
IMP1	1							
IMP2	**0.4163**	1						
iIMP3	-0.1018	**0.4303**	1					
iIMP4	0.0964	***0.2884***	**0.5256**	1				
iIMP5	**0.4059**	***0.2174***	0.138	***0.3888***	1			
iIMP6	***0.2555***	-0.04	-0.1484	***-0.2833***	0.0349	1		
iIMP7	0.0691	-0.0052	**0.4592**	***0.3644***	***0.2257***	-0.1376	1	
iIMP8	***-0.2826***	-0.1812	0.1681	0.1016	0.0594	***-0.2377***	-0.0507	1
iIMP9	**-0.4133**	-0.1317	0.1558	0.0814	0.0153	0.0826	-0.118	**0.4546**

iIMP10	0.0656	***0.3108***	0.1299	0.0062	0.187	***-0.2289***	0.0009	***0.2365***
iIMP11	-0.2019	-0.0349	***0.2397***	**0.4044**	-0.0909	0.0632	0.0853	***0.2337***
iIMP12	0.1879	***0.2552***	***0.2557***	**0.6143**	0.1477	-0.1331	0.137	-0.0682
iIMP13	**-0.4355**	-0.0108	***0.3675***	**0.5066**	0.1056	***-0.2541***	***0.376***	-0.0325
iIMP14	-0.1779	***-0.2443***	0.1159	-0.0051	0.0497	-0.0823	***0.27***	-0.0445

	iIMP9	iIMP10	iIMP11	iIMP12	iIMP13	iIMP14
iIMP9	1					
iIMP10	0.1772	1				
iIMP11	0.1282	-0.0065	1			
iIMP12	***-0.2680***	-0.0560	**0.5492**	1		
iIMP13	0.0811	0.0256	***0.2787***	**0.4655**	1	
iIMP14	0.0417	0.059	0.1267	-0.056	***0.2794***	1

Among the three correlation matrixes, the only variable without an absolute value of binary correlation coefficient above 0.2, is the MOB3 variable. This variable indicates the debt structure of the municipality and corresponds to the level of debt payment obligations with a due date less than a year to overall debts. Higher values indicate that the municipality has less flexibility in allocating funds for purchasing goods and services. However, almost 30% of respondents selected '0', indicating that they don't have any short-term debt obligations, thus the variance on responses is quite limited. The rest of the variables show largely strong binary correlations, which is a good indication for the suitability for the factor analysis.

A general rule of thumb suggests that components with an eigenvalue higher than 1, should be retained as lesser values account for less variance than original variable (Wulder, 2014). Another method to decide on the number of factors to be retained is the scree plot analysis. It is also important to evaluate the cumulative number that accounts for the percentage of the total variance measured by the factors. Starting with the mobilisation capacity variables, the eigenvalues and scree-plot of Mobilisation capacity variables suggest that the only one factor to be retained is the one which accounts for the 78 % variances. Since there is only one variable to retain, there is no need for rotation. The Table 5.7 shows that except for the iMOB8 (Public procurement), the rest of the variables are positively correlated with Factor1. In fact, iMOB8 does not necessarily reflect the mobilisation capacity, but iMOB8 is important to perceive the municipality's ability in extracting material resources if there is a need for purchasing. Not surprisingly, it is the least important indicator for mobilisation capacity. At the end, the factor scores of Factor1 are extracted and Factor 1 is labelled as the Mobilisation Capacity for the rest of the analysis.

Table 5.10 Eigenvalues- Mobilisation Capacity

Factor analysis/correlation				Number of obs = 33
Method: principal factors				Retained factors = 4
Rotation: (unrotated)				Number of params= 21
Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	2.36728	1.53439	0.7761	0.7761
Factor2	0.83288	0.46331	0.2731	1.0491
Factor3	0.36957	0.31548	0.1212	1.1703
Factor4	0.05409	0.19185	0.0177	1.1880
Factor5	-0.13777	0.02797	-0.0452	1.1429
Factor6	-0.16573	0.10429	-0.0543	1.0885
Factor7	-0.27003	.	-0.0885	1.0000

LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(21) = 69.70 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Figure 5.1 Scree plot – Mobilisation Capacity



Table 5.11 Factor loading matrix- Mobilisation Capacity

	Factor 1	Uniqueness
iMOB1	**0.7111**	0.6667
iMOB2	**0.4705**	0.4758
iMOB4	**0.6413**	0.5913
MOB5	0.2782	0.4666
iMOB6	**0.6468**	0.2173
iMOB7	**0.8469**	0.5306
iMOB8	-0.1265	0.6667

Moving to the second set of variables, the eigenvalues of the factors in Table 5.12 point out that there are 2 factors with an eigenvalue above 1. Yet the second factor's eigenvalue is slightly above 1 and the scree plot shows the line starts to flatten, following the second factor. The first factor explains 56 % of variances and the second factor adds 19% to the total variances. Therefore, only one factor is decided to be retained.

Table 5.12 Eigenvalues- Decision-Making Capacities

Factor Analysis/correlation				Number of obs = 33
Method: principal factors				Retained factors = 6
Rotation: (unrotated)				Number of params= 45
Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	**2.95991**	1.92982	0.561	0.561
Factor2	**1.0301**	0.16356	0.1952	0.7562
Factor3	0.86654	0.30093	0.1642	0.9205
Factor4	0.56561	0.19007	0.1072	1.0277
Factor5	0.37554	0.33233	0.0712	1.0988
Factor6	0.04321	0.07921	0.0082	1.107
Factor7	-0.036	0.05232	-0.0068	1.1002
Factor8	-0.08832	0.06708	-0.0167	1.0835
Factor9	-0.1554	0.12962	-0.0295	1.054
Factor10	-0.28502	.	-0.054	1

Figure 5.2 Scree plot – Decision-Making Capacity



Table 5.13 displays the factor loadings of the retained factor. According to it, the first factor is a fitting example of how decision-making capacity could look like. The factor has a positive strong relationship with iDM1, DM8, DM9, iDM7 and iDM2. D10 has a negative coefficient since the smaller values stand for larger number of visitors in the webpage. For Factor1, iDM1, DM10, DM8, DM9 are the most affected variables which represent ‘success in strategic planning’, ‘number of visitors in website’, ‘e-government system’ and ‘e-participation system’ respectively. It is notable, that among the most influential variables, DM8, DM9 and DM10 are associated with the capacity in e-governance. iDM3 and iDM5 are the least affected by Factor 1, which include ‘importance of strategic plan and performance plans on actual decision-making’ and ‘importance of local representatives on actual decision-making’. Interestingly, both variables indicate the link between decision-making capacity and the actual decision-making. This configuration indicates that the decision-making capacity in local governance is not necessarily linked with the decisions taken by the mayors.

Table 5.13 Factor loading matrix- Decision-Making Capacity

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
iDM1	**0.7998**	0.3603
iDM2	**0.4889**	0.761
iDM3	0.2052	0.9579
iDM4	***0.3073***	0.9055
iDM5	0.1918	0.9632
iDM6	***0.3553***	0.8738
iDM7	**0.5362**	0.7125
DM8	**0.7307**	0.466
DM9	**0.6047**	0.6343
DM10	**-0.771**	0.4056

The final set of variables about mobilisation capacity contains most variables in comparison to the former capacity variables. The results on initial eigenvalue scores point out that there are 3 factors with an eigenvalue above 1. Similarly, the scree plot graph displays that there are 3 factors to retain which account for the most of the variance. Three factors together can account for 75% of total variance.

Table 5.14 Eigenvalues- Implementation Capacity

Factor Analysis/correlation Method: principal factors Rotation: (unrotated)				Number of obs = 33 Retained factors = 9 Number of params= 90
Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	**2.82602**	1.15956	0.3710	0.3710
Factor2	**1.66645**	0.45416	0.2188	0.5898
Factor3	**1.21229**	0.30142	0.1592	0.7490
Factor4	0.91088	0.26362	0.1196	0.8686

Factor5	0.64725	0.08110	0.0850	0.9535
Factor6	0.56615	0.19358	0.0743	1.0279
Factor7	0.37258	0.09152	0.0489	1.0768
Factor8	0.28106	0.26038	0.0369	1.1137
Factor9	0.02067	0.05861	0.0027	1.1164
Factor10	-0.03794	0.08891	-0.0050	1.1114
Factor11	-0.12684	0.05446	-0.0167	1.0948
Factor12	-0.18130	0.04623	-0.0238	1.0710
Factor13	-0.22753	0.08536	-0.0299	1.0411
Factor14	-0.31289	.	-0.0411	1

Figure 5.3 Scree plot – Implementation Capacity



After controlling the factor rotation matrix with oblique rotation, the factor loadings are rotated with varimax for better interpretability of the results. Table 5.13 shows the factor loadings with a value above 0.3. Factor 1 is influenced by iIMP4 (Collaboration in Management), iIMP13 (Employment Policies), iIMP12 (HR Management System), iIMP11 (Personnel in Municipal Companies), iIMP3 (Initiative taking in Management) and iIMP7 (Seniority in Personnel). Factor 1 is mostly related with the systems and practices in implementation and least influenced by qualitative and quantitative features of mayor and staff. Factor 2 is mostly influenced by management capacity components and it can be labelled as the management capacity. Factor 3 is largely influenced by the quantitative aspects of human resources, therefore it can be interpreted as the sufficiency of staff In comparison to other factors, Factor 1 is the most representative of implementation capacity in local governance therefore Factor 1 is retrieved as Implementation Capacity for further analysis.

Table 5.15 Rotated factor loading matrix- Implementation Capacity

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Uniqueness
IMP1		0.6511	-0.4144	0.3852
IMP2		0.5864		0.6483
iIMP3	0.5394	0.3100	0.3300	0.5040
iIMP4	0.7688	0.3288		0.2940
iIMP5		0.5025		0.7134
iIMP6				0.8808
iIMP7	0.4773			0.7464
iIMP8			0.6506	0.5708
iIMP9			0.6659	0.5374
iIMP10			0.3722	0.7718
iIMP11	0.5694			0.6260
iIMP12	0.7192		-0.3430	0.3419
iIMP13	0.7503			0.3983
iIMP14				0.8996

To sum up, at the end of factor analysis 3 variables are created to represent the Mobilisation Capacity, Decision-Making Capacity and Implementation Capacity. The theoretical expectation is that these variables are strongly correlated with each other and in sum they represent the local governance capacity. The pairwise correlation matrix presented in Table 5.16 confirms the theoretical expectations as all three factors are significantly correlated.

Table 5.16 Significance of correlations- MOB-DM-IMP

	MOB	DM	IMP
MOB	1		
DM	0.7424	1	
	0.000		
IMP	0.4224	0.3876	1
	0.0143	**0.0258**	

5.4 Correlation and Regression Analyses

Three capacity variables are created at the end of factor analysis to capture the local governance capacity. This section will focus on their relationships with local capacity and decentralisation variables, as well as with the selected control variables. First, through correlation analysis I will identify the strength of relationships among the variables and second, I will select the best fitting model to describe the relationship between capacity and decentralisation variables. The relationships between variables will be measured by applying OLS-regressions, unless diagnostic tests suggest that alternative methods such as GLM or Tobit regression fit better for model assumptions.

5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics & Correlation Analyses

Table 5.17 presents the descriptive statistics of mobilisation capacity (MOB), decision-making capacity (DM), implementation capacity (IMP), decentralisation (DEC), local capacity (Dev), central government's influence (iINF), size of the province (POP), the political divide between the governing party and central government (PolDiv) and the difference in terms of party affiliations inside the municipality's decision-making body (Party). The local capacity variable has been coded with the acronym 'Dev' signifying the socio-economic development level in the province. 'iINF' is the imputed variable for INF which reflects the perception of mayor on central government's influence on local governance. 'POP' indicates the size of the municipality by using the population level of the locality where the municipality operates. 'Party' reflects the impact of political conflicts inside the municipality's decision-making body by utilising the ratio of the votes received by the elected party in the 2009 local elections. In this variable, a lower degree would imply a larger level of presence of opposition parties inside the municipal assembly. The third variable 'PolDiv' is a dummy variable indicating whether the municipality is governed by the governing party of the central government or by an opposition party.

Table 5.17 Descriptive statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
MOB	33	-8.78E-09	0.918457	-2.594843	1.358933
DM	33	-4.06E-09	0.9456926	-2.19453	1.535497
IMP	33	-5.42E-09	0.9435443	-2.325766	2.099706
DEC	33	0.2506061	0.1067889	0.053	0.527
Dev	33	-0.2148455	0.6977461	-1.7329	1.0493
iInf	33	2.849865	0.7824249	1.25	4.5
POP	33	158030.4	121153.4	19075	525497
PolDiv	33	0.6969697	0.4666937	0	1
Party	33	0.4573636	0.0763339	0.31	0.65

The correlation matrix in Table 5.18 presents the strength of correlations between the variables. High correlations are signified with bold characters. The table shows that all key variables of local governance capacity, local capacity and decentralisation are highly correlated.

As far as the external variables are concerned, PolDiv has a high negative correlation with IMP and Dev, and POP has a high positive correlation with DM. Also, a high positive correlation is observable between PolDiv and iINF, and also between PolDiv and Party. Finally, a correlation between POP and Party is observable. The correlations between PolDiv, MOB, Dev and iINF show that municipalities governed by AKP appear to be associated with lower implementation capacities and lower socio-economic development, yet in the meantime they are associated with higher perceived central government's influence on local governance. Besides that, the correlation between Party and PolDiv, shows that mayors which are selected with strong electoral support usually belong to AKP; and the correlation between Party and POP shows that governing parties of municipalities in more populous provinces usually have stronger electoral support.

Table 5.18 Polychoric Correlations

	MOB	DM	IMP	DEC	Dev	iINF	POP	PolDiv	Party
MOB	1								
DM	**0.742**	1							
IMP	**0.422**	**0.388**	1						
DEC	**0.636**	**0.672**	**0.368**	1					
Dev	**0.597**	**0.734**	**0.326**	**0.885**	1				
iINF	0.077	-0.025	0.079	0.106	-0.047	1			
POP	0.136	**0.392**	0.134	0.199	0.167	-0.008	1		
PolDiv	-0.175	-0.199	**-0.505**	-0.195	**-0.322**	**0.438**	-0.032	1	
Party	0.243	0.172	0.068	-0.111	-0.223	0.226	**0.383**	**0.303**	1

Additionally, the visual study of correlations with a scatterplot matrix did not point out a significant non-linear relationship, which could not be detected by the correlation analysis. However, the scatterplot graph between POP and DM hints a logarithmic relationship (see Figure 5.5). The graph shows that with population increase, there is a decreasing slope in decision-making capacity. In fact, increased population could lead to increased flow of information from locality. However, with the increased flow of information, the planning aspect of the decision-making capacity would be more challenging. In order to examine if the logarithmic transformation of POP would indicate a better fit with DM variable, a new variable 'lnPOP' has been generated. A re-run of the correlation analysis with lnPOP has in fact provided better results, even though the DM still remains the only key variable with a higher correlation. It is noteworthy to mention, that unlike it was expected, the correlation between development level and population does not indicate a high correlation even with the logarithmic transformation.

Figure 5.4 Scatterplot graph with fitted regression line of DM-POP



Figure 5.5 Scatterplot graph with fitted regression line of DM-lnPOP



Both DEC and Party are proportions and have the range between 0 and 1. A logarithmic transformation of both variables fits better for the visual and statistical interpretation of the relationships with other variables. The new variables 'logDec' and 'logParty' are created by log(x)= log(x/ 1-x))

A new correlation analysis with logarithmic transformation of both variables improved the degree of significant correlations. Table 5.19 presents the correlation analysis matrix after the logarithmic transformations of POP, Dec and Party variables.

Table 5.19 Correlation Analysis Matrix after Logarithmic Transformations

	MOB	DM	IMP	logDec	Dev	iINF	lnPOP	PolDiv	logParty
MOB	1								
DM	**0.742**	1							
IMP	**0.422**	**0.388**	1						
logDec	**0.688**	**0.716**	**0.384**	1					
Dev	**0.597**	**0.734**	**0.326**	**0.896**	1				
iINF	0.077	-0.025	0.079	0.157	-0.047	1			
lnPOP	0.292	**0.441**	0.165	0.224	0.214	0.015	1		
PolDiv	-0.175	-0.199	**-0.505**	-0.139	**-0.322**	**0.438**	0.033	1	
logParty	0.244	0.177	0.066	-0.102	-0.220	0.227	0.419	**0.304**	1

5.4.2 Ex-ante control

Multiple regression analysis relies on the following assumptions for the validity of results; (1) linearity, (2) multivariate normality, (3) multicollinearity, (4) autocorrelation, and (5) homoscedasticity. Since this study is not based on time-series data, serial autocorrelation is not an issue of concern. Also, since all data is collected from provincial municipalities which abide the same municipal law, there is no need to suspect from sectoral autocorrelation.

If the purpose of the analysis is to increase the predictability of the model, control on significant outliers and leverage points are also important. The prediction ability of the model is not the main issue of concern in this dissertation, but any influential outlier in the data will be duly reported.

Before regression analysis, linearity and normality assumptions are controlled both visually and with statistical tests as well. For linearity assumption, the binary relationships are controlled visually with a scatterplot matrix. As presented in Figure 5.6, the relationships among variables do not signify any non-linearity.

Figure 5.6 Scatterplot Matrix of all variables



The normality assumption is visually controlled with normal QQ-plots and boxplots, whereas the statistical control is done with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The visual study of the variables provides a largely clean view of the normal distribution of the residuals. Only MOB variable shows characteristics of a negatively skewed data due to three significant outliers apparent in the box-plot. Since the sample size is relatively limited for this research, the three outliers indicate the 10% of available data. That is why there is not a particular reason to remove these outliers. Similarly, the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test does not indicate that the normal distribution assumption is violated. Nevertheless, since PolDiv is a binary variable, we cannot talk about a normal distribution, but we know that the data is representative to the results of local elections; thus, there is not a sampling bias to challenge the normality assumption.

Figure 5.7 QQ-plots



Figure 5.8 Box-plots



Table 5.20 One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test against theoretical distribution

Smaller group	D	P-value	Corrected
MOB:	0.0884	0.597	
Cumulative:	-0.1626	0.175	
Combined K-S:	0.1626	0.347	0.275

The ex-ante control on linearity and normality assumptions does not suggest an that alternative regression methods such as GLM or Tobit, would create better fit for model assumption in comparison to OLS-regression.

5.4.3 Model Assumptions

The correlation analysis of key variables supported the argument that there is a linear dependency between local governance capacity, local capacity and decentralisation. The next step is to understand how these relationships are wired and which model can explain best the variance in the dependent variable.

There are seven relationships to be modelled with multiple regression analysis:

(1) logDec ~ MOB
(2) logDec ~ DM
(3) logDec ~ IMP
(4) logDec ~ MOB + DM + IMP
(5) logDec ~ MOB + DM + IMP+ Interaction terms
(6) logDec ~ MOB + DM + IMP + Interaction terms +Dev
(7) logDec ~ MOB + DM + IMP + Interaction terms + Dev+ iINF + lnPOP + PolDiv + logParty

The local governance capacity variables are regressed separately, together and with the interaction terms against decentralisation variable. Since the sample size is relatively limited, the significance level of the p-value is selected starting from $p<0.1$. Table 5.21 presents the regression results of all models.

Table 5.21 Regression Tables- Decentralisation vs. Local Governance Capacity

	Model1		***Model2***		***Model3***		***Model4***		***Model5***	
Ind. Var.	*Coef.*	*Std. Err.*	*Coef.*	*Std. Err.*	*Coef.*	*Std. Err.*	*Coef.*	*Std. Err.*	*Coef.*	*Std. Err.*
MOB	0,5 ****	0,095					0.238 *	0.136	0.299 *	0.158
DM			0,507 ****	0,089			0.315 **	0.129	0.4 **	0.136
IMP					0,272 ***	0,118	0.052	0.096	0.102	0.096
MOBxDM									-0.193	0.128
MOBxIMP									0.25	0.195
DMxIMP									-0.178	0.171
MOBxDM xIMP									-0.264	0.158
R^2	0,473		0,512		0,147		0,571		0,66	
Adj. R^2	0,456		0,497		0,12		0,527		0,564	
Root MSE	0,494		0,475		0,628		0,461		0,442	
F-value	27,8 ****		32,56 ****		5,35***		12,87 ****		6,92 ****	
Note: N=33, **p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01, **** p<0.001*										

The first three models indicate that each local governance capacity variable is a significant predictor on the variation of logDec. Nevertheless, if all variables are included in multiple regression analysis, MOB and DM variable are the two significant predictors remain. Model 5 has the highest adjusted R^2 value in regression table, even though the difference between Model 4 and Model 5 is limited despite the inclusion of four interaction terms. Even though none of the interaction terms has a significant p-value, inclusion of the interaction terms has improved the prediction of the model. The R^2 value of Model 4 suggests that the 57% of variability in the ‘logDec’ variable is accounted for the local governance capacity variables.

At the next stage, Dev variable is added into the equation with MOB, DM, IMP and interaction terms. Model 6 results with a statistically significant F-test and with a remarkably high R^2 value of 0.871 and adjusted R^2 0.8279. Similarly, the Root MSE value decreases from 0.442 to 0.2777, which indicates that Model 6 has a better accuracy in prediction in comparison to Model 5. The former analysis pointed out that DM variable is the most significant predictor among local governance capacity variables in relation to logDec variable. Model 6 signifies three significant predictors, Dev with a highly significant p value, MOB, and MOBxDMxIMP close to 95% confidence level.

Table 5.22 Model 6 – Decentralisation, Local Capacity and Local Governance Capacity

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	12.492	4	1.5615	F(8, 24)	20.25
Residual	1.8508	28	0.0771	Prob > F	0
Total	14.3427	32	0.4482	R-squared	0.8710
				Adj R-squared	0.8279
				Root MSE	0.2777
				Number of obs	33

logDec	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	[95% Conf.Interval]	
MOB	0.2737	0.0995	2.75	**0.011**	0.0685	0.4790
DM	0.0268	0.1040	0.26	0.799	-0.1879	0.2415
IMP	0.0614	0.0609	1.01	0.323	-0.0642	0.1870
MOBxDM	-0.0776	0.0827	-0.94	0.357	-0.2484	0.0931
MOBxIMP	-0.0204	0.1298	-0.16	0.876	-0.2883	0.2474
DMxIMP	0.1131	0.1176	0.96	0.346	-0.1295	0.3558
MOBxDMxIMP	-0.1955	0.0999	-1.96	**0.062**	-0.4018	0.0107
Dev	0.7555	0.1205	6.27	**0**	0.5068	1.0042
_cons	-1.0778	0.0630	-17.12	0	-1.2077	-0.9478

The most striking change between Model 5 and Model 6 is that the coefficient of DM variable has decreased significantly in the later, and that the p value has become insignificant. This shows that Dev has a confounding effect on DM variable. A confounder is a variable related to factors of interest that falsely obscures or accentuates the relationship between them (Meinert, 1986; Mackinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000). Unlike an intermediate variable, a confounder does not imply a causal relationship between the independent and third variable, but it removes the distortion which can obscure the relationship between independent and dependent variables. In this case, the relationship between DM and logDec is largely explained by the influence of Dev, as the regression coefficient of DM has decreased to almost zero once Dev is added into the equation. One explanation of this phenomenon could be that e-governance capacity indicators have an important influence on measuring decision-making capacity and higher e-governance capacity largely relies on the socio-economic factors (e.g. infrastructure, literacy level, number of computers in the household…etc.).

Another notable change is that MOBxDMxIMP has become a significant predictor and the significance of MOB as such has increased in the later model. Since the distortion on DM is removed with the inclusion of Dev variable, the significant effect of MOBxDMxIMP variable has become apparent. Surprisingly, the sign of the coefficient is negative, which indicates an adverse relationship with decentralisation. The 2-way interactions do not have any significant effect on dependent variable. Theoretically, any interaction effect of local governance capacity variable should be positive with decentralisation; therefore, I have decided to further scrutunise the plots of the variable. Figure 5.9 clearly shows that the trend between MOBxDMxIMP and logDec variable is in fact positive, but there are two outstanding negative outliers that could explain the negative relationship. The rerun of the regression analysis after removing the two negative outliers has significantly increased the p-value of the interaction term while significance of other variables did not change (see Table 5.23). Therefore, the observed significant relationship is more likely due to influential outliers and we should be careful to report any significant relationship between the 3-way interaction of local governance capacity variables and decentralisation.

Figure 5.9 MOBxDMxIMP vs logDec



Table 5.23 Regression Analysis with MOBxDMxIMP >-4

Source	SS	df	MS		Number of obs	31
Model	11.3332	8	1.4167		F(8, 22)	20.28
Residual	1.5367	22	0.0699		Prob > F	0
Total	12.8699	30	0.4290		R-squared	0.8806
					Adj R-squared	0.8372
					Root MSE	0.2643
logDec	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	[95% Conf.Interval]	
MOB	0.2307	0.0971	2.38	0.027	0.0293	0.4320
DM	0.0479	0.1218	0.39	0.698	-0.2046	0.3004
IMP	0.0446	0.0613	0.73	0.474	-0.0825	0.1718
MOBxDM	-0.0941	0.0910	-1.03	0.312	-0.2828	0.0946
MOBxIMP	0.0170	0.1706	0.1	0.921	-0.3368	0.3708
DMxIMP	0.0396	0.1185	0.33	0.742	-0.2061	0.2852
MOBxDMxIMP	-0.0686	0.1815	-0.38	**0.709**	-0.4450	0.3077
Dev	0.7100	0.1195	5.94	0	0.4621	0.9578
_cons	-1.0647	0.0631	-16.88	0	-1.1955	-0.9338

Mobilisation capacity is influenced by local government's ability on tax collection and revenue generation on owned immovable which directly affect own source revenues. Therefore, apart from the overall impact of local governance capacity, mobilisation capacity appears to have an impact on decentralisation. Nevertheless, the regression coefficient of Dev is so high in comparison to local governance variables that we can argue that the level of socio-economic development can explain the majority of the variance in financial autonomy of the local government.

The question at this stage is whether there is a measurement error that can explain the strikingly high R^2 value. There are three common causes of high R^2 value that can hint a measurement error. First, there can be too many regressors in the model creating inflation with a little prediction value. The adjusted R-square is a useful way to control the inflation due to large number of variables. In our case, the adjusted R^2 value is almost as high as the R^2 value, thus this option can be ruled out. Secondly, collinearity and multicollinearity are the usual suspects on high R^2 values, where two or more covariates have high correlations with each other. Nonetheless, the problem with multicollinearity is that it does not reduce the predictive power of the model but it affects the calculations regarding the predictors. The correlation matrix of variables shows that there are already high correlations among local governance capacity variables (especially between MOB and DM) and Dev variable, and there is a chance this could have a certain impact on the value of R^2 value. However, the statistical significance of covariates undermining that multicollinearity is the main reason of high R^2 value. The extent of collinearity will be controlled later with calculating Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of independent variables, and any potential multicollinearity problem will be reported. Thirdly, high R^2 value could be caused by a convenient regressor, which might be related to the dependent variable, thus measuring the same underlying construct. The most important change in the models occurred when Dev is included in the equation. 61 different indicators measure the aggregate variable of Dev, among which two indicators can have a direct inference with the revenues of municipalities. These are 'budget revenues per person' and 'provincial tax revenues'[53]. 'Budget revenues per person' measures the per capita value of the general budget revenue attained from the province. 'Provincial tax revenues' indicators measure the per capita value of revenue and corporate taxes are collected from the province. Both indicators can affect the municipal revenues through the transfer shares from

[53] 'Budget revenues per person' is the ratio of province's population on revenues. 'Provincial tax revenues' is the share of province in Turkey in terms of taxes collected in the province.

the general budget. However, it is difficult to argue that higher values would indicate higher values on decentralisation as the relationship cannot be built with own source revenues which is the dividend of the fraction. Moreover, the impact of 2 indicators among 61 indicators would be limited on the index value and it would be highly unlikely to explain the high correlation by arguing that the abovementioned two indicators and decentralisation variables are measuring the same underlying construct.

Finally, in Model 7 all control variables are included in the equation. Even though it is a slight change, the increase in adjusted R^2 and decrease in RMSE indicate that the model has improved. Remarkably, the p value of MOBxDMxIMP has increased and it is no longer a significant predictor. iINF is the only significant external variable with a statistically significant p value. As external factors are not necessarily an integral part of the hypotheses, the control variables except iINF are removed in the subsequent regression analysis.

Table 5.24 Model 7 – Decentralisation, Local Governance Capacity, Local Capacity and External Factors

Source	SS	df	MS		Number of obs	33
Model	13.0738	12	1.0895		F(12, 20)	17.17
Residual	1.2689	20	0.0634		Prob > F	0
Total	14.3427	32	0.4482		R-squared	0.9115
					Adj R-squared	0.8584
					Root MSE	0.2519

logDec	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	[95% Conf.Interval]	
MOB	0.3118	0.097	3.2100	**0.004**	0.1094	0.5142
DM	0.009	0.0985	0.0900	0.928	-0.1964	0.2145
IMP	0.0678	0.0594	1.1400	0.267	-0.0561	0.1917
MOBxDM	0.0208	0.0928	0.22	0.825	-0.1727	0.2143
MOBxIMP	0.0542	0.1337	0.41	0.69	-0.2247	0.333
DMxIMP	0.0052	0.1172	0.04	0.965	-0.2393	0.2497
MOBxDMxIMP	-0.1466	0.1019	-1.44	0.166	-0.3592	0.0659
Dev	0.7526	0.1327	5.67	**0**	0.4758	1.0293
iINF	0.1668	0.0691	2.41	**0.026**	0.0226	0.311
lnPOP	0.0497	0.0789	0.63	0.536	-0.1149	0.2144

PolDiv	0.1258	0.1217	1.03	0.314	-0.1282	0.3797
logParty	-0.1386	0.2252	-0.62	0.545	-0.6084	0.3312
_cons	-2.2842	0.9841	-2.32	0.031	-4.337	-0.2313

Expectedly, the removal of the control variables did not make any significant change in the model. 90% of the variability in logDec is accounted for by the variables in Model 8. Dev is still the most significant predictor in logDec variable, which is followed by MOB, iINF and MOBxDMxIMP variables. The p-value of the model shows that the effect of the variables is not random. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that DM and IMP do not have an influence on logDec, but the significance of the interaction term necessitates their inclusion in the model.

Model 8 indicates that if the effect of local governance capacity and local capacity variables is kept constant; the perceived central government's influence in local governance (iINF) is still significant on the financial autonomy of the local government. Interestingly, this influence is in a positive direction. This finding seems paradoxical, as the central government's influence in local governance should be in adverse relationship with the degree of decentralisation. One plausible explanation is that municipalities with higher financial autonomy could look for higher decentralisation, thus they can perceive the influence of central government in the local affairs is larger than it is requested or necessary.

Table 5.25 Model 8- Decentralisation, Local Governance Capacity, Local Capacity and Influence of Central Government

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	12.9711	9	1.4412	Number of obs	33
Residual	1.3716	23	0.0596	F(9, 23)	24.17
Total	14.3427	32	0.4482	Prob > F	0
				R-squared	0.9044
				Adj R-squared	0.8669
				Root MSE	0.2442

logDec	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	[95% Conf.Interval]	
MOB	0.2831	0.0875	3.23	**0.004**	0.102	0.4641
DM	0.024	0.0915	0.26	0.795	-0.1652	0.2133

IMP	0.0487	0.0537	0.91	0.374	-0.0624	0.16
MOBxDM	0.0007	0.0778	0.01	0.993	-0.1603	0.1617
MOBxIMP	0.0032	0.1144	0.03	0.978	-0.2335	0.24
DMxIMP	0.0501	0.1058	0.47	0.64	-0.1687	0.2689
MOBxDMxIMP	-0.1648	0.0885	-1.86	0.075	-0.348	0.018
Dev	0.779	0.1063	7.33	**0**	0.5591	0.9989
iINF	0.1742	0.0615	2.83	**0.009**	0.0471	0.3013
_cons	-1.5962	0.1911	-8.35	0	-1.9915	-1.2009

It is remarkable that the correlation analysis matrix did not point out any significant correlation between iINF and other key variables (see Table 5.19). The influence of iINF is only revealed when Dev is included in the equation and the former is only a significant predictor as long as Dev is part of the equation. Therefore, any alternative theory suggesting that central government is more willing to intervene in economically developed provinces would be invalid, because it would require a significant correlation between Dev and iINF variables which is not observed in the correlation matrix (see Table 5.19).

This phenomenon happens because Dev is so highly correlated with logDec; thus, the inclusion of iINF exposes a relatively small amount of variation that has been previously masked and this variation is associated with iINF. To check this argument, a new variable 'resid' is generated for the residuals between Dev and logDec and this variable is correlated with iINF. Table 5.26 shows that the correlation between the resid and iINF is large and significant although the rest of the correlations between iINF and other variables are small.

Table 5.26 Correlation Analysis Matrix with resid, iINF, Dev and logDec[54]

	logDec	Dev	iINF	resid
logDec	1			
Dev	0.8958	1		
	0			

[54] The first row shows the correlation coefficients and the second row shows the statistical significance of correlations.

iINF	0.1575	-0.0466	1	
	0.3815	0.7967		
resid	0.4444	0	0.4483	1
	0.0096	1	**0.0089**	

Furthermore, the comparison of AIC and BIC values of all models indicates that Model 8 explains most adequately the relationship between the given variables. In Model 8, both values are the lowest, thus the goodness of fit is largest in the last model.

Table 5.27 Goodness of Fit

	Obs	ll(null)	ll(model)	df	AIC	BIC
Model1	33	-33.07612	-22.51329	2	49.02657	52.01959
Model2	33	-33.07612	-21.22981	2	46.45962	49.45263
Model3	33	-33.07612	-30.45109	2	64.90218	67.89519
Model4	33	-33.07612	-19.11261	4	46.22523	52.21126
Model5	33	-33.07612	-15.29506	8	46.59013	58.56219
Model6	33	-33.07612	.7100425	9	16.57992	30.04848
Model7	33	-33.07612	6.937588	13	12.12482	31.57942
Model8	33	-33.07612	5.653748	10	**8.692505**	**23.65758**

The last step before suggesting the model is to check whether multicollinearity and/or homoscedasticity are affecting the model assumptions. The high level of correlations between Dev and local governance capacity variables might be an indication of multicollinearity. To control multicollinearity, the Variance of Influence (VIF) and Tolerance levels of variables are calculated (see Table 5.27). The VIF scores suggest that there is a mild impact of collinearity, but none of the values are high enough to be of concern A general rule of thumb is if the VIF score is above a tolerance (1/VIF) of less than 0.2 or 0.1, and/or a VIF of 5 or 10 would suggest a multicollinearity problem (O'Brien, 2007). In our case, only MOBxDMxIMP variable appears as slightly problematic in terms of multicollinearity. Furthermore, Klein's rule of thumb suggests that multicollinearity may be a problem only if R^2 obtained from an auxiliary regression is greater than the overall R^2 (Gujarati, 2004). None of the auxiliary regressions with changing the dependent and independent variables have pointed out such a phenomenon. This finding shows that high correlation between independent variables is not the main cause of the high R^2 value.

Table 5.28 VIF and Tolerance level

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
MOBxDMxIMP	5.78	0.173053
MOBxDM	4.75	0.210640
DM	4.02	0.248951
MOBxIMP	3.65	0.274140
MOB	3.47	0.288413
DMxIMP	3.20	0.312444
Dev	2.95	0.338829
IMP	1.38	0.725839
iINF	1.24	0.805974
Mean VIF	3.38	

The assumption of homoscedasticity is tested with the Breusch-Pagan test. The test produces a p-value of 0.9471, which means we cannot reject the null hypothesis stating that there is no heteroskedasticity in this degree of freedom.

Table 5.29 Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity

Ho: Constant variance Variables: MOB DM IMP MOBxDM MOBxIMP DMxIMP MOBxDMxIMP Dev iINF
chi2(9) = 3.38 Prob > chi2 = 0.9471

Finally, influential outliers are controlled on the given dataset. Figure 5.10 displays the graph of leverage versus squared residuals. As we can see, Van, Bitlis and Mugla have both high leverage and large residuals. To calculate the Cook's distance values, a new variable "d1" is created and a cut-off level of 4/n (n is the number of observations) is implemented to display influential cases. The calculation of Cook's distance with cut-off level produced 4 influential outliers that require a closer examination.

Figure 5.10 Leverage vs Squared Residuals



Table 5.30 Cook's Distance

provinces	d1
Ardahan	0.3486432
Bitlis	0.3769775
Mugla	0.8283066
Van	0.7361557

Further tests are conducted to identify the influential outliers. Studentised residuals help to identify the cases which have high influence in determining the other coefficients in the model (Belsley , Kuh, & Welsch, 1980). Cases higher than 3 or less than -3 are considered as problematic. STATA also has the 'leverage' command, which identifies high leverage cases. Since there is a limited data sample, the cases with leverage more than 3k>n[55], will be considered with high leverage. Finally, DFBETA option in STATA shows how much a coefficient would change if a case is removed from the data. Observations with dfbeta>2 sqrt(n) would require further attention (Belsley , Kuh, & Welsch, 1980). Table 5.31 summarises the list of potential problematic cases for each test. Considering the results of Cook's distance test as well, the most problematic cases on all tests are Mugla and Van. In fact, these two cities are two extreme cases in terms of socio-economic development. Mugla is one of the most socio-economically developed city in Turkey whereas Van is one of the most underdeveloped cities despite the fact of it being a populous city (see Table 4.5). Therefore, this result is most likely not due to a measurement error, but because of extreme cases. As a final step, the influential cases were dropped individually and the regression analysis is rerun to observe any significant changes in the model. The only changes occurred in MOBxDMxIMP when Van and Bitlis were dropped from the observation. On both cases the p-value increased significantly and the variable was no longer a significant predictor. This finding confirms that the interaction term is not necessarily a significant predictor and its significance is a result of influential outliers. Nonetheless, these cases will be kept in the data as there is no reason to remove them. Yet, post-estimation tests indicate that it is safer not to regard the influence of MOBxDMxIMP variable on decentralisation as significant.

Table 5.31 Studentised Residuals, Leverage and DFBETA tests

provinces	rstudent	leverage	_dfbeta_1
Mugla	2.385529	0.6366783	1.166055
Van	-1.786484	0.7164272	0.9358091
Bitlis	2.008111		0.4651692

[55] 'k' is the number of coefficients and 'n' is the number of cases.

Ardahan	-1.184974	0.7164371	
Kahramanmaras	0.7007552	0.6621275	

Following the post-estimation analyses, Model 8 is selected as the most rigorous and representative model on the relationship between decentralisation, local capacity and local governance capacity variables. The following equation represents the linear relationship between the logarithmic transformation of decentralisation, local capacity, local governance capacity variables, 3-way interaction of local governance variables and perceived influence of central government in local governance.

$$y^* = a + b_1 X_1 + b_2 X_2 + b_3 X_3 + b_4 X_1 X_2 + b_5 X_1 X_3 + b_6 X_2 X_3 + b_7 X_1 X_2 X_3 + b_7 X_4 + b_8 X_5 + \varepsilon$$

Ind. Var.	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	Beta
MOB	0.2831	0.0875	3.23	**0.004**	0.3883
DM	0.024	0.0915	0.26	0.795	0.0340
IMP	0.0487	0.0537	0.91	0.374	0.0686
MOBxDM	0.0007	0.0778	0.01	0.993	0.0013
MOBxIMP	0.0032	0.1144	0.03	0.978	0.0035
DMxIMP	0.0501	0.1058	0.47	0.64	0.0546
MOBxDMxIMP	-0.1648	0.0885	-1.86	0.075	-0.2886
Dev	0.779	0.1063	7.33	**0**	0.8119
iINF	0.1742	0.0615	2.83	**0.009**	0.2036
_cons	-1.5962	0.1911	-8.35	0	.

According to Model 8, a one-unit change in Dev by keeping constant other variables is associated with 0.779 unit change in logarithmic transformation of decentralisation. On the other hand, the standardised beta coefficients show that one standard deviation increase in Dev would result in 0.812 standard deviations change in the dependent variable. This influence is followed by the changes in MOB with standardised beta coefficient 0.388 and by iINF with 0.174. Thus the impact of the change in Dev on the dependent variable is almost twice as high than MOB and four times higher than iINF.

5.5 Conclusion

In Chapter 5, the central research questions have been addressed via a series of statistical analyses. The primary outcomes of the analyses are the following:

(1) We can reject the null hypothesis that local capacity does not have an effect on decentralisation. We can reject the null hypothesis that mobilisation capacity does not have an effect on decentralisation. We cannot reject the null hypothesis for decision-making capacity and implementation.

(2) The local capacity is the most influential variable to explain the variance in decentralisation. The standardised beta coefficient indicates that the impact of local capacity on the change of the standard deviation is almost two times higher than mobilisation capacity.

(3) A change in local capacity is associated both with the change in local governance capacity and decentralisation. We observe this influence on the p-value of DM when local capacity variable is included in the model. This change shows that local capacity is a confounding variable, thus it covaries both with local governance capacity and decentralisation variable. Mackinnon, Krull & Lockwood (2000) explain that a confounder variable is 'a variable related to two factors of interest that falsely obscures or accentuates the relationship between them (Meinert, 1986)'. The confounding effect of local capacity removes the influence of decision-making capacity on decentralisation, which is observed on the previous models without including the Dev variable. Confounding influence does not necessarily imply causality but further studies with SEM or causal path analysis could provide further insights on causal relationships among local capacity, local governance capacity and decentralisation.

(4) Among local governance capacity variables, mobilisation capacity variable is the only significant predictor on decentralisation. Considering that the mobilisation capacity is partly captured by the ability of collecting taxes and generating revenues through owned immovable, it can directly affect financial autonomy. However, this effect is much smaller than the influence of socio-economic development on decentralisation. In addition, the observed significant relationship between the 3-way interaction of

local governance capacity variables and decentralisation has failed to pass the reliability tests.

(5) The only statistically significant predictor among control variables is the perceived influence of central government in local governance (iINF). iINF does not have any significant correlation with any of the key variables but it explains the variance of decentralisation which is not explained by local capacity. One plausible explanation of this influence is that the municipalities from socio-economically more advanced provinces perceive the presence of central government in local governance as more than it is necessary or asked for. Similarly, municipalities with a lower level of socio-economic development perceive that the involvement of central government in local governance is not satisfactory, as they cannot respond to local needs with existing resources.

(6) The suggested model has a distinctly high R^2 value which is uncommon in social sciences. Neither the statistical test nor the logical analysis of the relationships pointed out a measurement error to justify high R^2 value. The most plausible explanation is that Dev variable has a high explanatory power due to 61 constituting elements on decentralisation. Additionally, the model relies on relatively limited data sample size, and with a larger dataset, the high R^2 value can decrease to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the suggested model has a very high predictive power on the variance of decentralisation.

In light of the findings, the relationship between local capacity, local governance capacity and decentralisation is depicted in Figure 5.10. The confounding effect observed between local capacity and local governance capacity variables, indicates a relationship between local governance capacity and local capacity in explaining the relationship with decentralisation. However, this relationship is not elaborated statistically as it is not within the scope of this research.

Considering the hypotheses suggested in Chapter II, we reject Hypothesis 1, which indicates that there is no relationship between local capacity and decentralisation. We can also reject Hypothesis 3 which indicates that there is no relationship between local governance capacity and decentralisation. The statistical analyses point out that the relationship between governance capacity and decentralisation is best represented by Hypothesis 2.

Figure 5.11 The Relationship between Decentralisation and Governance Capacity



Although the direction of relations cannot be derived by the regression analysis, it is logical to interpret that local capacity influences both decentralisation and local governance capacity, and local governance capacity influences decentralisation. One counter-argument could be that a reverse causality can be established between decentralisation and socio-economic development. This argument would entail an indirect causality suggesting that an increase in financial autonomy brings better governance of public services and better public services affect the indicators measuring the socio-economic development. However, none of the indicators in SEGE study are directly affected by the municipal services. Variables in relation to health, education, life quality and mobility services in the province are mostly under the responsibility of the central government. Therefore, this alternative explanation on the direction of the relationship between decentralisation and local capacity would be theoretically less convincing.

CHAPTER VI- QUALITATIVE RESPONSES & REMARKS

This chapter presents the qualitative responses gathered from the surveys and separate questions, which are not included into statistical analysis. This information will provide a further insight on how to interpret the statistical findings into policy recommendations and it could lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between capacity and decentralisation in Turkish case.

The chapter presents in sequence the remarks with regard to mobilisation, decision-making and implementation capacity and central government's influence, and at the final part the findings from each section will be synthesised with statistical findings.

6.1 Remarks on Mobilisation Capacity

In relation to mobilisation capacity, the respondents are directed questions on the choices on public procurement, utilisation of municipal partnerships, purpose of debt usage and the prioritisation in service areas.

Starting with the first aspect, two questions are addressed to mayors in relation to the public procurement. First, mayors are asked to select the sources they are using to cover their material requirements. Among four given choices, 'State Supply Office' and 'Private Sector Organisation' are the most frequent selected choices with a percentage of preference around 40% (See Figure 6.1). Secondly, mayors are asked to assess the importance of sources in covering their equipment requirement. They are asked to pick a number from 1 to 5 to signify the degree of importance in each choice (see Figure 6.2). Similarly, State Supply Office and Private Sector Organisations are selected as the most important sources to cover equipment requirements. State Supply Office, is a state enterprise under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance, and its primary function is to supply state institutions with office materials with competitive prices. State Supply Office is supplied from several vendors and it supplies a large variety of merchandise to its customers from the public sector. Its profit is channelled as an income to the Treasury. Even though the primary customers for State Supply Office are the central government and its agencies, the provincial municipalities prefer the Office as their primary choice in procurement as well. The implication of these findings reveal that, in terms of the relationship between decentralisation and local governance capacity, both private and public sources are almost equally important in covering the material needs. By contrast, municipal enterprises or other municipalities are less important and less preferred choices in covering material needs.

Figure 6.1 Choices on Public Procurement



Figure 6.2 Importance on Public Procurement



Similarly, the responses of deputy mayors on the utilisation of municipal partnerships confirm that municipal partnerships are not the preferred choices to cover material needs. Among 25 responses, only 3 municipalities remarked that they are engaging in municipal partnerships to cover their material needs. These findings imply that at least for provincial municipalities, the municipal partnerships do not play an important role on mobilisation capacity. The municipalities state the ambiguity of the current law on regulating municipal partnerships, as the primary reason of avoiding municipal partnerships. This option is followed by “no adequate personnel capacity to contribute to municipal partnerships” and “no adequate budget for municipal partnership”. With regard to the impact of financial constraints, one respondent stated that “Municipalities expect support from each other due to financial constraints, therefore joint projects fail to be materialised”. Nonetheless, 12 out of 25 municipalities state they do not avoid municipal partnerships, despite the considerably low responses in utilising municipal partnerships, as an alternative way to meet their material needs. Furthermore, 62% of mayors’ responses were affirmative when asked if they engage with unofficial partnerships with other municipalities, (see Figure 6.4). That means there is a room for improvement in terms of collaboration between municipalities, and that with legislative and capacity-related improvements, municipal partnerships can be a feasible alternative for private and public sources of procurement and purchases.

Figure 6.3 Reason of Avoiding from Municipal Partnerships



Figure 6.4 Unofficial Partnerships



One important aspect under mobilisation capacity is if the financial and material assets are utilised in an effective way to enhance the local governance capacity. Especially, utilising loans and credits to build further financial and material capabilities, and knowing the public service areas in need of improvement are important aspects to improve the existing local governance capacity.

For the former aspect, mayors are asked on their motivations of getting loans and credits. Debts can be instrumental on capacity enhancement in financial and material aspects, as long as they are utilised for new investments. Five options (i.e. administrative costs, current expenses of public services, investment on infrastructure, investment on superstructure, financial investment) are given to the municipalities to select the ones on which they utilise their loans and credits. Figure 6.5 shows the distribution of responses collected from 25 municipalities. The results indicate that for a clear majority of municipalities, the municipal debts are used for investment purposes. On the other hand, debts for current expenses such as administrative costs or cost of public services correspond to a total of 28%. The results portray a relatively positive picture on the sufficiency of financial resources for the provincial municipalities, and it shows that for a majority of provincial municipalities, current financial sources are sufficient to carry on the municipal services.

Figure 6.5 Utilisation of Debts



To explore if there is a recurring area among municipal services where the provincial municipalities are in need of enhancing their capabilities, mayors are addressed with a practical question; 'if you were given 1 Million TL in addition to your existing budget, on which service areas and how much would you spend?' Table 6.1 shows that environment preservation and construction are two salient areas wherein the municipalities are more willing to invest, whereas religion and public security are the least emphasised service areas. Given that most of the services in public security & order, religion and health are covered by the central government, the results are consistent with the municipal responsibilities.

Table 6.1 Public Service Areas in Need of Capacity Enhancement

Public Service Areas	***Amount allocated (in thousand TL)***
Administrative & General	2650
Economical activities	3542
Construction	4775
Environment Preservation	6000
Education	2697
Sports, Culture, Entertainments	2017
Religion	944

Public Security & Order	914
Health	1249
Social Aid	3577

In the final part of this section, the comments by the mayors and deputy mayors on financial and material aspects will be examined. Among 17 different comments received by the mayors and deputies from 16 municipalities, the financial issues are the second most commented subjects in terms of capacity. Usually, municipalities of poorer provinces mention the lack of financial resources as the most urgent subject under the financial capacities, contrary to the richer provinces which hardly report a lack in capacity with regard to financial or material aspects. The lack of financial resources is usually accompanied by lack of capacity in material aspects, such as a need in reparation and maintenance of owned equipment and machinery, or insufficient physical conditions. It is noteworthy to mention, that in sum, there are three kinds of requests or statements regarding financial aspects; (1) central government's involvement in co-financing of investments with larger financial burden, (2) more financial autonomy to levy taxes and an increase in financial decentralisation, (3) the misbalance between the municipal responsibilities and existing financial resources. Especially in terms of the misbalance there are two outstanding positions. First of all, municipalities from poorer provinces underline that local sources are insufficient to generate income in scarcely populated and poorer areas for adequate public services. Secondly, the municipalities which are granted the metropolitan municipality status following the 2014 elections, point out the additional financial burden, which will be brought by the indebted district municipalities to them, once these municipalities are part of their jurisdiction. Last but not the least, in terms of material aspects, municipalities which report lack of capacity in financial resources are similarly stating a lack in material capacities.

6.2 Remarks on Decision-Making Capacity

Several questions are directed to respondents to elaborate particularly on their preferences on strategic planning and on their municipality's communication system. With regard to strategic planning, the respondents are asked, which actors are involved in strategic planning, what are the means of their involvement and whether they received external consultancy during the preparation of the plans. As part of the communication dimension, questions regarding the presence of a communication plan and a body responsible with internal communication, the structure of the information-sharing and data-storage system, as well the options of trainings or guidelines for the electorates in the municipal assembly have been addressed to respondents.

In terms of strategy planning, the mayors are asked to select the actors which have participated in the strategic planning process and their means of participation. Figure 6.6 points out that the managers of the municipality (i.e. deputy mayors and directors) are the main contributors in strategy plans as being most marked actors. In terms of interaction, managers inside the municipality usually engage personally with the mayor in strategy planning process, while group meetings are usually the most preferred methods for the rest of the actors. Only for citizens and municipal personnel, surveys are preferred as a viable option, while for the rest of the actors surveys appear as a marginal choice. Additionally, the respondents are asked if they have received any external consultancy during strategy planning, and if yes, on what stage have they required the external consultancy. Among 29 respondents, 5 municipalities replied positively on receiving external consultancy on the preparation of strategic plans.

Figure 6.6 Participation in Strategy Planning



As far as the communication dimension goes, the mayors and deputy mayors are asked to fill the number of regular meetings they hold per month or per year with given actors. Figure 6.7[56] shows the average[57] number of meetings held by mayors with each actor per year. Inside the organisational structure, the number of regular meetings each month with the municipal executive committee is around 5, whereas this number decreases in average to 2 for directors and municipal assembly. In terms of external communication, regular meetings with the representatives of locality are quite limited given that for most of the municipalities it is around 3 or 4 times per year. However, the number of regular meetings with the central government and governors exceed the number of meetings with Urban Council and muhtars, with an average number of 18 meetings per year. Additionally, the deputy mayors are asked how many times per month they have regular meetings with directors. The average number of meetings per month is slightly above 3, which corresponds to approximately 40 meetings per year. Hence, the communication with directors is taking place by deputy mayors in general. These findings can be interpreted as the decision-makers of the municipality put the intraorganisational communication at first place, which is followed by the communication with the central government and its agents, and lastly by the communication with the

[56] The frequency of meetings with the councillors, municipal committee and directors are asked on a monthly basis, and the results have been multiplied by 12, unless an exemption is notified by the respondent.

[57] The average number is attained by dividing the sum to the number of respondents for each actor. The municipalities which did not provide any precise number (i.e. wordings such as “countless times” or “don’t know the exact number”) were not taken into account.

representatives of locality. Hence in terms of communication, the access of local actors in local governance is more limited than the access of central government actors.

Figure 6.7 The Structure of Communication Channels in Municipalities



Furthermore, the mayors are asked to describe the approach of Urban Council members in meetings. For the majority of municipalities, Urban Councils are perceived as useful and cooperative bodies suitable for collaboration and more engaged action. These results are contradicting with the findings of the former graphs because, while Urban Councils are largely described as cooperative and constructive, the mayors have fewer tendencies to engage with them in terms of local governance.

Figure 6.8 Attitude of Urban Council towards Municipality



The previous studies about municipal councillors underlined the lack of communication capacity and involvement in municipal affairs. Therefore, some questions are addressed to apprehend the communication capacity of the councillors. The mayors are addressed the question of how many times per month they receive petitions or written requests from councillors, and what is the average time of responding to these requests. Unfortunately, only a few municipalities responded to have received petitions or written requests from councillors. Additionally, the deputy mayors are asked if there are any guidelines or training options inside the municipality for councillors to enhance their communication with municipal personnel and citizens. Around 25% of municipalities responded they provide guidelines or trainings for councillors on their communications towards municipal personnel and citizens. The findings point out that both, the involvement and the capacity of councillors as monitoring and engaging actors inside the municipality are quite limited despite being directly elected from localities.

Figure 6.9 Guidelines or Training for Councillors on Communication



Finally, several questions are addressed to apprehend the information management system inside the municipality. The municipalities are asked if they have (1) a unit responsible to arrange interdepartmental communication, (2) a desk for citizens to appeal their complaints and requests[58], (3) an electronic registry system to store the complaints received from citizens, (4) an information sharing system and who has access to it. Figure 6.10 indicates that for almost all municipalities, citizens are provided with the means to appeal the complaints and requests. Also, an e-registry system to store complaints is available. On the one hand, when it comes to the internal communication, only a few municipalities responded affirmatively on a unit responsible of organising the interdepartmental communication. On the other hand, almost all municipalities responded positively having an information-sharing system inside the municipality. Among the given four options - i.e. mayor, deputy mayors, directors and municipal personnel - the level of access between actors is fairly balanced with the percentages for each respective actor as following; 27% for mayors, 28% for deputy mayors, 26% for directors and 19% for municipal personnel.

[58] This desk is usually referred to as “white desk”.

Figure 6.10 Information Management



Figure 6.11 Access to Information Sharing System



Lastly, the comments of mayors and deputy mayors have been analysed within the frame of decision-making capacity. Unsurprisingly, the comments on communication and planning aspects of capacity have been limited in comparison to other dimensions of local governance capacity. Among the few municipalities which provided an input on planning and communication aspects, they underlined that they do possess adequate capacity and ability in planning and implementing projects, as well as successfully engaging with citizens. Only one municipality was more receptive in relation to its shortcomings in engaging with localities and utilising the information collected from citizens. One mayor stated that their municipality lacks the necessary structure “to request the input from citizens, to make sense out of it and to transform it into meaningful services”.

6.3 Remarks on Implementation Capacity

The additional questions related to the managerial and human resources dimensions of capacity can be clustered under trainings provided inside the municipality, methods and means to increase performance and efficiency in personnel, and the women’s role in human resources.

To start with the first aspect, the mayors are asked if the deputy mayors and director have received occupational trainings during the last year. 86% of the municipalities responded positively, with an average of 3 trainings per year provided to managers in the municipality. A few municipalities have noted the trainings and seminars provided by the Union of Turkish Municipalities were in fact useful to complement the internal trainings inside the municipalities. With regard to trainings, the following questions are addressed: (1) is there a unit responsible inside the municipality to evaluate the training needs?; (2) is there a municipal training program for the personnel?; (3) is there a specific budget allocated only for the municipal trainings? Figure 6.12 suggests that for most of the provincial municipalities, the means of trainings are available inside the municipality. In 78% of responding municipalities, there is a unit responsible to assess training needs; in 70% of the municipalities, there is a municipal training program for the personnel, and 62% of responding municipalities are allocating a specific amount of budget (75000 TL per year) for trainings.

Figure 6.12 Trainings in the Municipality



The second set of questions was about the means and methods to enhance performance inside the municipalities. The municipalities are inquired about their motivation enhancing activities through the following questions; 1) 'is there any awarding system for high performance?'; 2) 'are you undertaking satisfaction surveys among personnel?'; and 3)'are you organising any social events for the personnel?'.

Figure 6.13 Means to Increase Motivation inside the Municipality



46% of responding municipalities remarked they are adopting a form of awarding systems for higher performance. For around 70% of municipalities, awarding takes a sort of financial form such as bonuses or premiums. Other popular means in awarding include letters of appreciation, gifts or placards. Around 45% of municipalities undertake satisfaction surveys among personnel, usually one time per year. Lastly, 80% of municipalities responded affirmatively in providing social activities for their personnel. In average of 4 times per year municipalities are organising social events for their personnel.

Figure 6.14 Performance Criteria in Municipalities



Additionally, questions on the application and the extent of performance measurement criteria, and the existence of commonly agreed terms of reference have been directed to respondents with regard to municipal performance. 52% of participating municipalities responded to having had adopted a sort of performance criteria as part of their municipal decisions. Among them, 21% responded they use performance criteria on salary payments, while 71% use performance criteria for promotion decisions and contract renewals. 76% of municipalities adopt a sort of terms of reference to avoid of duplication of work, whereas 24% responded negatively on this.

Figure 6.15 Terms of Reference in Municipal Works



Finally, the municipalities are asked to provide information about the number of women in personnel and in management. The results indicate that the ratio of women in personnel and in management is approximately similar, which is 11,6% and 11,1% respectively. According to Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), the national average of women employment in 2013 was 25.9% . The women employment in municipalities is way below the national average of employment, yet it is remarkable to observe that there is not a significant decrease between the women employment in personnel and in management. This result suggests that the gender disparity in management is mostly representative of the overall gender structure inside the provincial municipalities.

Moving to the comments of mayors and deputy mayors about the implementation capacity, the lack of qualified personnel is the foremost mentioned weakness in commentaries. A clear majority of responding municipalities underline that they either lack educated and technical personnel, or they have a mediocre capacity. The absence of incentives to attract qualified personnel due to the regulations and legal frameworks, and the absence of qualified personnel in smaller or poorer municipalities, are articulated as the primary reasons for incapacities in human resources. Also, the political polarisation among personnel has been identified in several times as a primary cause of the inability in utilising the qualified personnel in managerial positions. Additionally, different educational background and poor communication due to high workload are stated as other reasons for poor collaboration among directors. One mayor stated that there is a 'learned helplessness' among directors that municipalities are dysfunctional places and this creates inertia and distrust in management.

6.4 Remarks on Central Government's Influence

The responses of municipalities on the debt acquisition and communication are analysed for a more enhanced understanding of the central government's and its agencies' influences on local governance.

First of all, the municipalities are given several actors and asked to give a value from 1 to 5 in terms of their importance on debt acquisition. According to Figure 6.16, Bank of Provinces and Central Government are the two primary sources of income for the provincial municipalities in terms of debt acquisition. Given that a primary function of Bank of Provinces is to provide interest-free loans to municipalities, it is understandable why the Bank is a particular preference for the municipalities. Yet, this graph shows that the central government is also a key source for loans and a credit, which shows that provinces with limited financial sources are more prone to influence from the central government in terms of the financial dependency.

Figure 6.16 Influence on Debt Acquisition



The second topic examines the importance of central government in communication in comparison to other actors, and its preferences in communication with the central government. Among several given actors in locality, the municipalities are asked to evaluate each one of them in terms of the importance of communication. According to Figure 6.17, despite the relatively close values with other actors, except the municipal assembly, the highest valued two options are the governorate and the agencies of central government in locality. This graph shows that the communication with the central government and governorates is highly important for provincial municipalities. One interpretation of these results could be that provincial municipalities feel the need to consider the central government's position regarding the local governance.

Figure 6.17 Influence on Communication



Furthermore, the mayors are asked on their preferences on their contacts with the central government. Four choices are given to municipalities; (1) personal contact, (2) contacting through the associated political party, (3) contacting through the Union of Municipalities, (4) contacting through the local agencies of central government. Figure 6.18 displays that mayors primarily prefer personal contact with central government, followed by 'through associated political parties', and with a slight difference by 'through local agencies of the central government' and 'through union of municipalities'. The primary indication of this graph is that mayors have largely a direct access to central government and they prefer a direct communication with central government about their affairs.

Figure 6.18 Preferences on Contacting with the Central Government



Finally, the comments of mayors and deputy mayors do not point out any arbitrary influence of central government in local governance, but they pointed out that there are requests from central government in terms of financial decentralisation. In this regard, two types of demands are prevalent in municipalities, (a) more involvement of central government, especially in terms of assisting municipalities on investments and providing additional funding from central budget, (b) an increased financial autonomy or some tax exemptions with regard to value added taxes and special consumption taxes (OTV) on municipal services. The long-term and interest-free loans provided by the Bank of Provinces appear as a viable option for municipalities to acquire equipment and machinery, yet these loans are insufficient for municipalities to maintain the existing machinery or to improve the physical conditions.

6.5 Synthesis of Quantitative and Qualitative Findings

The synthesis of the qualitative findings with the quantitative findings provides further insight on the interpretation of the data in Turkish case.

First and foremost, the relationship between capacity and decentralisation is usually associated with financial aspects. In this regard, municipalities are divided into two clusters;

one group articulates that more financial decentralisation (e.g. increase discretion on levying taxes, collecting taxes, removing indirect taxes on municipal services) is necessary to overcome financial constraints, whereas another group demands more involvement from central government in local governance by pointing out the difficulty to raise revenues due to incapacities in local environment. In fact, a major statistical finding has shown that local capacity is the main determinant on the relationship between local governance capacity and decentralisation, and only mobilisation capacity showed a statistically significant relationship with decentralisation. Remarkably, municipalities requesting more financial decentralisation belong to the provinces with higher socio-economic development. Furthermore, this finding supports the interpretation on the relationship between the influence of central government in local governance and decentralisation as socio-economically developed municipalities look for more financial autonomy. This means that they are highly likely to perceive the central government's existing presence in local governance more than necessary. Nevertheless, existing financial sources are sufficient for the majority of municipalities to cover the current expenses, and central government's involvement is usually requested to co-finance investments. Similarly, debts are usually used for investment purposes.

Secondly, lack of capacity in qualified personnel is a severe problem for municipalities, which is associated with the absence of tools to attract qualified personnel. On the one hand, this is partly due to the current legislation, as the maximum wage allowed to the contracted personnel cannot surpass % 25 of the highest ranked civil servant's salary, and the usage of performance payments are conditioned to certain criteria[59]. On the other hand, municipalities in socio-economically poorer provinces have less access to qualified personnel. In this regard, trainings provide little solution to improve existing human resources capaicty, given that most of the municipalities already have training programmes but lack of qualified personnel.

Thirdly, the influence of residents or Urban Councils appears to be limited in municipal decisions. Findings show that central government and its agents have more weight in communication in comparison to local actors. Although municipalities possess the technical capacities in information management, most of the communication is inside the

[59] Article 49 on 5393-coded Law on Municipalities states that personnel expenses cannot exceed 30% of municipal revenues. For the municipalities with less than 10000 residents, the regulation is that personnel expenses cannot exceed 40% of municipal revenues. Moreover, the same article states that the performance payments are only applicable to permanent civil servants, they cannot be allocated more than twice a year and limited with the 10% of municipal personnel.

organisation and the involvement of councillors is limited. Correspondingly, the two indicators of decision-making capacity measuring the impact on actual decision-making (iDM3 and iDM5), were the least influential indicators on DM variable. An interpretation of these findings could be that the participation of citizens in governance is not effective in the Turkish case. In that sense, we can talk about a disconnection between the involvement of citizens and decision-making in local governance.

Fourthly, none of the respondents reported an arbitrary involvement of central government in local governance, but the impact of political differences in personnel and management have been mentioned several times as a reason of poor performance in implementation. Nevertheless, the later argument is not supported by the statistical findings. The correlation matrix (Table 5.18) did not point out any significant correlation between Party (i.e. different party affiliations inside the municipality) and IMP variables.

Lastly, findings on municipal partnerships suggest that there is room for improvement to utilise municipal partnership as alternative methods to mobilise resources, but at the current moment municipal partnerships are not instrumental on mobilisation capacity.

CHAPTER VII- CONCLUSION

Empowering the local versus the centre and vice versa, has always been an integral part of theoretical debates in governance. There are many authors who even perceive the history of governments as a pendulum between centralization and decentralization (see Atasoy, 2009; Sanderson, 1995). When the term decentralization appeared for the first time in English language in the mid of 19th century, it was used as the binary opposite of centralization which was largely accepted as the panacea of ineffective, bad governance in the post-French revolution Europe. Tocqueville, one of the earliest supporters of decentralization, challenged this idea arguing that decentralization is not only better for democratic principles but also better for efficient and effective governance, thus contesting the key argument of the supporters of centralism. While the supporters of decentralization had been marginal until the second part of the 20th century, both concepts – decentralization and centralization - have prevailed in academic circles. New battlefields were discovered for their supporters to argue which concept provides the best alternative in democracy building, management, economics and development. In the second half of the 20th century, decentralization emerged victorious in this long rivalry as the best alternative for governance in the post-nation state and globalized world system. Once decentralization was acknowledged as the best alternative, the debate on whether decentralization or centralization is better for governance, shifted into a debate which was preoccupied with diagnosing the conditions for the best outcomes in decentralized systems. Any conflicting empirical result coming from developing countries was treated with the interest to identify the failing institutions or discordant cultural elements, which could be addressed with proper institutional arrangements and learning programs. Even though countless donor programmes and research is established to build capacities in failing institutions and to change legal infrastructures, it has been largely unrevealed how these presumed capacities or contextual conditions are affecting the outcomes of decentralization.

Driven by this academic debate, this study addressed the broader discussion of ‘when decentralization leads to better governance’ by focusing on the mechanism between the capacities for better governance and decentralization. The study addressed two central questions (1) which capacities are important for decentralization, and (2) how these capacities are affecting decentralization. One novel approach in this research is that capacities are not engaged solely as the attributes of the governance institutions, but also as the socio-economic attributes of the surrounding environment, which is conceptualised as the local capacity.

Inevitably, concepts such as capacity, decentralization or governance require a diligent attention on how to conceptually frame and operationalize them. An analogical framework was established to measure the local governance capacity by focusing on the three fundamental functions (i.e. mobilization of resources, decision-making in policies and implementation of the decisions) of local governments with regards to governance. The outcome of decentralization has been operationalized in terms of the financial autonomy of local government. To control the contextual factors, the country case specific conditions of Turkey are analysed and several influential variables such as influence of central government in local governance, size of the province, political diversities between local and central government and also the political divergences inside the municipalities, are identified.

In terms of methodological choices, the study undertook a quantitative approach based on the data collected from the mayors and deputy mayors. The selection of the same tier of local government institutions from a single country case enabled a controlled environment, free from the influence of any legal or country specific cultural conditions. Hence, the findings of this research have better generalizability across other country cases.

Before elaborating on the findings, the theoretical and practical implications of the study, it is imperative to say that the most significant contribution of this study is first shedding light on the inadequately understood mechanism of decentralization, and second, how to increase the predictability of decentralization policies on better governance.

7.1 Empirical Findings

The primary empirical finding of this study has been that financial autonomy of the local government is strongly associated with the socio-economic conditions in the province and to a lesser extent with the local governance capacity, predominantly the mobilization capacity of the municipality. In relation to the research questions, any prediction on the outcomes of the decentralization policies should consider both the local capacity and local governance capacity.

The empirical findings point out that local capacity does not only directly influence the outcome of decentralization, but it also influences the relationship between local governance capacity and decentralization. This influence has been most notable on the relationship between decision-making capacity and decentralization. The statistical analysis pointed out that the level of socio-economic development explains most of the covariance between decision-making capacity and decentralization. One logical explanation of this influence is that in Turkey, the practice of involving citizens or their representatives in actual decision-making is limited, and most of the information about the locality comes from the e-government sources. Therefore, any province with lower levels of Internet usage or broadband connection would inevitably have lesser sophistication in e-government system, either because of the material incapacities or because of less interest to invest in it.

Among the control variables, perceived influence of central government in local governance has been the only significant predictor on the level of decentralization. This empirical finding was interpreted in congruence with the qualitative responses which showed that municipalities in socio-economically more developed provinces, feel more confident and more capable to generate income from local resources. Thus, they request more fiscal decentralization from the central government. On the contrary, municipalities from socio-economically less developed provinces are requesting more involvement from central government in local governance; thus, they feel the presence of the central government is less than it ought to be. None of the control variables showed any significant influence on decentralization. This finding is important because it disputes the impact of the municipality's size on decentralization and leaves the socio-economic development as a more important indicator on financial autonomy than the population of the province. Similarly, political diversities inside the municipal management or municipalities governed by the opposition party do not necessarily affect the financial autonomy. This does not suggest that an arbitrary act by the central government would not affect the financial autonomy of the municipality. Rather, the assumed effects will be limited if the capacity conditions are sufficient.

7.2 Theoretical Implications

The most notable theoretical implication of this research is that socio-economic development in local level is an essential precondition in order to predict the outcomes of decentralization.

With regards to the existing literature on the preconditions of successful decentralisation, this study suggests that socio-economic development in local level is an important prerequisite on the success of the decentralization. Hence, any policy planner of decentralization should consider the socio-economic differences in regions or provinces beforehand.

Although the impact of local or regional socio-economic conditions on successful decentralization has been articulated in previous studies (e.g. Barrett, Mude, & Omiti, 2007), there the socio-economic conditions are addressed as part of the contextual realities of the country case, and the question of how socio-economic conditions are influencing the outcomes of decentralization has been intact. A contribution of this study is that not only it confirms the vast importance of socio-economic development on decentralization, but also presents a model to predict the value of change in financial autonomy vis-à-vis local development level.

The findings of this study challenge the propositions of fiscal federalism. The theory on fiscal federalism argues that the local governments can monitor and act better on local needs, thus the assignment of the tax and expenditure authority to lowest level of government would create the conditions of higher accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in governance. By setting the importance of socio-economic development on the success of decentralisation, this research suggests that, the outcomes of fiscal federalism are largely determined by the local socio-economic development instead of the local government's convenience to act on local needs.

A number of studies treat the relationship between decentralization and development from a counter-causal perspective, arguing that decentralization leads to socio-economic development in regional or local level (e.g. Bartlett, Malekovic, & Monastiriotis, 2013; Romeo, 2012). For instance, on her essay on the impact of decentralization on local regional development in Croatia, Alibegovic (2013) implements methodologically similar choices on the analysis between decentralization and local development. Alibegovic adopts regional GDP per capita as the indicator of regional development and regressed it against several indicators for fiscal decentralization, and observes a statistical significant relationship between regional development and the subnational government share of own tax revenues. She concludes that higher level of fiscal autonomy is expected to exert higher local and regional development, and recommends central governments to pursue fiscal decentralization for local and regional development. Alibegovic's research is important to mention for two reasons. First, the measurement of variables are almost identical as decentralization is measured by the share of subnational government in own-tax revenues and the regional development is measured by the GDP per capita, which is one of the indicators in this study to measure the socio-economic development. Although two studies draw different conclusions, the statistical significant relationship between local development and decentralisation shows the generalizability of the results in different country cases. In fact, one of the biggest challenges in decentralization studies is identifying the notions that can be applied in different country cases because the outcomes of decentralization are shaped extensively by country's idiosyncrasies. Secondly, interpreting this statistical finding as the impact of decentralization on development, is to say the least, overly optimistic. A more logical assumption would be that higher regional economic development affects the own tax revenues of the regional or local government; thus, increasing its financial autonomy.

Nonetheless, 'decentralization leads to development' is a predominantly accepted idea among primary international donor organizations (e.g. UNDP, the EU, ICDS…etc). A major programme under UNDP called 'Decentralized Governance for Development', promotes the idea that decentralized governance is 'crucial to attain human development and MDGs (Millennium Development Goals)' (UNDP, 2004). Despite this strong stance, there is hardly any empirical evidence in the literature that decentralized governance leads in fact to higher human development or reduction in poverty in developing countries. What is more, almost all empirical studies on the topic call for the necessity on careful policy crafting in national and local level, the establishment of required institutional settings and capacity buildings.

My argument on the relationship between decentralization and local development is that decentralization can be a policy instrument to attain better governance if certain socio-economic conditions exist in the locality. Only then, decentralization policies reforming the institutional and legal framework in the local level could result in better-tuned policies to promote local development. In cases of a lack of socio-economic parameters, central government should be an active participant in investments and promote incentives for private sector to engage in economical activities, in order to attain local development. Thus, I argue that the conflicting empirical results in developing countries are partly explained by the corresponding socio-economic realities, rather than the implementation of decentralization policies or capacities in the local and national governments.

7.3. Policy Implications

The strong relationship between socio-economic development in the locality and the level of financial autonomy of local administration, necessitates the policy implementer and capacity-building practitioners to consider the socio-economic realities before implementing any institutional changes that seek to empower the local governments for better governance.

Especially in developing countries, which are usually faced with disproportionate distribution of wealth and inequities among regions, are more likely to result with different outcomes in terms of governance if a uniform, symmetrical decentralization policy is applied at the national level. For these countries, a mixed decentralization policy could result with better outcomes in local governance. One policy recommendation is the creation of a benchmark among regions or local areas to cluster different development levels matching different discretions, in terms of financial autonomy and public service delivery. Regions with higher indices can be authorized with higher fiscal autonomy such as levying taxes and higher self-financing responsibilities in expenditure assignments, whereas regions with lower indices can have a co-financing option and share of responsibility in public services with central government's agencies.

Furthermore, capacity building practices in local governments should not only focus on the engagement of citizens in governance, but also empower the local governments on their entrepreneurial and tax-collection capabilities. Local governments with higher mobilization capacities can generate the most revenues out of the available local sources; thus, higher accountability in return of higher financial dependency on local sources can be established easier.

Finally, the statistical analysis failed to establish a significant relationship between the population level and the relationship between capacity and decentralization. This finding is crucial especially considering the recent Turkish law on new metropolitan municipalities and the law regulating the intergovernmental transfer shares. In 2014, 14 former provincial municipalities with a population above 750.000 have been raised to metropolitan municipality status. The new status brings enhanced rights on financial discretion. However, the findings of this research suggest that the municipalities with lower development levels but higher population (e.g. Van) would most likely fail to attain higher financial autonomy despite increased financial discretion. Similarly, in 2008 the new law on intergovernmental transfer shares has introduced new criteria such as development level or geographical size, to regulate the transfer shares from general budget. Yet, the population criterion still has the largest impact (80%) on the final amount. A policy recommendation of this study is to increase the weight of development index on calculating the shares from general budget to increase the policy effectiveness.

7.4 Limitations of the study

This study was conducted on a single country case and on a specific tier of local governments. Although this methodological choice enabled the controlled environment to address the research questions, only a limited population in sample size was available to strengthen the statistical findings. Despite the relatively good response rate of 50% from a long survey conducted with mayors and deputy mayors, the achieved sample size of 33 is relatively low to draw statistical conclusion with prediction purposes. Nevertheless, even with the limited sample size, the study was able to address the research questions and elaborate on the relationship between decentralization and capacity in local governance. Nonetheless, a future research with more sample size would increase the predictability value of the model presented in Chapter V.

7.5 Final remarks and recommendations for future research

The most important contribution of this study to decentralisation and governance studies is that it establishes the local socio-economic development as an integral part on evaluation and design of decentralisation policies. Hitherto, the equivocal outcomes of decentralization practices, especially in developing countries, were largely addressed as part of 'management deficit' in governance and various capacity building programmes have been implemented by international donor organizations to educate managers, organizations, even communities and institutions. Albeit not being a substantial evidence of improvement in governance, every year billions of dollars are invested in capacity building programmes to enhance the governance capacity in developing countries. Relying on surveys and official data collected from 65 Turkish provincial municipalities, this study evidences that socio-economic conditions are most important on the outcomes of decentralization for better local governance. Based on this, the relationship between decentralization and governance should not only be addressed with a managerial perspective but also with development one.

To generate achievable policy strategies and development targets with regards to decentralization, replication of this study in other country cases is recommended. Adaption of the analytical model in different country specific conditions can provide further insights on how different country cases are influencing the outcomes in local governance capacities.

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APPENDICES

Local Administration Budget Balance 2006-2015

(Million TL)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Expenditures	**33.009**	**39.383**	**45.942**	**48.227**	**52.226**	**61.011**	**69.299**	**87.590**	**84.173**	**65.962**
Personnel Cost	7.096	7.516	9.044	9.531	10.286	11.259	12.193	13.489	13.347	10.980
Govern. Premiums to Social Security Agencies	996	1.147	1.257	1.483	1.818	1.904	1.968	2.173	2.172	1.736
Good and Service Purchase	9.915	11.785	14.343	15.468	17.984	22.105	26.196	31.736	32.546	27.482
Interest Expenditures	607	634	938	1.454	1.361	1.322	1.433	1.412	1.765	1.299
Current Transfers	1.356	1.685	2.125	2.573	2.919	2.417	2.413	2.957	2.983	2.519
Capital Expenditures	12.256	15.771	17.391	15.332	16.391	19.780	23.315	33.577	28.644	20.150
Capital Transfers	426	313	241	733	385	1.167	740	524	676	725
Lending	357	533	603	1.653	1.082	1.056	1.040	1.720	2.040	1.072
Revenues	**31.725**	**35.474**	**38.842**	**42.477**	**53.582**	**63.415**	**69.263**	**83.376**	**87.171**	**69.388**
Taxes	3.378	3.691	4.190	3.776	5.904	6.901	7.250	8.213	9.292	7.413
Property Income	8.060	8.993	9.188	10.558	11.922	13.868	16.050	17.917	18.025	15.531
Grants and Aids and Special Revenues	4.305	4.589	5.209	5.860	8.876	10.261	10.331	13.939	6.980	4.999
Interest, Shares and Fines	13.622	16.013	18.404	19.885	24.172	28.852	32.547	37.691	42.935	38.441
Capital Revenues	2.003	1.949	1.732	1.333	2.690	3.483	3.049	5.607	6.661	2.820
Collections from Loans	358	239	119	1.064	17	48	36	9	3.278	184
Budget Balance	**-1.284**	**-3.909**	**-7.100**	**-5.750**	**1.356**	**2.404**	**-35**	**-4.213**	**2.998**	**3,426**

Source: www.maliye.gov.tr

Local Administrations' Detailed Budget Balance 2011 (January-December)

(Thousand TL)	Local Administrations								
	Municipalities					Municipal Enterprises	SPA	Unions	Local authorities (central adm.)
	Provincial Municipalities			District and Town Mun.	Total				
	Metropolitan Mun.	Non-metropolitan mun.	Total						
Expenditures	**15.570.973**	**4.901.245**	**20.439.747**	**20.716.418**	**41.132.755**	**8.463.086**	**10.216.828**	**2.694.867**	**61.011.336**
Compensation of Employees	1.585.518	1.101.478	2.686.996	4.892.182	7.579.178	1.276.630	2.201.255	202.411	11.259.474
Govern. Premiums to Social Security	273.531	199.726	473.257	816.005	1.289.262	246.106	342.807	26.199	1.904.374
Good and Service Purchase	4.100.762	2.036.898	6.137.660	9.158.772	15.296.432	3.456.525	2.376.501	975.275	22.104.733
Interest Expenditures	669.269	108.175	777.444	297.257	1.074.701	231.270	10.469	5.618	1.322.058
Current Transfers	990.042	138.018	1.100.098	810.548	1.887.236	272.194	408.264	131.811	2.416.930
Capital Expenditures	5.469.735	1.280.962	6.750.697	4.647.892	11.398.589	2.545.360	4.583.170	1.253.027	19.780.146

Capital Transfers	757.579	25.420	778.490	71.413	849.903	3.334	294.116	95.601	1.167.435
Lending	1.724.537	10.568	1.735.105	22.349	1.757.454	431.667	246	4.925	1.056.186
Revenues	**15.560.584**	**4.518.688**	**20.079.272**	**20.660.955**	**40.740.227**	**9.581.186**	**11.678.259**	**2.221.391**	**63.415.789**
Taxes	333.122	595.026	928.148	5.949.992	6.878.140	0	16.814	6.535	6.901.489
Property Income	1.302.592	1.237.736	2.540.328	2.825.555	5.365.883	7.695.203	331.679	476.053	13.868.818
Grants and Aids and Special	120.000	92.869	212.869	413.844	626.713	820.623	8.003.367	1.483.291	10.261.712
Interest, Shares and	11.928.431	2.412.481	14.340.912	10.050.304	24.391.216	938.128	3.276.131	246.606	28.852.081
Capital Revenues	1.750.415	180.576	1.930.991	1.420.281	3.351.272	80.286	50.268	1.806	3.483.632
Collections from Loans	126.024	0	126.024	979	127.003	46.946	0	7.100	48.057
Budget Balance	**-10.389**	**-382.557**	**-360.475**	**-55.463**	**-392.528**	**1.118.100**	**1.461.431**	**-473.476**	**2.404.453**

Source: www.maliye.gov.tr

Personnel Numbers in Local Administrations

Type	Civil Servant		Contracted Personnel		Worker				Total	
					Permanent		Temporary			
	2009	2010	2009	2010	2009	2010	2009	2010	2009	2010
SPA	8.142	9.404	1.264	1.537	30.390	28.626	740	260	40.536	39.827
Municipalities	76.618	81.732	13.520	13.621	124.347	112.909	9.556	7.736	224.041	215.998
Municipal Enterprises	5.014	7.406	913	1.104	18.345	18.470	564	327	24.836	27.307
Unions	454	784	264	364	2.944	2.537	1.011	1.270	4.673	4.955
Total	90.228	99.326	15.961	16.626	176.026	162.542	11.871	9.593	294.086	288.087

Source: (Mahalli İdareler Genel Müdürlüğü, 2011)

Personnel Numbers In Local Administrations On The Basis Of Service Groups

Year	Manager and qualified personnel	Administrative Staff	Technical Staff	Health Personnel	Assistants	City Police	Firefighters	Other personnel	Total number
2009	7.574	31.100	14.587	1.997	4.682	15.278	9.938	5.072	90.228
2010	13.486	33.540	17.365	2.082	4.170	14.993	10.197	3.493	99.326

Source: (Mahalli İdareler Genel Müdürlüğü, 2011)

List Of Indicators

Capacity Indicators

	Code	Name	Clarification	Relevancy	Type	Instrument	Source of data	Measurement Level	Unit of Analysis
Mobilisation Capacity	MOB1	Property Taxation	The ratio of collected taxes to overall registered residents	Capability in own source revenues	Financial	Survey	Deputy Mayor (q2)	Ratio	0-1
	MOB2	Utilization of immovable	The ratio of the annual revenue attained from immovable to the overall value of the immovable owned by the municipality.	Capability in own source revenues	Financial	Survey	Deputy mayor (q1)	Ratio	0-1
	MOB3	Debt structure	The ratio of short term debts to long term debts	Sustainable debt level	Financial	Survey or Municipality's own data	Deputy mayor or manager of financial department (q4)	Ratio	0-1
	MOB4	Adequacy of financial resources	The score on the adequacy of existing financial resources for municipal functions	Financial capacity	Financial	Survey	Mayor (q21)	Ordinal	1 to 5 scale
	MOB5	Purchasing power	The ratio of the expenditures on goods and services to the overall expenditures	Financial capability on purchasing	Material	Survey or Municipality's own data	Deputy mayor or manager of financial department	Ratio	0-1

	MOB6	Physical and technical adequacy	The mean score of 5 Likert items on adequacy in; (1) computer and computer hardware, (2) technical equipment and machinery, (3) internet connection and computer software, (4) physical conditions of civil servant's offices, (5) physical conditions of manager's offices.	Material adequacy inside the municipality	Material	Survey	Deputy mayor (q7)	Interval	1-5
	MOB7	Material adequacy in public services	The mean score of the adequacy in equipment in each service area.	Material adequacy in terms of service areas	Material	Survey	Mayor (q18)	Interval	1-5
	MOB8	Public procurement	The mean score of 4 Likert-items, (1) swiftness of public procurement, (2) Sufficiency of public procurement to meet the municipality's needs, (3) competence of municipal personnel on public procurement processes, (4) adequacy in e-procurement options	Capacity in public procurement	Material	Survey	Deputy mayor (q11/1,2,4, 5)	Interval	1-5
Decision-making Capacity	DM1	Success in strategic planning	The mean score of the mayor and deputy mayor's evaluation of the last strategic planning.	Capability in strategic planning	Planning	Survey	Mayor (q 9,1) and Deputy Mayor (q36)	Interval	1-5

	DM2	Performance budgeting	The mean score of 7 Likert-item on performance budgeting; (1)timing in budget planning, (2)integration of budget plans with performance plans, (3)implementation of performance criteria on budget negotiations, (4)coherence with strategic planning, (5) integration of activity-based costing, feasibility analysis, risk assessment and cost accounting in budget plans, (6)adequacy of equipment to monitor and assess performances, (7) adequacy of e-budget system	Capacity in performance budgeting	Planning	Survey	Deputy mayor (q37)	Interval	1-5
	DM3	Importance of strategic plan and performance plans on actual decision-making	The mean score of 2 Likert items; (1) the importance of strategic plan on implementation, (2) the importance of performance reports on high important political decisions	The actual impact of strategic and performance plans on decision-making	Planning	Survey	Mayor (q9/3,4)	Interval	1-5

	DM4	Intra-organizational communication	The mean score of 7 Likert items; (1) communication among departments, (2)communication between deputy mayors and directors, (3) share of information inside the municipality, (4) adequacy of IT systems, (5)storing of information, (6)division of work and collaboration among department, (7) communication between civil servants and councillors	The capacity of intra-organizational communication	Communication	Survey	Deputy mayor (q27)	Interval	1-5
	DM5	Importance of local representatives on decision-making	The mean score of the importance of Urban Council and muhtars on formation of the municipal programme.	The relevance of representatives of citizens on decision-making	Communication	Survey	Mayor (q9/5,6)	Interval	1-5
	DM6	Data sheets	The number of datasheets spread in 2012	Collecting information on the characteristics of citizens	Communication	Survey	Deputy mayor (q34)	Ratio	Number
	DM7	Citizen Polls	The number of citizen polls took place in 2012	Collecting information on the expectations of citizens	Communication	Survey	Deputy mayor (q33)	Ratio	Number

	DM8	E-government system	The mean score of dummy variables on online service available in municipality's website. Each variable will be registered as 1 or 0. It comprises 8 services; (1) transaction with taxes, fees..etc., (2)business search, (3) reaching personal documents, (4)company registration, (5)statistical information, (6)applying for permits and licences, (7)personal statements on finances and taxes, (8) information about zoning status.	Collecting information on citizens via online services	Communic ation	Municipality website	Municipali ty website	Interval	0-1
	DM9	E-participation system	The mean score of dummy variables on online e-participation means in municipality's website. Each variable is registered as 1 or 0. It comprises 7 variables; (1) announcement of municipal decisions, (2) announcement of projects, (3) announcement of plans, (4) broadcasting municipal sessions, (5) social media tools, (6) opinion polls, (7) white desk	Collecting information about opinion of citizens via online services	Communic ation	Municipality website	Municipali ty website	Interval	0-1

	DM10	Visitors of the website	The ranking of municipal website according to the Alexa traffic rank. Lesser numbers indicate higher ranks..	The level of online communication with citizens	Communication	Alexa Traffic Ranking	Alexa's website www.alexa.com (06.08.2013)	Ratio	Number
Implementation Capacity	IMP1	Education level of the mayor	The level of education. Primary school-1; Junior High-2; Highschool-3; Undergrad-4; Postgraduation-5; Doctoral-6. .	The intellectual capacity of the mayor	Management	Survey	Mayor (q1)	Ordinal	1 to 6 scales
	IMP2	Years in office	The number of years in the office as mayor	Experience of the mayor	Management	Survey	Mayor (q1)	Nominal	Number
	IMP3	Initiative taking in management	The mean score of initiative taking by the deputy mayors and directors	The level of initiative taking in management	Management	Survey	Mayor (q12)	Interval	1-5
	IMP4	Collaboration in management	The mean score of collaboration between deputy mayors and directors, and deputy mayor and mayor.	The level of collaboration in management	Management	Survey	Mayor (q13) and Deputy mayor (q24/3,4)	Interval	1-5
	IMP5	Management Practices (staff development)	The mean score of 3 Likert items; (1) practices to increase motivation among staff, (2) trainings on leadership and management, (3) practices to increase	The quality of management practices to increase organizational capacity	Management	Survey	Deputy mayor (q24/1,2,5)	Interval	1-5

			initiative taking in directors and other personnel						
	IMP6	Seniority in directors	A sum value indicating the years in occupation for directors. There are 5 ranges divided by 5 years scale. 0-5 years= 1; 5-10 years=2; 10-15 years=3; 15-20 years=4; above 20=5. The number of personnel on each cluster will be multiplied by the corresponding number.	Experience in management	Manageme nt	Survey	Deputy mayor (q14)	Interval	1-5
	IMP7	Seniority in personnel	A sum value indicating the years of occupation for personnel. There are 5 ranges divided by 5 years scale. 0-5 years= 1; 5-10 years=2; 10-15 years=3; 15-20 years=4; above 20=5. The number of personnel on each cluster will be multiplied by the corresponding number.	Experience in personnel	Human Resources	Survey	Deputy mayor (q15)	Interval	1-5
	IMP8	Norm cadre	The norm cadre indicates the number of personnel required for municipal functions. The ratio of number of norm cadre to the total number of	Sufficiency in number of personnel or overstaffing	Human Resources	Survey	Deputy mayor (q12)	Ratio	Number

			employees.						
	IMP9	Technical personnel	The ratio of technical personnel to overall number of personnel	Capacity in technical personnel	Human Resources	Survey	Deputy mayor (q13)	Ratio	0-1
	IMP10	Specialised Personnel	The ratio of personnel graduated postgrad or equivalent vocational training to overall personnel	Capacity in qualified personnel	Human Resources	Survey	Deputy mayor (q13)	Ratio	0-1
	IMP11	Personnel in municipal companies	The ratio of number of personnel employed in municipalities to overall number of personnel	Sufficiency in number of personnel	Human Resources	Survey	Deputy mayor (q12)	Ratio	Number
	IMP12	HR management system	The mean score of 7 Likert items: (1) the functionality of HR management system (mayor), (2) the sufficiency of HR management system, (3) the coherence of the HR management plans with the municipality's needs, (4) competence of the HR department, (5) implementation of HR strategies, (6) monitoring and assessing the training need, (7) trainings meet the municipality's needs	Capacity in HR management	Human Resources	Survey	Mayor (q10) and deputy mayor (q19)	Interval	1-5

	IMP13	Employment policies	The mean score of 4 Likert items; (1) sufficiency in personnel number, (2) sufficiency in qualified personnel number, (3) efficiency of employment policies, (4) match of new recruits the job criteria	The success in employment policies	Human Resources	Survey	Deputy mayor (q20)	Interval	1-5
	IMP14	Formation	The average hour of occupation training per personnel who received training	HR quality	Human Resources	Survey	Deputy mayor (q18)	Ratio	Number

Decentralisation Indicator

DEC	Decentralisation	The ratio of own source revenues (tax revenue+revenue from enterprise&properties+capital revenues+ receivables) to overall revenues	Financial Autonomy	Fiscal Decentralisation	Datasheet on local administration's revenue	http://www.bumko.gov.tr	Ratio	0-1

Control Variables

INF	Influence of central government	The mean score of 8 Likert-items for the influence of central government and its agencies on: (1) delivery of municipal services, (2) administrative activities, (3) decision-making about municipal services, (4) partnerships with other local administrations, private sector organisations and civil society organisations, (5) own-source revenues, (6) grants and aids, (7) debts and loans, (8) investments	Influence of central government on local governance	External Factor	Survey	Mayor (q24)	Interval	1-5
POP	Population	The rank of the province in terms of population. The lower the rank, the higher the population	Direct impact on financial capacity and local capacity	External Factor	Union of Turkish Municipality's database	http://www.tbb.gov.tr/storage/catalogs/2012-belediye-nufuslari.pdf	Interval	from 1 to 81
PolDiv	Political diversity	Municipalities which are not governed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) will be rated as 0, the rest will be rated as 1.	Arbitrary stance of central government towards municipalities governed by opposition parties can affect decentralization and capacity.	External Factor	Local Elections Newsportal	http://secim.haberler.com/2009/il-sonuclari.asp	Ordinal	0 or 1
Party	Party affiliation	The percentage of votes of winning party in the municipality according to the 2009 local election. Lower percentage indicates less party affiliation among the management.	Different party affiliation inside the municipality might affect capacity in local government	External Factor	Local Elections Newsportal	http://secim.haberler.com/2009/il-sonuclari.asp	Ratio	0-1

Data List

Mobilisation Capacity

provinces	MOB1	MOB2	MOB3	MOB4	MOB5	MOB6	MOB7	MOB8
Adiyaman	0.54	0.009	0.189	2.00	0.310	4.20	3.86	3.25
Afyonkarahisar	0.85	0.051	0.000	4.00	0.365	4.60	4.79	4.25
Aksaray	0.77	0.21	0.700	3.00	0.341	.	4.64	.
Amasya	0.57	0.019	0.795	3.00	0.331	4.00	4.21	4.00
Ardahan	0.37	0.007	0.621	1.00	0.369	3.00	2.86	5.00
Artvin	0.73	0.034	0.000	4.00	0.334	.	4.64	4.50
Bilecik	0.70	.	0.000	2.00	0.340	5.00	3.64	2.75
Bitlis	0.33	0.017	0.030	.	0.287	3.80	.	4.75
Bolu	0.68	0.023	0.410	.	0.425	4.50	4.21	5.00
Burdur	0.51	0.01	0.077	3.00	0.460	4.00	4.14	3.50
Canakkale	0.64	0.02	0.176	5.00	0.362	3.80	4.07	3.00
Corum	.	.	.	4.00	0.419	.	4.14	.
Denizli	0.66	0.027	0.239	.	0.369	4.60	.	4.25
Giresun	0.65	.	.	4.00	0.415	.	4.86	.
Gumushane	.	.	.	3.00	0.391	.	3.83	.
Kahramanmaraş	0.78	0.024	0.450	3.50	0.400	5.00	4.64	4.00
Karabuk	0.76	0.0175	0.296	4.00	0.412	3.20	4.07	3.25
Karaman	0.77	0.0057	0.200	3.00	0.294	4.80	3.57	1.00
Kars	0.80	0.0131	0.000	3.00	0.381	3.40	3.64	3.50
Kastamonu	0.58	.	0.000	5.00	0.355	4.80	4.57	4.00
Kutahya	.	.	.	5.00	0.344	.	4.14	.
Manisa	0.84	.	0.300	5.00	0.413	4.60	4.93	4.50
Mardin	0.65	0.0027	0.000	1.00	0.346	4.20	4.21	4.75
Mugla	0.82	0.1395	0.195	3.00	0.414	4.60	5.00	4.00
Mus	0.68	.	0.000	1.00	0.307	4.40	4.00	4.50
Nigde	0.72	.	0.044	3.00	0.355	.	4.21	.
Rize	0.74	0.0488	0.100	.	0.502	4.40	.	.
Sivas	0.70	0.0187	0.555	4.00	0.435	4.20	4.07	4.75
Tokat	.	.	.	5.00	0.384	.	4.29	.
Trabzon	0.60	0.0085	0.614	2.00	0.458	5.00	4.64	5.00
Usak	0.78	0.0723	0.400	4.00	0.333	.	4.43	3.25

Van	.	.	.	1.00	0.362	.	2.79	.
Yozgat	0.80	0.1271	0.089	3.00	0.411	4.20	4.36	3.50

Decision-Making Capacity

provinces	DM1	DM2	DM3	DM4	DM5	DM6	DM7	DM8	DM9	DM10
Adiyaman	3.13	4.00	3.00	4.00	3.00	0.00	0.00	0.88	0.50	3449743.00
Afyonkarahisar	3.88	4.00	4.50	4.43	4.50	0.00	0.00	0.75	0.63	1169742.00
Aksaray	4.50	4.00	5.00	3.71	2.50	5.00	2.00	0.63	0.63	551612.00
Amasya	4.00	3.57	5.00	4.00	4.00	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.50	1961721.00
Ardahan	2.63	4.14	5.00	4.29	3.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.38	4914915.00
Artvin	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	2.50	0.00	0.00	0.75	0.50	2543869.00
Bilecik	3.63	3.71	3.50	3.57	2.00	4.00	2.00	0.38	0.25	966902.00
Bitlis	.	4.00	.	4.14	.	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.38	8373694.00
Bolu	4.38	3.50	4.00	.	3.50	1.00	1.00	0.75	0.50	569875.00
Burdur	4.38	4.29	4.00	4.00	3.50	0.00	0.00	0.88	0.50	2867540.00
Canakkale	4.00	3.14	4.00	4.29	4.00	12.00	1.00	0.75	0.63	448494.00
Corum	.	.	4.00	.	2.00	.	.	0.50	0.88	1484275.00
Denizli	.	4.00	.	4.57	.	12.00	1.00	0.75	0.50	319202.00
Giresun	.	.	5.00	.	4.00	.	.	0.00	0.50	1616509.00
Gumushane	.	.	.	.	3.00	.	.	0.25	0.38	3340409.00
Kahramanmaraş	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.71	5.00	2.00	2.00	0.50	0.75	362258.00
Karabuk	3.38	2.71	4.00	3.86	3.50	3.00	0.00	0.75	0.88	1685665.00
Karaman	3.88	4.00	5.00	2.43	3.50	4.00	1.00	0.88	0.50	1162660.00
Kars	3.00	2.86	4.00	3.29	3.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	3481300.00
Kastamonu	4.50	3.43	4.50	3.57	4.50	1.00	.	0.75	0.38	2942933.00
Kutahya	.	.	4.00	.	3.00	.	.	0.63	0.88	2550939.00
Manisa	4.63	5.00	5.00	4.14	4.50	.	2.00	0.63	0.75	467635.00
Mardin	3.50	3.14	5.00	4.29	5.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	1702479.00
Mugla	4.00	4.29	4.00	5.00	4.50	3.00	2.00	0.50	0.63	2604425.00
Mus	3.50	3.29	4.50	3.57	2.50	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.50	5949733.00
Nigde	4.00	4.71	3.00	4.43	3.00	1.00	1.00	0.83	0.63	795495.00
Rize	.	.	.	.	.	1.00	1.00	0.83	0.50	1568630.00
Sivas	4.50	3.14	5.00	3.29	5.00	0.00	0.00	0.75	0.83	388966.00
Tokat	.	.	.	.	1.50	.	.	0.50	0.38	2053151.00

Trabzon	4.88	3.57	5.00	4.57	4.00	1.00	1.00	0.83	0.63	453182.00
Usak	3.88	3.86	4.50	4.57	2.00	0.00	1.00	0.83	0.83	576835.00
Van	.	.	3.50	.	4.00	.	.	0.00	0.25	3113899.00
Yozgat	3.50	3.00	4.50	4.14	3.50	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.25	5514491.00

Implementation Capacity

provinces	**IMP1**	**IMP2**	**IMP3**	**IMP4**	**IMP5**	**IMP6**	**IMP7**	**IMP8**	**IMP9**	**IMP10**	**IMP11**	**IMP12**	**IMP13**	**IMP14**
Adiyaman	4.00	9.00	4.00	3.33	3.33	3.41	1.62	1.17	0.09	0.10	0.00	3.14	3.25	32
Afyonkarahisar	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.67	4.33	3.34	4.35	1.30	0.21	0.12	0.00	3.43	4.50	86
Aksaray	4.00	9.00	4.00	4.00	2.67	3.49	2.41	1.75	0.13	0.02	0.00	3.14	4.00	9
Amasya	4.00	4.00	3.50	4.67	3.33	3.86	4	1.02	0.16	0.07	1.49	4.15	4.00	20
Ardahan	4.00	4.00	1.50	3.67	3.33	2.4	1.33	0.75	0.07	0.15	0.00	3.71	3.25	17
Artvin	4.00	14.00	5.00	4.67	3.33	3.28	3.75	0.87	0.16	0.24	0.84	4.14	4.00	7
Bilecik	4.00	9.00	3.00	3.67	3.00	.	.	.	.	.	0.00	2.57	3.00	20
Bitlis	4.00	4.00	.	.	4.00	3.19	3.6	1.91	0.12	0.17	0.07	.	3.75	0
Bolu	4.00	9.00	3.50	.	.	3	3.92	1.09	0.08	0.03	0.74	.	.	5
Burdur	4.00	9.00	4.00	4.33	3.33	3.29	2.29	1.57	0.19	0.40	1.44	3.43	3.25	0
Canakkale	4.00	10.00	4.00	4.33	4.00	2.82	4.18	1.54	0.13	0.36	0.25	3.15	3.50	200
Corum	4.00	4.00	3.50	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.26	.	.	.	3
Denizli	4.00	2.00	.	.	4.67	2.86	4.05	1.32	0.20	0.02	0.00	.	3.75	147
Giresun	4.00	4.00	4.50	.	.	.	.	1.43	0.07	.	.	.	.	94
Gumushane	4.00	14.00	4.00	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Kahramanmaraş	4.00	10.00	4.00	4.67	4.67	3.05	3.92	1.84	0.15	0.21	3.17	4.57	3.75	32
Karabuk	3.00	4.00	4.50	4.67	1.67	2.03	4.18	1.55	0.10	0.02	1.88	4.71	5.00	.
Karaman	6.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	2.33	3.19	2.48	1.35	0.15	0.30	0.06	2.86	2.00	24
Kars	4.00	4.00	3.50	3.67	2.67	3.51	1.59	2.20	.	0.25	1.34	3.28	2.75	30
Kastamonu	4.00	14.00	4.50	4.00	4.00	3.08	2.75	.	0.09	0.15	1.04	3.57	3.75	16
Kutahya	5.00	9.00	3.50	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Manisa	4.00	4.00	4.50	4.67	3.33	.	.	2.26	0.25	0.14	1.82	2.43	3.00	10
Mardin	4.00	4.00	3.50	4.33	4.33	3.44	1.47	2.11	0.21	0.11	1.46	4.43	4.00	20

Mugla	5.00	14.00	5.00	5.00	4.67	2.39	4.36	1.68	0.19	0.38	0.00	4.00	4.50	13
Mus	4.00	9.00	3.50	3.33	2.33	3.34	3.88	0.90	0.05	0.01	0.00	3.00	3.25	0
Nigde	3.00	4.00	4.50	3.67	3.67	2.83	4.6	2.14	0.20	0.48	0.00	3.15	4.00	0
Rize	4.00	9.00	.	.	.	2.59	3.35	2.54	0.28	0.23	1.82	.	4.00	104
Sivas	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.33	3.00	4.02	4.76	0.93	0.15	0.24	2.20	3.43	4.50	200
Tokat	6.00	9.00	3.00	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Trabzon	6.00	4.00	4.00	4.67	4.00	3.43	4.27	1.40	0.00	0.02	1.26	4.86	3.50	37
Usak	4.00	9.00	3.00	4.33	3.33	2.84	1.3	1.34	0.13	0.45	.	3.71	4.50	78
Van	1.00	1.00	3.00	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Yozgat	4.00	9.00	4.00	4.33	3.33	3.86	2.6	1.13	0.33	0.09	1.44	3.71	4.00	2

Other Variables

provinces	**INF**	**POP**	**PolDiv**	**Party**	**Dev**	**INF**
Adiyaman	2.625	217,463	1	0.49	-0.960	2.625
Afyonkarahisar	3.5	186,991	1	0.48	-0.080	3.5
Aksaray	3.25	186,599	1	0.58	-0.367	3.25
Amasya	3.5	91,874	1	0.40	0.051	3.5
Ardahan	2.125	19,075	1	0.37	-1.138	2.125
Artvin	2.571	25,771	0	0.44	-0.105	2.571
Bilecik	3.875	51,260	1	0.38	0.363	3.875
Bitlis	.	46,111	1	0.43	-1.400	.
Bolu	3.25	131,264	1	0.43	0.639	3.25
Burdur	3.75	72,377	1	0.40	0.368	3.75
Canakkale	3.25	111,137	0	0.39	0.600	3.25
Corum	1.875	231,146	1	0.46	-0.241	1.875
Denizli	.	525,497	1	0.40	0.912	.
Giresun	3.625	100,712	0	0.47	-0.256	3.625
Gumushane	2.750	32,444	0	0.42	-0.481	2.750
Kahramanmaraş	3.625	443,575	1	0.65	-0.468	3.625
Karabuk	2.000	110,537	0	0.31	0.292	2.000
Karaman	1.375	141,630	1	0.49	0.186	1.375
Kars	2.875	78,100	1	0.33	-1.092	2.875
Kastamonu	2.375	96,217	1	0.49	-0.147	2.375
Kutahya	3.750	224,898	1	0.62	0.020	3.750

Manisa	1.625	309,050	0	0.39	0.471	1.625
Mardin	2.250	86,948	1	0.45	-1.359	2.250
Mugla	1.250	64,706	0	0.46	1.049	1.250
Mus	3.125	81,764	1	0.51	-1.733	3.125
Nigde	3.875	118,186	1	0.40	-0.376	3.875
Rize	.	104,508	1	0.47	0.155	.
Sivas	3.000	312,587	0	0.51	-0.221	3.000
Tokat	2.125	132,437	1	0.50	-0.382	2.125
Trabzon	3.125	243,735	1	0.48	0.222	3.125
Usak	2.250	187,886	0	0.40	0.374	2.250
Van	2.250	370,190	0	0.54	-1.378	2.250
Yozgat	4.500	78,328	1	0.55	-0.608	4.500

STATA Do-File

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destring,replace

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ttest Dev == Dev0, unpaired

**** Cronsbachs alpha***

import excel "/Users/vjosamusliu/Desktop/REWORKED/Datalist (reworked2).xlsx", sheet("Cronbachs") firstrow

destring, replace

alpha Q111 Q112 Q114 Q115

alpha Q371 Q372 Q373 Q374 Q375 Q376 Q377

alpha Q271 Q272 Q273 Q274 Q275 Q276 Q277

alpha MQ13 Q243 Q244

alpha Q241 Q242 Q245

alpha MQ10 Q191 Q192 Q193 Q194 Q195 Q196

alpha Q201 Q202 Q203 Q204

alpha MQ241 MQ242 MQ243 MQ244 MQ245 MQ246 MQ247 MQ248

alpha Q71 Q72 Q73 Q74 Q75

alpha Q361 Q362 Q363 Q364 MQ91

**** Imputation***

import excel "/Users/vjosamusliu/Desktop/REWORKED/Datalist (reworked2).xlsx", sheet("Datalist") cellrange(A1:AM34) firstrow

destring, replace

summarize

impute MOB1 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iMOB1)

impute MOB2 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iMOB2)

impute MOB3 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iMOB3)

impute MOB4 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iMOB4)

impute MOB6 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iMOB6)

impute MOB7 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iMOB7)

impute MOB8 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iMOB8)

impute DM1 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iDM1)

impute DM2 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iDM2)
impute DM3 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iDM3)
impute DM4 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iDM4)
impute DM5 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iDM5)
impute DM6 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iDM6)
impute DM7 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iDM7)
impute IMP3 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP3)
impute IMP4 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP4)
impute IMP5 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP5)
impute IMP6 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP6)
impute IMP7 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP7)
impute IMP8 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP8)
impute IMP9 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP9)
impute IMP10 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP10)
impute IMP11 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP11)
impute IMP12 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP12)
impute IMP13 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP13)
impute IMP14 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP14)
impute INF MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iINF)

**** Check the results of imputed variables, change the negative values to 0, change the values above 5 to 5***
replace iMOB2 = 0 in 32
replace iMOB3 = 0 in 32
replace iMOB6 = 5 in 29
replace iDM3 = 5 in 29
replace iDM6 = 0 in 15
replace iDM7 = 0 in 32

**** Harman's Test***
factor iMOB4 iMOB6-iMOB8 iDM1-iDM5 iIMP3-iIMP7 iIMP12 iIMP13

****Normality***
sktest MOB1-IMP14
histogram MOB1, frequency normal
histogram MOB2, frequency normal
histogram MOB3, frequency normal
histogram MOB4, frequency normal

histogram MOB5, frequency normal
histogram MOB6, frequency normal
histogram MOB7, frequency normal
histogram MOB8, frequency normal
histogram DM1, frequency normal
histogram DM2, frequency normal
histogram DM3, frequency normal
histogram DM4, frequency normal
histogram DM5, frequency normal
histogram DM6, frequency normal
histogram DM7, frequency normal
histogram DM8, frequency normal
histogram DM9, frequency normal
histogram DM10, frequency normal
histogram IMP1, discreet frequency normal
histogram IMP2, frequency normal
histogram IMP3, frequency normal
histogram IMP4, frequency normal
histogram IMP5, frequency normal
histogram IMP6, frequency normal
histogram IMP7, frequency normal
histogram IMP8, frequency normal
histogram IMP9, frequency normal
histogram IMP10, frequency normal
histogram IMP11, frequency normal
histogram IMP12, frequency normal
histogram IMP13, frequency normal
histogram IMP14, frequency normal

**** Linearity***
graph matrix iMOB1-iMOB4 MOB5 iMOB6-iMOB8, half
graph matrix iDM1-iDM7 DM8-DM10, half
graph matrix IMP1 IMP2 iIMP3-iIMP14, half

****Polychoric Correlation***
polychoric iMOB1-iMOB4 MOB5 iMOB6-iMOB8
polychoric iDM1-iDM7 DM8-DM10

polychoric IMP1 IMP2 iIMP3-iIMP14

Bartlett's & KMO

ssc install factortest

factortest(iMOB1 iMOB2 iMOB3 iMOB4 MOB5 iMOB6 iMOB7 iMOB8)

factortest(iDM1-iDM7 DM8-DM10)

factortest(IMP1 IMP2 iIMP3-iIMP14)

factortest (iMOB1 iMOB2 iMOB3 iMOB4 iMOB6 iMOB7 iMOB8)

MOB factor

factor iMOB1-iMOB2 iMOB4 MOB5 iMOB6-iMOB8

screeplot

predict Factor1

rename Factor1 MOB

lab var MOB MOB

DM factor

factor iDM1-iDM7 DM8-DM10

screeplot

predict Factor1

rename Factor1 DM

lab var DM DM

IMP factor

factor (IMP1 IMP2 iIMP3-iIMP14),factor(3)

screeplot

rotate, varimax horst blanks(.3)

predict Factor1

rename Factor1 IMP

lab var IMP IMP

*** significance of corr.***

pwcorr MOB DM IMP,sig

*** Descriptive statistics***

sum MOB DM IMP DEC Dev iINF POP PolDiv Party

polychoric MOB DM IMP DEC Dev iINF POP PolDiv Party

```
scatter DM POP || lfit DM POP
gen lnPOP= ln(POP)
lab var lnPOP lnPOP
scatter DM lnPOP || lfit DM lnPOP
gen logDec = log(DEC/(1-DEC))
lab var logDec logDec
gen logParty = log(Party/(1-Party))
lab var logParty logParty
polychoric MOB DM IMP logDec Dev iINF lnPOP PolDiv logParty
```

Linearity

```
graph matrix MOB DM IMP logDec Dev iINF lnPOP PolDiv logParty,half
```

Normality for Dependent and Independent Variables

```
qnorm MOB
graph box MOB
qnorm DM
graph box DM
qnorm IMP
graph box IMP
qnorm Dev
graph box Dev
qnorm logDec
graph box logDec
qnorm lnPOP
graph box lnPOP
sktest MOB
summarize MOB, detail
ksmirnov MOB = normal((MOB+8.78E-09)/0.918457)
```

**** Multiple regressions***

```
gen MOBxDM= MOB*DM
gen MOBxIMP= MOB*IMP
gen DMxIMP= DM*IMP
gen MOBxDMxIMP= MOB*DM*IMP
regress logDec MOB DM IMP MOBxDM MOBxIMP DMxIMP MOBxDMxIMP
regress logDec MOB DM IMP
```

```
regress logDec MOB DM IMP MOBxDM MOBxIMP DMxIMP MOBxDMxIMP Dev

regress logDec MOB DM IMP MOBxDM MOBxIMP DMxIMP MOBxDMxIMP Dev iINF lnPOP PolDiv logParty

regress logDec MOB DM IMP MOBxDM MOBxIMP DMxIMP MOBxDMxIMP Dev iINF

regress logDec Dev

predict resid, residuals

pwcorr logDec Dev iINF resid, sig


*Control of MOBxDMxIMP

scatter MOBxDMxIMP logDec || lfit MOBxDMxIMP logDec

regress logDec MOB DM IMP MOBxDM MOBxIMP DMxIMP MOBxDMxIMP Dev if MOBxDMxIMP>-4


*Multicollinearity

estat vif


*Goodness of fit

estat ic


*Diagnostic test for hetereskodasticity

hettest MOB DM IMP MOBxDM MOBxIMP DMxIMP MOBxDMxIMP Dev iINF


*Influential Cases

lvr2plot, mlabel(provinces)

predict d1, cooksd

clist provinces d1 if d1>4/33, noobs

predict rstudent, rstudent

clist provinces rstudent if rstudent>3

clist provinces rstudent if rstudent<-3

predict leverage, leverage

clist provinces leverage if leverage >18/33

dfbeta

clist provinces _dfbeta_1 if _dfbeta_1 >2/sqrt(33)


*Standardized Betas

regress logDec MOB DM IMP MOBxDM MOBxIMP DMxIMP MOBxDMxIMP Dev iINF, beta
```

Translation Of The Survey Questions

Survey I- For the mayors

1) Below are some questions on your personal profile. Please fill in the required fields and provide explanation if necessary.

What is your last degree obtained? (elementary, junior high, high school, university, vocational school, masters, doctorate)	
For how many years are you a mayor?	
Did you work as manager in a municipality before being elected as mayor?	

2) Does your municipality have a communication plan? Please mark the appropriate response.

YES	NO	I DON'T KNOW

3) This purpose of this question is to learn the structure of the information pathways in your municipality. Please fill in the required fields and provide explanation if necessary. For some question, you are asked to provide an approximate value. For these questions, please indicate a range which corresponds best to your answer.

How many regular meetings do you have per month with the municipal committee?	
How many regular meetings do you have per month with the directors of departments?	
How many regular meetings do you have per month with the elected councillors?	
How many meetings do you have approximately per year with the representatives of the central government?	
How many meetings do you have approximately per year with the governor of your province?	
Approximately, how many petitions are you receiving per month from the elected councillors?	
Approximately, how many days do you need to respond to the petitions from the elected councillors?	
How many regular meetings do you have per year with the Urban Council?	
How do you describe the approach of civil society organisations participating in the meetings with the Urban Council? (e.g. open to cooperation, critical, constructive, destructive …etc.)	
How many meetings do you have approximately per year with muhtars?	

4) Please indicate the importance of communication with the actors by providing a value between 1 and 5. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 indicates “the least important” and the value 5 indicates “the most important”.

	Scale				
	Least important				**Most important**
1. Municipal Assembly	1	2	3	4	5
2. Urban Council	1	2	3	4	5
3. Representatives of central government	1	2	3	4	5
4. Private sector organisations in locality	1	2	3	4	5
5. Muhtars	1	2	3	4	5
6. Unions of municipalities	1	2	3	4	5
7. Civil Society Organisations	1	2	3	4	5
8. Governor	1	2	3	4	5

5) Which channels do you use most on your communication with the representatives of the central government? Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 indicates “the least” and the value 5 indicates “the most”.

	Scale				
	Least				Most
1. Personal direct communication	1	2	3	4	5
2. Via the affiliated political party	1	2	3	4	5
3. Via the union of municipalities.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Via the agents of central government in the province.	1	2	3	4	5

6) This question is about the participants in strategic planning and their methods of participation. Please, mark the boxes with 'X' to indicate the actors who participated in strategic planning and their methods of participation. It is possible to mark more than one box for each actor. Empty boxes will be interpreted as the corresponding participation did not take place in strategic planning.

		METHOD OF PARTICIPATION			
		Face to face meeting	Group meetings	Survey	Other (Please specify)
PARTICIPA	Elected Councillors				
	Municipal Committee				
	Deputy Mayors				

N T S					
	Directors				
	Non-executive municipal personnel				
	Members of Urban Council				
	Muhtars				
	Residents/ Citizens				

7) Did you receive any consultancy services during the preparation of the strategic plan? Please mark the appropriate answer. If your answer is ‘Yes’, please state the extent of the consultancy service.

YES (please explain)	**NO**

8) Did you conduct citizen polls or surveys to realise citizen participation in strategic planning? Please mark the appropriate answer.

YES	NO	I DON'T KNOW

9) This question is about your evaluation of the planning structure of your municipality. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 indicates "weak or least" and the value 5 indicates "perfect or most".

	Scale				
	Weak				**perfect**
1. The success of your last strategic planning process	1	2	3	4	5
2. The adequacy of current guidelines on strategic planning	1	2	3	4	5
3. The importance of the strategic plan on the municipality's functioning	1	2	3	4	5
4. The importance of performance reports on political decisions of high importance (i.e. investments, appointment in high ranking positions, decisions on budget limits)	1	2	3	4	5
5. The importance of Urban Council's proposals on designating the municipal programme	1	2	3	4	5
6. The importance of muhtars' proposals on designating the municipal programme	1	2	3	4	5

10) Do you have a human resource management system in your municipality? If yes please rate the effectiveness of this system by giving a value between 1 and 5 to evaluate. The value 1 indicates "the least effective" and the value 5 indicates "the most effective".

YES (please give a number between 1 and 5)	NO

11) Did the head of departments and/or other managers receive an occupational training during your presidency? If yes, how many occupational trainings took place in last year?

12) Do your directors and deputy mayors take enough initiatives? Please give a value between 1 and 5 to evaluate. The value 1 indicates "weak" and the value 5 indicates "perfect".

Deputy Mayors	
Directors	

13) How do you assess the level of cooperation among your departments? Please give a value between 1 and 5 to evaluate. The value 1 indicates "the least" and the value 5 indicates "the most". If you think, the level of cooperation is insufficient, please indicate the reasons.

14) Is there an awarding system for your municipality personnel? If yes, please explain briefly this system.

15) Are there regular staff satisfaction surveys in your municipality? If yes, how often do you conduct satisfaction surveys?

16) Are there occasional social events organised for your personnel? If yes, how often do you organise?

17) Which of these sources do you use to supply your municipality's material needs? Please mark with 'X' the sources that you use.

State Supply Office	
Municipal enterprises	
Other municipalities	
Private sector organisations	

18) Please rate the adequacy of equipment on the public service areas given below. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 indicates "weak" and the value 5 indicates "perfect".

	Scale				
	Weak				**perfect**
1. Construction	1	2	3	4	5
2. Water and sanitation services	1	2	3	4	5
3. Transport	1	2	3	4	5
4. Environment and environmental health, waste collection and hygiene.	1	2	3	4	5

5. Police, fire service, emergency, rescue and ambulance services.	1	2	3	4	5
6. Urban traffic	1	2	3	4	5
7. Burial and cemetery services	1	2	3	4	5
8. Parks and recreation	1	2	3	4	5
9. Housing	1	2	3	4	5
10. Culture and art	1	2	3	4	5
11. Tourism	1	2	3	4	5
12. Sports and youth activities	1	2	3	4	5
13. Social aids and services	1	2	3	4	5
14. Promotion of local economy and trade activities	1	2	3	4	5

19) Please rate the importance of the sources given below on meeting the material needs of your municipality. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 indicates "least important" and the value 5 indicates "most important".

	Scale				
	Least important				**Most important**
1. State Supply Office	1	2	3	4	5

2. Municipal enterprises	1	2	3	4	5
3. Other municipalities	1	2	3	4	5
4. Private sector organisations	1	2	3	4	5

20) Do you have unofficial partnerships with other municipalities? Please mark the appropriate answer.

YES	NO	I DON'T KNOW

21) How sufficient are your financial resources to cover the municipal services? Please give a value between 1 and 5 to evaluate. The value 1 indicates "least sufficient" and the value 5 indicates "most sufficient".

22) How important the sources given below on the debt acquisition of your municipality? Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 indicates "the least important" and the value 5 indicates "the most important".

	Scale

	Least important				Most important
1. Central government	1	2	3	4	5
2. Municipal enterprises	1	2	3	4	5
3. Private sector organisations	1	2	3	4	5
4. Bank of Provinces	1	2	3	4	5
5. National and International Banks	1	2	3	4	5
6. Other municipalities	1	2	3	4	5

23) If you have an additional 1 Million Turkish Lira to spend on freely on the municipal services, how would you allocate this amount on the municipal services? Please fill in the amount for the service areas that you wish to allocate money, without exceeding the total sum of 1 Million Turkish Lira.

Service Areas	**Amount (TL)**
Administrative & General	
Economical activities	

Construction	
Environment Preservation	
Education	
Sports, Culture, Entertainments	
Religion	
Public Security & Order	
Health	
Social Aid	

24) This question aims to learn the influence of central government and/or its provincial organisations on your municipality. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 indicates "the least important" and the value 5 indicates "the most important".

	Scale

	minimum				maximum
1. The influence on delivery of municipal services	1	2	3	4	5
2. The influence on administrative activities	1	2	3	4	5
3. The influence on decision-making about municipal services	1	2	3	4	5
4. The influence on partnerships with other local administrations, private sector organisations and civil society organisations	1	2	3	4	5
5. The influence on own-source revenues	1	2	3	4	5
6. The influence on grants and aids for your municipality	1	2	3	4	5
7. The influence on the debts and loans of your municipality	1	2	3	4	5
8. The influence on the municipality's investments	1	2	3	4	5

25) This is an open-ended question about your assessment on the adequacy of your municipality's capacity. Please state below your opinion about the adequacy of your municipality's capacity.

Survey II- For the deputy mayors

1) This question is about the value of the municipality's immovable. Please, fill in the value of immovable according to 2012 numbers.

	Değer (TL)
Total value of immovable owned by the municipality	
The reveue earned from immovable in 2012	

2) What is the rate of property tax collection in 2012? Please state the percentage of property tax collection on registered residents in your municipality according to 2012 data.

3) According to the last budget report, what is the amount of the municipality's revenue and expenditure? Please fill in.

	Amount(TL)
Total revenue	
Total expenditure	

4) This question is about the debt structure of your municipality. Please fill in according to 2012 data.

	Amount(TL)
Total debt owned by the municipality	
Total debt with a due date in a year	

5) For which expense items are you utilising the municipal debts? Please mark with 'X' the appropriate responses.

Administrative costs	
Current expense of public services	
Infrastructure investments	
Superstructure investments	
Financial investments to raise revenues	

6) This question is about the structure of your municipal enterprises. Please fill in and provide explanation if necessary.

The number of municipal enterprises	
The total value of your municipal enterprises (in case you don't have actual numbers, please indicate an approximate value)	

7) This question is about the adequacy of the physical conditions and equipment in your municipality. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 indicates "weak or least" and the value 5 indicates "perfect or most".

	Scale				
	Weak				**perfect**
1. Computers and computer hardware	1	2	3	4	5
2. Technical equipment and machinery	1	2	3	4	5

3.	Internet connection and computer software	1	2	3	4	5
4.	Physical conditions of civil servant's offices	1	2	3	4	5
5.	Physical conditions of manager's offices.	1	2	3	4	5

8) How many public bid opening did you have since January 2012 for public procurement? What is the total value of the public bids?

Number of public bid opening in 2012	
The total value of public bids in TL	

9) Do you have municipal partnership established to meet the material needs of your municipality? If your answer is yes, please circle the appropriate value which best presents your judgement on the importance of these partnerships on meeting the material needs. The value 1 indicates “the least important” and the value 5 indicates “the most important”.

YES					NO	I DON'T KNOW
1	2	3	4	5		

10) What are the reasons of avoiding the partnerships with other municipalities? Please mark the options which correspond to your opinion.

Current law is not clear about municipal partnerships.	☐
No adequate personnel capacity to contribute to municipal partnerships	☐
No adequate budget for municipal partnerships	☐
No municipality on the area where we want partnerships	☐
Not avoiding from municipal partnerships	☐
Other (please specify)	

11) This question is about the effectiveness of public procurement processes. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 indicates "weak or least" and the value 5 indicates "perfect or most".

	Scale				
	Weak				**perfect**
1. Swiftness of public procurement	1	2	3	4	5

2. Sufficiency of public procurement to meet the municipality's needs.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Adequacy of current legislation	1	2	3	4	5
4. Competence of municipal personnel on public procurement processes.	1	2	3	4	5
5. Competence in e-procurement options	1	2	3	4	5

12) This question is about the personnel structure in your municipality. Please fill in and provide explanation if necessary.

Total number of municipal personnel	
Number of civil servants	
Number of contracted personnel	
Number of workers	
Number of norm cadre personnel	
Number of municipal personnel employed in municipal enterprises	

13) This question is about the attribute of the municipal personnel. Please fill in and provide explanation if necessary.

Total number of permanent and contracted personnel in technical services	
Number of personnel with a postgrad degree or an equivalent degree from vocational school	
Number of women personnel	
Number of women managers (i.e. deputy mayors and directors)	

14) This question is about the experience of your personnel in occupation. Please indicate the number of personnel for each range of years in employment.

Total number of years in employment	**Number of personnel**
0-5 years	
5-10 years	
10-15 years	
15-20 years	
20 + years	

15) This question is about the experience of your directors in occupation. Please indicate the number of personnel for each range of years in employment.

Total number of years in employment	**Number of personnel**
0-5 years	
5-10 years	
10-15 years	
15-20 years	
20 + years	

16) Is there a particular unit in the municipality responsible to monitor the training needs? Please mark the appropriate response.

YES	NO	I DON'T KNOW

17) Do you have a municipal training programme for your personnel? Please mark the appropriate response.

YES	NO	I DON'T KNOW

18) What is the total amount of training provided to municipal personnel in 2012? What is the total number of participants to the trainings?

Total hours of training	
Total number of participants	

19) This question is about your evaluation of the human resource management in your municipality. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 indicates "weak or least" and the value 5 indicates "perfect or most".

	Scale

	weak				perfect
1. Sufficiency of HR management system	1	2	3	4	5
2. Coherence of the HR management plans with the municipality's needs	1	2	3	4	5
3. Competence of the HR department	1	2	3	4	5
4. Implementation of HR strategies	1	2	3	4	5
5. Monitoring and assessing the training need,	1	2	3	4	5
6. Trainings meet the municipality's needs	1	2	3	4	5

20) This question is about your evaluation of employment policies in your municipality. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 indicates "weak or least" and the value 5 indicates "perfect or most".

	Scale				
	weak				perfect
1. Sufficiency in personnel number	1	2	3	4	5
2. Sufficiency in qualified personnel number,	1	2	3	4	5

3. Efficiency of employment policies	1	2	3	4	5
4. Match of new recruits the job criteria	1	2	3	4	5

21) Do you have a specific budget allocated for personnel training? If your answer is yes, please indicate the amount allocated.

YES (please indicate the amount allocated)	**NO**

22) Do you adopt performance criteria in your municipality? If your answer is yes, please mark the options where you adopt performance criteria.

Salary payment	
Promotion decision	
Contract renewal	
Performance criteria are not used	

23) Is there a term of reference for departments to avoid of duplication of work? Please mark the appropriate response.

YES	**NO**	**I DON'T KNOW**

24) This question is about your evaluation of the management systems in your municipality. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 indicates “weak or least” and the value 5 indicates “perfect or most”.

	Scale				
	weak				**perfect**
1. Practices to increase motivation among staff	1	2	3	4	5
2. Training on leadership and management	1	2	3	4	5
3. Collaboration and harmony between deputy mayors and directors	1	2	3	4	5
4. Collaboration and harmony between mayor and deputy mayors	1	2	3	4	5
5. Practices to increase initiative taking in directors and other personnel	1	2	3	4	5

25) Is there a particular unit in the municipality responsible for interdepartmental communication? Please mark the appropriate response.

YES	**NO**	**I DON’T KNOW**

26) Do you have an information sharing system in your municipality? If yes, please indicate who can reach this system.

Mayor	
Deputy Mayors	

Directors	
Civil servants	

27) This question is about your evaluation of the communication systems in your municipality. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 indicates “weak or least” and the value 5 indicates “perfect or most”.

	Scale				
	weak				**perfect**
1. Communication among departments	1	2	3	4	5
2. Communication between deputy mayors and directors	1	2	3	4	5
3. Share of information inside the municipality	1	2	3	4	5
4. Adequacy of IT systems	1	2	3	4	5
5. Storing of information	1	2	3	4	5
6. Division of work and collaboration among departments	1	2	3	4	5
7. Communication between civil servants and councillors	1	2	3	4	5

28) How many meetings do you organise per month with directors? Please provide explanations if necessary.

29) Do you have guidelines or trainings for the elected councillors on how to engage in communication with municipal personnel? Please mark the appropriate response.

YES	NO	I DON'T KNOW

30) Do you have guidelines or trainings for the elected councillors on how to engage in communication with citizens? Please mark the appropriate response.

YES	NO	I DON'T KNOW

31) Is there a desk for citizens to appeal their complaints and requests? Please mark the appropriate response.

YES	NO	I DON'T KNOW

32) Is there an electronic registry system to store the complaints received from citizens? Please mark the appropriate response.

YES	NO	I DON'T KNOW

33) How many citizen polls did you undertake in 2012?

34) How many spreadsheets did you disperse in 2012 via your website or on hand?

35) Did you allocate a specific amount for 'Information and Technology' on your last budget? If your answer is yes, please indicate the amount allocated.

YES (please indicate the amount allocated)	**NO**

36) This question is about your evaluation of the strategic planning process. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 indicates "weak or least" and the value 5 indicates "perfect or most".

	Scale				
	weak				**perfect**
1. Describing the vision, mission and strategic goals	1	2	3	4	5
2. Identifying measurable outputs and performance indicators for goals	1	2	3	4	5
3. Monitoring the implementation of the strategic plan	1	2	3	4	5
4. Evaluation of the implementation of the strategic plan	1	2	3	4	5

37) This question is about your evaluation of the budget planning process. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 indicates "weak or least" and the value 5 indicates "perfect or most".

	Scale				
	weak				**perfect**
1. Timing in budget planning	1	2	3	4	5
2. Integration of budget plans with performance plans	1	2	3	4	5
3. Implementation of performance criteria on budget negotiations	1	2	3	4	5
4. Coherence with strategic planning	1	2	3	4	5
5. Integration of activity-based costing, feasibility analysis, risk assessment and cost accounting in budget plans	1	2	3	4	5
6. Adequacy of equipment to monitor and assess performances	1	2	3	4	5
7. Adequacy of e-budget system	1	2	3	4	5

Original Surveys

Bu çalışma, Belçika'da bulunan Katholieke Leuven Üniversitesi'nin bünyesindeki bir doktora projesinin parçası olarak, Türkiye Belediyeler Birliği'nin işbirliğiyle yürütülmektedir. Yürütülen çalışma, yerel yönetimlerin yetkileri ve kapasiteleri arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemeye yöneliktir. Bu amaçla Türkiye'deki 65 il belediyesine yönelik bir anket çalışması gerçekleştirilmektedir. Çalışma kapsamında, 65 belediye başkanı ve her belediyeden bir başkan yardımcısı için iki ayrı anket formu hazırlanmıştır. Anket formlarının belediye başkanı ve belediye başkanlarından biri tarafından doldurulması beklenmektedir.

Bu çalışma 2014 yılından itibaren büyükşehir belediyesi statüsü kazanacak olan, 13 il belediyesini de içermektedir. Anketteki sorular belediyelerin şu andaki mevcut kapasitelerini ölçmeyi hedeflemekte olup, büyükşehir belediyesi olacak il belediyeleri de bu araştırma kapsamında değerlendirilecektir.

Anket için verilen cevapların her biri sadece bu araştırma kapsamında kullanılacaktır ve anketi dolduranların izni alınmadan hiçbir şekilde üçüncü kişilere bilgiler verilmeyecektir. Anket sonuçları istatistiki veriler için kullanılacak olup kişisel bilgiler anonim kalacaktır.

Anket soruları, belediyenizin personel, yönetim, iletişim, planlama ve donanım yeterlilikleriyle ilgili sorulardan oluşmakta olup, belediye başkanları ve başkan yardımcıları için ayrı sorular olarak hazırlanmıştır. Anket sorularının çoğu sizlerden bu alanlarla ilgili değerlendirmelerinizi istemekte olup, sorular seçmeli ve doldurmalı olarak hazırlanmıştır.

Anket sorularıyla ilgili her türlü önerileriniz ve sorularınız için anketin en son sayfasında, anketi yürüten kişinin iletişim bilgilerini bulabilirsiniz. Ayrıca katkılarınız ve düşünceleriniz bu çalışmanın geliştirilebilmesi için son derece önemli olup, anket yürütücüsü nezdinde son derece kıymetlidir. Anketi lütfen doldurduktan sonra paketin içinden çıkan zarfa koyup, yazılı adrese postalayınız.

Şimdiden işbirliğiniz ve ilginiz için çok teşekkür ederim.

1

BELEDİYE BAŞKANLARI TARAFINDAN DOLDURULACAKTIR

2

1) Aşağıda, şahsınıza yönelik sorular bulunmaktadır. Lütfen aşağıdaki kısımları, gerekli açıklamaları yaparak doldurunuz.

En son mezun olduğunuz okul nedir? (ilkokul, ortaokul, lise, meslek okulu, üniversite, yüksek lisans, doktora)	
Kaç senedir belediye başkanlığı yapıyorsunuz?	
Belediye başkanı olmadan önce herhangi bir belediyede yöneticilik yaptınız mı?	

2) Belediyenizin bir iletişim planı bulunmakta mıdır? Lütfen cevabınıza denk gelen seçeneği işaretleyin.

EVET	HAYIR	BİLMİYORUM

3) Bu soru belediyenizdeki iletişim kanallarının yapısını öğrenmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen aşağıdaki kısımları gerekli açıklamaları yaparak doldurunuz. Bazı sorular sizden ortalama değer vermenizi istemektedir. Bu sorular için sayı aralığı da belirtebilirsiniz.

Belediye encümeniyle bir ayda düzenli olarak toplam kaç toplantı yapıyorsunuz?	

3

Müdürlüklerle bir ayda düzenli olarak toplam kaç toplantı yapıyorsunuz?	
Belediye meclis üyeleriyle bir ayda düzenli olarak toplam kaç toplantı yapıyorsunuz?	
Merkezi yönetim temsilcileriyle bir yıl içinde ortalama kaç toplantı gerçekleştiriyorsunuz?	
Bulunduğunuz ilin valiliğiyle bir yıl içinde ortalama kaç toplantı gerçekleştiriyorsunuz?	
Belediye meclisi üyelerinden bir ayda ortalama kaç adet şahsınıza yönelik dilekçe geliyor?	
Belediye meclisi üyelerinden gelen taleplere geri dönüşü ortalama kaç gün içinde gerçekleştiriyorsunuz?	
Kent konseyi üyeleriyle bir yılda içinde düzenli olarak kaç toplantı gerçekleştiriyorsunuz?	
Kent konseylerindeki sivil toplum kuruluşu temsilcilerinin görüşmelerinizdeki yaklaşımlarını nasıl tanımlarsınız? (örn. işbirliğine açık, eleştirel, yapıcı, yıkıcı...)	
Muhtarlarla bir yılda içinde düzenli olarak kaç toplantı gerçekleştiriyorsunuz?	

4) Lütfen aşağıdaki aktörlerle olan iletişimin önemini 1'le 5 arası bir rakam vererek değerlendiriniz. Lütfen aşağıdaki numaralar arasından değerlendirmenizi en iyi yansıtan numarayı yuvarlak içine alın. Verilen ölçeğe göre "1" en önemsiz, "5" en önemli olarak değerlendirilecektir.

	Ölçek				
	önemsiz		orta		önemli
1. Belediye meclisi	1	2	3	4	5
2. Kent konseyi	1	2	3	4	5
3. Merkezi yönetim temsilcileri	1	2	3	4	5
4. Yereldeki özel sektör kuruluşları	1	2	3	4	5
5. Muhtarlar	1	2	3	4	5
6. Belediye birlikleri	1	2	3	4	5
7. Sivil toplum kuruluşları	1	2	3	4	5
8. Valilik	1	2	3	4	5

5) Merkezi yönetim yetkilileriyle olan iletişiminizi en çok hangi kanallar vasıtasıyla gerçekleştiriyorsunuz? Lütfen aşağıdaki numaralar arasından değerlendirmenizi en iyi yansıtan numarayı yuvarlak içine alın. Verilen ölçeğe göre "1" en az, "5" en çok olarak değerlendirilecektir.

	Ölçek				
	az		Orta		çok
1. Bireysel iletişim	1	2	3	4	5
2. Üyesi olduğunuz siyasi parti aracılığıyla iletişim	1	2	3	4	5
3. Belediye birlikleri aracılığıyla iletişim	1	2	3	4	5
4. Taşra teşkilatı temsilcileri aracılığıyla iletişim	1	2	3	4	5

5

6) Bu soru belediyenizin stratejik planlama sürecine kimlerin, hangi kanallar vasıtasıyla dâhil olduğunu öğrenmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Aşağıdaki tablonun yatay olarak verilmiş kısmı planlama sürecine dâhil olan katılımcıları, düşey kısmı ise katılım yöntemini belirtmektedir. Eğer aşağıdaki aktörler stratejik planlama sürecine dâhil oldularsa, denk gelen kutucuklara çarpı (X) işareti koyunuz. Katılım yöntemi olarak birden çok kutucuğu işaretleyebilirsiniz. Boş olan kutucuklar belirtilen şekilde bir katılım gerçekleştirilmemiştir olarak yorumlanacaktır.

		KATILIM YONTEMI			
		Bireysel yüz yüze görüşme	Grup toplantıları	Anket	Diğer (Lütfen açıklayınız)
KATILIMCILAR	Belediye meclis üyeleri				
	Belediye Encümeni				
	Belediye başkan yardımcıları				
	Müdürler				
	Yönetici olmayan belediye personeli				
	Kent Konseyi üyeleri				

	Muhtarlar				
	Hemşeriler/ Vatandaşlar				

7) Stratejik planlama sırasında danışmanlık firmalarından herhangi bir danışmanlık hizmeti aldınız mı? Lütfen cevabınıza karşılık gelen kutucuğu işaretleyiniz. Eğer cevabınız 'evet' ise, lütfen bu hizmetin içeriğini açıklayınız.

EVET (lütfen açıklayınız)	HAYIR

8) Stratejik planlama sürecine halk katılımını gerçekleştirmek amacıyla kamuoyu yoklaması ya da anket gerçekleştirdiniz mi? Lütfen cevabınıza denk gelen seçeneği işaretleyin.

EVET	HAYIR	BİLMİYORUM

7

9) Aşağıda, belediyenizin planlama yapısıyla ilgili değerlendirmeleriniz sorulmaktadır. Lütfen aşağıdaki numaralar arasından değerlendirmenizi en iyi yansıtan numarayı yuvarlak içine alın. Verilen ölçeğe göre "1" zayıf, "5" mükemmel olarak değerlendirilecektir.

	Ölçek				
	zayıf		orta		mükemmel
1. Belediyenizin en son gerçekleştirdiği stratejik planlama sürecinin başarısı	1	2	3	4	5
2. Stratejik planlama süreci için mevcut olan yol gösterici kaynakların yeterliliği	1	2	3	4	5
3. Mevcut stratejik planın, belediyenizin gerçekleştirdiği çalışmalar için önemi	1	2	3	4	5
4. Performans raporlarının, belediyeniz için yüksek önemdeki politik kararlar (örn. yatırım harcamaları, önemli pozisyonlara atamalar, bütçe üst limitinin belirlenmesi) için önemi	1	2	3	4	5
5. Kent konseyi önerilerinin, belediye programını belirlemedeki önemi	1	2	3	4	5
6. Muhtarlardan gelen önerilerin, belediye programını belirlemedeki önemi	1	2	3	4	5

10) Belediyenizde insan kaynakları yönetimi için bir sistem kullanıyor musunuz? Eğer kullanıyorsanız, bu sistemin işlevselliğini, 1'le 5 arası bir rakam vererek değerlendiriniz. Değerlendirmenizi, "1" en işlevsiz, "5" en işlevli olarak gerçekleştiriniz.

EVET (lütfen bir rakam vererek değerlendiriniz)	**HAYIR**

11) Belediye başkanlığınız süresince, müdürler ve/veya diğer yöneticiler mesleki bir eğitime tâbi tutuldular mı? Eğer cevabınız evetse, son bir sene içinde kaç eğitim gerçekleştirildi?

12) Sizce, müdürleriniz ve başkan yardımcılarınız yeterince inisiyatif alıyorlar mı? Lütfen 1'le 5 arası bir rakam vererek değerlendiriniz. Değerlendirmenizi, "1" zayıf, "5" mükemmel olarak gerçekleştiriniz.

Başkan yardımcıları	
Müdürler	

13) Sizce belediyenizdeki müdürlükler arasındaki işbirliğinin düzeyi nasıl? Lütfen 1'le 5 arası bir rakam vererek değerlendiriniz. Değerlendirmenizi, "1" en yetersiz, "5" en yeterli olarak gerçekleştiriniz. Eğer müdürlükler arası işbirliğinin düzeyinin yetersiz olduğunu düşünüyorsanız, lütfen size göre nedenlerini açıklayınız.

14) Belediyenizde çalışanlara yönelik bir ödüllendirme sistemi bulunmakta mı? Varsa, bu ödüllendirme sisteminin nasıl olduğunu, lütfen açıklayınız.

15) Belediyenizde, düzenli olarak çalışanlara yönelik memnuniyet anketleri yapılıyor mu? Yapılıyorsa ne kadar sıklıkta yapıldığını lütfen açıklayınız.

16) Belediyenizde çalışanlara yönelik sosyal etkinlikler düzenleniyor mu? Düzenleniyorsa, ne kadar sıklıkta düzenlendiğini lütfen açıklayınız.

17) Aşağıda verilen kaynaklardan hangisi veya hangilerini belediyeniz için ihtiyaç duyduğunuz malzemelerin sağlanmasında kullanıyorsunuz? Lütfen ilgili kaynakları, denk gelen kutucuğa çarpı (X) işareti koyarak işaretleyiniz.

Devlet Malzeme Ofisi	
Belediyenize ait iştirakler	
Diğer belediyeler	
Ozel sektör kuruluşları	

18) Aşağıdaki hizmet alanlarındaki, belediyenizin donanım yeterliliğini değerlendiriniz. Lütfen aşağıdaki numaralar arasından değerlendirmenizi en iyi yansıtan numarayı yuvarlak içine alın. Verilen ölçeğe göre "1" zayıf, "5" mükemmel olarak değerlendirilecektir.

	Ölçek				
	Zayıf		Orta		Mükemmel
1. İmar	1	2	3	4	5
2. Su ve kanalizasyon servisleri	1	2	3	4	5
3. Ulaşım	1	2	3	4	5
4. Çevre ve çevre sağlığı, temizlik ve katı atık	1	2	3	4	5
5. Zabıta, itfaiye, acil yardım, kurtarma ve ambulans	1	2	3	4	5
6. Şehir içi trafik	1	2	3	4	5
7. Defin ve mezarlıklar	1	2	3	4	5
8. Ağaçlandırma, park ve yeşil alanlar	1	2	3	4	5
9. İskân	1	2	3	4	5
10. Kültür ve sanat	1	2	3	4	5
11. Turizm ve tanıtım	1	2	3	4	5

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12. Gençlik ve spor	1	2	3	4	5
13. Sosyal hizmet ve yardım	1	2	3	4	5
14. Ekonomi ve ticaret hizmetlerinin geliştirilmesi	1	2	3	4	5

19) Aşağıda verilen kaynaklar belediyenizin donanım ihtiyaçlarını karşılamada ne kadar önemli? Lütfen aşağıdaki numaralar arasından değerlendirmenizi en iyi yansıtan numarayı yuvarlak içine alın. Verilen ölçeğe göre "1" en önemsiz, "5" en önemli olarak değerlendirilecektir.

	Ölçek				
	Önemsiz		Orta		Önemli
1. Devlet Malzeme Ofisi	1	2	3	4	5
2. Belediyenize ait iştirakler	1	2	3	4	5
3. Diğer belediyeler	1	2	3	4	5
4. Özel sektör kuruluşları	1	2	3	4	5

20) Diğer yerel yönetimlerle resmi olmayan kanallar aracılığıyla işbirlikliği yapıyor musunuz? Lütfen cevabınıza denk gelen seçeneği işaretleyin.

EVET	HAYIR	BİLMİYORUM

21)Mevcut mali kaynaklarınız, belediye hizmetlerinizi karşılamada ne kadar yeterli? Lütfen 1'le 5 arası bir rakam vererek değerlendiriniz. Değerlendirmenizi, "1" en yetersiz, "5" en yeterli olarak gerçekleştiriniz.

22) Aşağıdaki kaynaklar, belediyenizin borçlarının finansmanında ne kadar önemli? Lütfen aşağıdaki numaralar arasından değerlendirmenizi en iyi yansıtan numarayı yuvarlak içine alın. Verilen ölçeğe göre "1" en önemsiz, "5" en önemli olarak değerlendirilecektir.

	Olçek				
	önemsiz		Orta		önemli
1. Merkezi yönetim	1	2	3	4	5
2. Belediyenize ait ekonomik iştirakler	1	2	3	4	5
3. Özel sektör kuruluşları	1	2	3	4	5
4. İller Bankası	1	2	3	4	5
5. Ulusal ve uluslararası bankalar	1	2	3	4	5
6. Diğer belediyeler	1	2	3	4	5

23)Size 1 milyon lira verseler ve bu parayı istediğiniz şekilde belediyenizin ihtiyaçları için kullanabileceğinizi söyleseler, aşağıdaki seçeneklerden hangilerine, ne miktarda kullanırdınız? Lütfen aşağıdaki alanların yanına toplamları 1 milyon lira olacak şekilde, arzu ettiğiniz para miktarını yazınız.

Hizmet Alanı	**Para Miktarı (TL)**
Idari ve genel hizmet faaliyetleri	
Ekonomi ile ilgili faaliyetler	
Imar faaliyetleri	
Çevre koruma	
Eğitim işleri (okul öncesi eğitim, mesleki eğitim kursları düzenleme, kütüphane açma...vs.)	
Eğlence, spor, kültür aktiviteleri	
Din hizmetleri	
Kamu güvenliği ve düzeni ile ilgili faaliyetler	
Sağlık hizmetleri	
Sosyal yardım faaliyetleri	

24) Bu soru merkezi yönetim ve/veya merkezi yönetimin taşra teşkilatlarının, belediyeniz üzerindeki etkisini ölçmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen aşağıdaki numaralar arasından değerlendirmenizi en iyi yansıtan numarayı yuvarlak içine alın. Verilen ölçeğe göre "1" en az, "5" en çok olarak değerlendirilecektir.

	Ölçek				
	az		orta		çok
1. Merkezi yönetim ve/veya taşra teşkilatlarının, belediye hizmetlerinizin sağlanmasına etkisi	1	2	3	4	5
2. Merkezi yönetim ve/veya taşra teşkilatlarının, belediyenizin idari faaliyetlerinin gerçekleştirilmesine etkisi	1	2	3	4	5
3. Merkezi yönetim ve/veya taşra teşkilatlarının, belediye hizmetlerinizin karar alma sürecinde etkisi	1	2	3	4	5
4. Merkezi yönetim ve/veya taşra teşkilatlarının, belediyenizin diğer yerel yönetimler, özel sektör kuruluşları ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarıyla kurduğu işbirliklerine etkisi	1	2	3	4	5
5. Merkezi yönetim ve/veya taşra teşkilatlarının, belediyenizin öz gelirlerine etkisi	1	2	3	4	5
6. Merkezi yönetim ve/veya taşra teşkilatlarının, belediyenize yapılan yardım ve bağışlara olan etkisi	1	2	3	4	5
7. Merkezi yönetim ve/veya taşra teşkilatlarının, belediyenizin aldığı borç ve kredilere olan etkisi	1	2	3	4	5
8. Merkezi yönetim ve/veya taşra teşkilatlarının, belediyenizin gerçekleştirdiği yatırımlara olan etkisi	1	2	3	4	5

25) Bu soru açık uçlu bir soru olup sizden, belediyenizdeki kapasite yeterliliğiyle ilgili görüşlerinizi öğrenmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen, aşağıda verilen kısma, belediyenizin kapasite yeterliliğiyle ilgili düşüncelerinizi yazınız.

Anketin sonuna geldik, anketi doldurduğunuz ve işbirliğiniz için çok teşekkür ederiz. Soru ve önerileriniz varsa, lütfen aşağıda verilen alanda bunları belirtiniz. Eğer çalışmanın sonuçları hakkında bilgi sahibi olmak istiyorsanız, aşağıda verilen iletişim bilgileri üzerinden sorularınızı iletebilirsiniz.

Soru ve önerileriniz:

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BELEDİYE
BAŞKAN YARDIMCISI TARAFINDAN DOLDURULACAKTIR

2

1) **Bu soru belediyenize ait taşınmazların değerini ölçmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen belediyenizin sahip olduğu taşınmazların değerini, 2012 yılı rakamlarına göre denk gelen kutucuklara yazınız.**

	Değer (TL)
Sahip olunan taşınmazların toplam değeri	
Sahip olunan taşınmazlardan, 2012 yılında elde edilen toplam kazanç	

2) **2012 yılına göre, belediyenizin emlak vergisi toplama oranı nedir? Lütfen, 2012 yılı içinde emlak vergisini yatıranların kayıtlı vergi mükelleflerinize oranını yüzde(%) olarak belirtiniz.**

3) **En son bütçe raporuna göre, belediyenizin toplam gelir ve giderleri ne kadardır? Lütfen belirtiniz.**

	Miktar (TL)
Belediye toplam geliri	
Belediye toplam gideri	

4) Bu soru belediyenize ait borçların yapısını öğrenmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen aşağıdaki kutucukları, 2012 rakamlarına göre doldurunuz.

	Miktar (TL)
Belediyenizin toplam borç miktarı	
Vadesi bir sene içinde bitecek toplam borç miktarı	

5) Belediyeniz tarafından alınan borçlar, hangi harcama kalemlerini karşılamak için kullanılıyor? Lütfen aşağıdaki uygun olan seçenekleri, denk gelen kutucuklara çarpı (X) koyarak işaretleyiniz.

Belediyenin idari harcamaları	
Belediye tarafından gerçekleştirilen olağan kamu hizmetleri için yapılan harcamalar	
Altyapı Yatırımları	
Üstyapı Yatırımları	
Gelir Arttırıcı Finansal Yatırımlar	

6) Bu soru belediye iştiraklerinizin yapısını öğrenmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen aşağıdaki kısımları gerekli açıklamaları yaparak doldurunuz.

Belediyenize ait şirketlerin sayısı	
Belediyenize ait şirketlerin toplam değeri (sabit rakamların olmaması durumunda, lütfen yaklaşık bir değer veriniz)	

7) Bu soru belediyenizin fiziksel ve donanım bakımından yeterliliğiyle ilgili görüşlerinizi öğrenmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen aşağıdaki numaralar arasından değerlendirmenizi en iyi yansıtan numarayı yuvarlak içine alın. Verilen ölçeğe göre "1" zayıf, "5" mükemmel olarak değerlendirilecektir.

	Ölçek				
	Zayıf		Orta		Mükemmel
1. Belediyenizdeki bilgisayar ve bilgisayar donanımı yeterliliği	1	2	3	4	5
2. Belediyenizdeki teknik malzeme ve makine donanımı yeterliliği	1	2	3	4	5
3. İnternet bağlantısı ve bilgisayar programı yeterliliği	1	2	3	4	5
4. Belediye çalışanlarının bulundukları ofislerin yeterliliği	1	2	3	4	5
5. Müdürlerin ve başkan yardımcılarının ofislerinin yeterliliği	1	2	3	4	5

8) 2012 Ocak ayından itibaren, hizmet almak amacıyla kaç tane kamu ihalesi açtınız? Bunların toplam değeri ne kadardır lütfen açıklayınız.

2012 yılında açılan toplam kamu ihalesi sayısı	
2012 yılında açılan kamu ihalelerinin toplam değeri (TL)	

9) Diğer belediyelerle, belediyenizin donanım ve malzeme ihtiyacını karşılamak için oluşturduğunuz ortaklıklar var mı? Eğer cevabınız evet ise, lütfen bu ortaklıkların, belediyenizin ihtiyaçlarını karşılamadaki yeterliliklerini, yargınızı en iyi yansıtan numarayı yuvarlak içine alarak değerlendiriniz. "1" en kötü, "5" en iyi olarak değerlendirilecektir.

EVET					HAYIR	BİLMİYORUM
1	2	3	4	5		

10) Diğer belediyelerle işbirliği yapmaktan kaçınmanızın sebepleri aşağıdakilerden hangisi ya da hangileridir? Lütfen, görüşünüzü karşılayan seçeneklerin karşısındaki kutucukları işaretleyiniz.

Var olan yerel yönetimler yasası, belediyeler arasındaki işbirliği konusunda net değil.	☐
Belediyemizde bu tarz bir iş birliğine katkı yapabilecek yeterli çalışan	☐

kapasitesi yok.	
Bu tarz bir işbirliği yapabilmemiz için yeterli bütçemiz yok.	☐
İşbirliği yapmak istediğimiz alanda, işbirliği yapabileceğimiz bir belediye yok.	☐
Diğer belediyelerle işbirliği yapmaktan kaçınmıyoruz.	☐
Diğer (lütfen açıklayınız)	

11) Bu soru, kamu ihale süreçlerinin etkinliğini öğrenmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen aşağıdaki numaralar arasından değerlendirmenizi en iyi yansıtan numarayı yuvarlak içine alın. Verilen ölçeğe göre "1" zayıf, "5" mükemmel olarak değerlendirilecektir.

	Ölçek		
	Zayıf	Orta	Mükemmel

1.	Kamu ihalelerinin tamamlanma hızı	1	2	3	4	5
2.	Kamu ihalelerinin, belediyenizin ihtiyaçlarını karşılama konusundaki yeterliliği	1	2	3	4	5
3.	İlgili mevzuatın yeterliliği	1	2	3	4	5
4.	Kamu ihaleleri ile ilgili belediye personelinin yetkinliği	1	2	3	4	5
5.	Belediyenizin, elektronik ihale yöntemleri konusundaki yeterliliği	1	2	3	4	5

12)Bu soru belediyenizdeki personel yapısını öğrenmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen aşağıdaki kısımları gerekli açıklamaları yaparak doldurunuz.

Toplam belediye personeli sayısı	
Memur statüsündeki personel sayısı	
Sözleşmeli çalışan personel sayısı	
Kadrolu işçi sayısı	
Norm kadro personeli sayısı	
Belediye şirketlerinde çalışan, belediye personeli sayısı	

13)Bu soru belediyenizdeki çalışanların özelliklerini öğrenmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen aşağıdaki kısımları gerekli açıklamaları yaparak doldurunuz.

Teknik hizmetlerdeki toplam sözleşmeli ve kadrolu personel sayısı	
Meslek yüksekokulu ya da lisansüstü eğitim yapmış çalışan sayısı	

8

Kadın çalışan sayısı	
Kadın yönetici (müdür ve başkan yardımcısı) sayısı	

14) Bu soru belediyenizdeki çalışanların ortalama iş tecrübesini öğrenmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen, aşağıda verilen yıl aralıklarına göre, belediye çalışanlarınızın sayısını belirtiniz.

Belediyede çalışılan toplam yıl	**Çalışan sayısı**
0-5 yıl	
5-10 yıl	
10-15 yıl	
15-20 yıl	
20 yıl ve yukarısı	

15) **Bu soru belediyenizdeki müdürlerin ortalama iş tecrübesini öğrenmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen, aşağıda verilen yıl aralıklarına göre, denk gelen müdürlerin sayısını belirtiniz.**

Belediyede çalışılan toplam yıl	**Çalışan sayısı**
0-5 yıl	
5-10 yıl	
10-15 yıl	
15-20 yıl	
20 yıl ve yukarısı	

16) **Belediyenizde, belediye çalışanlarının eğitim ihtiyacını belirleyen yetkili bir birim var mı? Lütfen cevabınıza denk gelen seçeneği işaretleyin.**

EVET	**HAYIR**	**BİLMİYORUM**

17) **Belediyenizin çalışanlarına yönelik bir belediye eğitimi programı var mı? Lütfen cevabınıza denk gelen seçeneği işaretleyin.**

EVET	**HAYIR**	**BİLMİYORUM**

18)2012 yılı içerisinde, belediye çalışanlarına yönelik toplam kaç saat eğitim düzenlediniz? Bu eğitimlere katılan toplam belediye çalışanı sayısını lütfen belirtiniz.

Toplam eğitim saati	
Katılan kişi sayısı	

19)Bu soru belediyenizdeki İnsan Kaynakları Yönetimi'yle ilgili değerlendirmelerinizi öğrenmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen aşağıdaki numaralar arasından değerlendirmenizi en iyi yansıtan numarayı yuvarlak içine alın. Verilen ölçeğe göre "1" zayıf, "5" mükemmel olarak değerlendirilecektir.

	Ölçek				
	Zayıf		Orta		Mükemmel
1. İnsan Kaynakları Yönetim sisteminin yeterliliği	1	2	3	4	5
2. İnsan Kaynakları Yönetimi için geliştirilen planların belediye ihtiyaçlarına cevap vermesi	1	2	3	4	5
3. İnsan kaynaklarından sorumlu birimin yeterliliği	1	2	3	4	5
4. İnsan kaynaklarıyla ilgili stratejilerin uygulanması	1	2	3	4	5
5. Eğitim ihtiyacının takip edilmesi ve değerlendirilmesi	1	2	3	4	5
6. Uygulanan eğitimlerin belediyenin ihtiyaçlarını karşılaması	1	2	3	4	5

20) Bu soru belediyenizdeki işe alım politikalarıyla ile ilgili değerlendirmelerinizi öğrenmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen aşağıdaki numaralar arasından değerlendirmenizi en iyi yansıtan numarayı yuvarlak içine alın. Verilen ölçeğe göre "1" zayıf, "5" mükemmel olarak değerlendirilecektir.

	Ölçek				
	Zayıf		Orta		Mükemmel
1. Belediyenizdeki çalışan sayısının yeterliliği	1	2	3	4	5
2. Belediyenizdeki kalifiye çalışan sayısının yeterliliği	1	2	3	4	5
3. Belediyenizdeki işe alım politikasının etkinliği	1	2	3	4	5
4. İşe alınan kişilerin aranan kriterlere uygunluğu	1	2	3	4	5

21)Belediye personeli eğitimine ayrılmış özel bir bütçeniz var mı? Eğer cevabınız evetse, ne kadarlık bir bütçe ayırdığınızı lütfen belirtiniz?

EVET (lütfen ayrılan bütçe miktarını yazınız)	HAYIR

22)Belediyenizde, çalışanlar için, performans ölçüm kriterleri uygulanıyor mu? Eğer cevabınız evet ise, lütfen hangi seçenekler için uygulandığını işaretleyiniz.

Maaş ödemeleri	
Terfi kararları	
Sözleşme yenilenmesi	
Performans ölçüm kriterleri uygulanmıyor	

23)Belediyenizde, iş tekrarını önlemek için, birimlerin sorumluluk alanlarını düzenleyen bir çalışma planı bulunmakta mıdır? Lütfen cevabınıza denk gelen seçeneği işaretleyin.

EVET	HAYIR	BİLMİYORUM

24) Bu soru belediyenizdeki yönetim sistemleri ile ilgili değerlendirmelerinizi öğrenmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen aşağıdaki numaralar arasından değerlendirmenizi en iyi yansıtan numarayı yuvarlak içine alın. Verilen ölçeğe göre "1" zayıf, "5" mükemmel olarak değerlendirilecektir.

	Ölçek				
	Zayıf		Orta		Mükemmel
1. Belediye çalışanlarının motivasyonlarını arttırmaya yönelik uygulamalar	1	2	3	4	5
2. Liderlik ve yöneticilik eğitimleri	1	2	3	4	5
3. Müdürler ve başkan yardımcıları arasındaki işbirliği ve uyum	1	2	3	4	5
4. Başkan yardımcıları ve belediye başkanı arasındaki işbirliği ve uyum	1	2	3	4	5
5. Müdürlerin ve diğer çalışanların, sorumluluk almalarını teşvik eden uygulamalar	1	2	3	4	5

25)Belediyenizde müdürlükler arasındaki iletişimi sağlamaktan sorumlu ayrı bir birim bulunmakta mıdır? Lütfen cevabınıza denk gelen seçeneği işaretleyin.

EVET	HAYIR	BİLMİYORUM

26) Belediyeniz içinde bilgi paylaşımı için oluşturulmuş bir sistem var mı? Eğer varsa bu sisteme kimlerin ulaşabildiğini lütfen işaretleyiniz?

Belediye Başkanı	
Başkan yardımcıları	
Müdürler	
Memurlar	

27)Bu soru belediyenizdeki iletişim sistemleriyle ile ilgili değerlendirmelerinizi öğrenmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen aşağıdaki numaralar arasından değerlendirmenizi en iyi yansıtan numarayı yuvarlak içine alın. Verilen ölçeğe göre "1" zayıf, "5" mükemmel olarak değerlendirilecektir.

	Ölçek				
	Zayıf		Orta		Mükemmel
1. Müdürlükler arasındaki iletişim	1	2	3	4	5
2. Başkan yardımcılarının müdürlerle olan iletişimleri	1	2	3	4	5
3. Belediye içindeki bilgi paylaşımı	1	2	3	4	5
4. Bilgi ve iletişim donanım sistemlerinin yeterliliği	1	2	3	4	5
5. Toplanan bilgi ve verilerin saklanması	1	2	3	4	5
6. Müdürlükler arası iş bölümü ve paylaşımı	1	2	3	4	5
7. Belediye çalışanlarının, belediye meclisi üyeleriyle olan iletişimleri	1	2	3	4	5

28)Müdürlerle bir ay içinde toplam kaç toplantı yapıyorsunuz? Lütfen gerekli açıklamaları yaparak doldurunuz.

nasıl kuracaklarına yönelik kılavuz ya da eğitim olanakları bulunuyor mu? Lütfen cevabınıza denk gelen seçeneği işaretleyin.

EVET	HAYIR	BİLMİYORUM

30) Belediyenizde, belediye meclisi üyeleri için vatandaşlarla iletişimlerini nasıl kuracaklarına yönelik kılavuz ya da eğitim olanakları bulunuyor mu? Lütfen cevabınıza denk gelen seçeneği işaretleyin.

EVET	HAYIR	BİLMİYORUM

31) Belediyenizde vatandaşların şikâyetlerini ve sorularını bildirebilecekleri bir birim bulunmakta mı? Lütfen cevabınıza denk gelen seçeneği işaretleyin.

EVET	HAYIR	BİLMİYORUM

32) Belediyenize gelen şikâyetlerin kaydedilmesi için elektronik bir kayıt sistemi mevcut mu? Lütfen cevabınıza denk gelen seçeneği işaretleyin.

EVET	HAYIR	BİLMİYORUM

33) 2012 yılı içinde kaç defa seçmenlere yönelik kamuoyu yoklaması yaptınız?

34) 2012 yılı içinde kaç defa belediye hizmetleri konusunda bilgi toplama amaçlı seçmenlere, elden ya da web sayfanız üzerinden bilgi formu dağıttınız?

35) En son bütçenizde "Teknoloji ve iletişim" için bir bütçe ayırdınız mı? Eğer cevabınız evetse, ne kadar bir bütçe ayırdığınızı lütfen belirtiniz?

EVET (lütfen ayrılan bütçe miktarını yazınız)	**HAYIR**

36) Aşağıda verilen stratejik planlama süreciyle ilgili aşamaları, en son stratejik planınızda ne ölçüde gerçekleştirebildiğinizi değerlendiriniz. Lütfen aşağıdaki numaralar arasından değerlendirmenizi en iyi yansıtan numarayı yuvarlak içine alın. Verilen ölçeğe göre "1" zayıf, "5" mükemmel olarak değerlendirilecektir.

	Ölçek				
	Zayıf		Orta		Mükemmel
1. Vizyon, misyon ve stratejik hedeflerin belirlenmesi	1	2	3	4	5
2. Ölçülebilir çıktıların seçilmesi ve hedefler için performans göstergelerinin belirlenmesi	1	2	3	4	5
3. Stratejik planın uygulama sürecinin takibi	1	2	3	4	5
4. Stratejik planın uygulanmasının değerlendirilmesi	1	2	3	4	5

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37)Aşağıda verilen bütçe planı süreciyle ilgili aşamaları, en son bütçe planlamasında ne ölçüde gerçekleştirebildiğinizi değerlendiriniz. Lütfen aşağıdaki numaralar arasından değerlendirmenizi en iyi yansıtan numarayı yuvarlak içine alın. Verilen ölçeğe göre "1" zayıf, "5" mükemmel olarak değerlendirilecektir.

	Ölçek				
	Zayıf		Orta		Mükemmel
1. Bütçe planlamasının hedeflenen sürede bitirilmesi	1	2	3	4	5
2. Bütçe ve harcama planlarının, performans planlamalarına entegre edilmesi	1	2	3	4	5
3. Performans ölçümlerinin, bütçe görüşmelerinde kıstas olarak kullanılması	1	2	3	4	5
4. Stratejik plana uygunluğunun değerlendirilmesi	1	2	3	4	5
5. Sonuç odaklı ücretlendirme, fizibilite analizi, risk değerlendirmesi ve maliyet odaklı muhasebe yöntemlerinin bütçe planlama sürecinde uygulanması	1	2	3	4	5
6. Performans ile ilgili verilerin takibini ve değerlendirmesini sağlayacak donanımların yeterliliği	1	2	3	4	5
7. E-bütçeleme sisteminin yeterliliği	1	2	3	4	5

Anketin sonuna geldik, anketi doldurduğunuz ve işbirliğiniz için çok teşekkür ederiz. Soru ve önerileriniz varsa, lütfen aşağıda verilen alanda bunları belirtiniz. Eğer çalışmanın sonuçları hakkında bilgi sahibi olmak istiyorsanız, aşağıda verilen iletişim bilgileri üzerinden sorularınızı iletebilirsiniz.

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Support Letter from Union of Municipalities of Turkey

T.C.
TÜRKİYE BELEDİYELER BİRLİĞİ
Dış İlişkiler Müdürlüğü

Sayı : M.06.6.TBB.0.76-180 -3376 11/12/2012
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KATHOLIEKE LEUVEN ÜNİVERSİTESİNE

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Bilgilerinize arz ederim.

Hayrettin GÜNGÖR
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doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen en doctoraten in de sociale EN CULTURELE ANTROPOLOGIE

I. Reeks van doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen [(1)]

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13. BANGO, J., *Changements dans les communautés villageoises de l'Europe de l'Est. Exemple : la Hongarie*, 1973, 434 blz.

14. VAN PELT, H., *De omroep in revisie. Structurering en ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden van het radio- en televisiebestel in Nederland en België. Een vergelijkende studie*, Leuven, Acco, 1973, 398 blz.

15. MARTENS, A., *25 jaar wegwerparbeiders. Het Belgisch immigratiebeleid na 1945*, 1973, 319 blz.

16. BILLET, M., *Het verenigingsleven in Vlaanderen. Een sociologische typologieformulering en hypothesetoetsing*, 1973, 695 blz. + bijlagen.

17. BRUYNOOGHE, R., *De sociale structurering van de gezinsverplegingssituatie vanuit kostgezinnen en patiënten*, 1973, 205 blz. + bijlagen.

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25. LEMMEN, M.H.W., *Rationaliteit bij Max Weber. Een godsdienstsociologische studie*, 1975, 2 delen, 354 blz.

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